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Introduction
Maude Toussaint-Comeau
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Bruce D. Meyer
University of Chicago and NBER

On November 15–16, 2007, the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
and the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research cosponsored
a conference at the Chicago Fed, “Strategies for Improving Economic
Mobility of Workers.” The conference’s purpose was threefold: 1) to
bring together researchers, practitioners, and policymakers to discuss
policies affecting low-wage workers and other vulnerable or disadvantaged populations; 2) to identify best practices in workforce development initiatives; and 3) to extract lessons for devising effective policies.
This book is an outgrowth of that conference.
The chapters in this book aim at offering a fresh review of the economic circumstances of disadvantaged segments of our population, as
well as providing a provocative but nuanced assessment of the effectiveness of various policies and practices geared to redress a number of
issues affecting them. Examples of programs discussed include housing
allowances that address the spatial mismatch between poor inner-city
neighborhoods and areas with job growth, education retention programs
and financial aid for older low-income students, employment and training programs for former welfare recipients, and labor market reentry
programs for the hard-to-employ/ex-offenders in distressed communities. This diversity of programs reflects the variety of challenges and
varying issues that vulnerable populations and communities confront; it
also reflects the many creative ways of approaching these problems.
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Chapter Content
The book presents a compilation of chapters from leading experts
commissioned to present papers at the conference, in which they discuss
key ongoing and emerging issues facing policies affecting the poor. The
chapters include studies that address the following specific questions:
• What are the trends in wages, work, occupations, and economic
resources—the “material circumstances” of low-income workers—and what are their implications for economic mobility?
• How effective are the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and
welfare reform in improving the lives of single women with children?
• How well do education retention programs work in meeting the
needs of low-income adults?
• What are the shortcomings of financial aid policies in serving
nontraditional students, and how can policies be altered to better
serve them?
• How effective are residential mobility programs?
• How effective are various workforce investment programs in
linking workers to work and to greater economic opportunities?
• How well do correctional programs work in helping ex-offenders
reenter the labor market?
• In evaluating community-based programs and services, what
should practitioners know about the limits of such evaluation,
and what should they do?
The first part of the book comprises this brief introductory chapter
and the lengthier chapter that follows, which contains an overview of
the research and discussion from the conference. In this introductory
chapter we will quickly run through the book’s authors and their topics, but in the next chapter Maude Toussaint-Comeau will address in
greater detail the specific contributions of the papers that make up this
volume, as well as the substance of the remarks by speakers at the conference. Then she will identify key challenges and opportunities for
moving forward.

Introduction 

The second part of the volume is formed by the 10 remaining chapters; each tackles specific aspects of the questions outlined above.
The first chapters in Part 2 of the volume provide an overview of
the data analyses and research surrounding the trends in the wages,
income, employment, and poverty of low-wage workers in the United
States. These trends provide the background for policy considerations
discussed for the situation of workers today.
David Autor sets out the main facts about the trends in wages and
occupations for low-income workers in his chapter, “Past Trends and
Projections in Wages, Work, and Occupations in the United States.”
Hilary Hoynes, in her chapter, “The Earned Income Tax Credit,
Welfare Reform, and the Employment of Low-Skilled Single Mothers,”
analyzes the trends in employment for less-educated single women with
children in comparison with other groups and discusses the role of the
EITC and welfare reform in shaping these trends.
Bruce Meyer, in “Reflections on Economic Mobility and Policy,”
looks at additional indicators of the overall material circumstances of
workers, including change in consumption as well as income.
One recurring policy topic throughout the conference was access to
education. This is the theme of two chapters, “Low-Wage Workers and
Postsecondary Education Persistence: A Review of Several Community
College Strategies,” by Lashawn Richburg-Hayes, and “Financial Aid
and Older Workers: Supporting the Nontraditional Student,” by Bridget
Terry Long.
Spatial mismatch between residents of the inner city and areas with
job growth remains a potential challenge when it comes to moving
certain segments of workers in the labor market. Housing allowances
and residential mobility programs help potential workers move outside
areas of poverty concentration. James Rosenbaum addresses this subject
in his chapter, “Can Residential Mobility Programs Improve Human
Capital? Comparing Social Mechanisms in Two Different Programs.”
He discusses the results of impact evaluation of two programs, the Gautreaux program and the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) program.
Three subsequent chapters focus on policies and programs that provide employment training and assistance and that generally fall under
the umbrella of workforce development. Collectively, those chapters
offer a provocative look of the state and effectiveness of some major
policies and programs.
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Harry Holzer, in “What Might Improve the Employment and
Advancement Prospects of the Poor?” proposes various potential alternatives and discusses the effectiveness of existing programs that have
been targeted at three different groups: 1) the working poor, 2) disadvantaged youth, and 3) hard-to-employ ex-offenders.
Burt Barnow and Jeffrey Smith, in “What We Know about the
Impacts of Workforce Investment Programs,” discuss the state of knowledge of the effectiveness of various programs, including the Workforce
Investment Act, Job Corps, and Worker Profiling and Reemployment
Services (WPRS). Barnow and Smith also discuss employer-focused
programs, which provide on-the job training (OJT), customized training, and sectoral training.
Continuing with the theme of worker training program evaluation
but targeted at hard-to-employ/ex-offender populations, John H. Tyler
and Jillian Berk discuss research results for programs designed to help
ex-offenders reintegrate into mainstream society in their paper, “Correctional Programs in the Age of Mass Incarceration: What Do We
Know about ‘What Works’?”
Finally, Robert Lalonde discusses the inherent analytical and methodological problems and challenges associated with evaluating the
impact of programs from small, community-based organizations and
makes some recommendations as to what these organizations can do
in his chapter, “Comparing Apples to Oranges When Evaluating Community-Based Programs and Services.”

2
Bringing Together
Policymakers, Researchers, and
Practitioners to Discuss Strategies
for Improving Economic Mobility
Maude Toussaint-Comeau
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

Three principles seem to be broadly accepted in our society: that
economic opportunity should be as widely distributed and as equal
as possible; that economic outcomes need not be equal but should
be linked to the contributions each person makes to the economy;
and that people should receive some insurance against the most
adverse economic outcomes, especially those arising from events
largely outside the person’s control.
—Ben S. Bernanke (2007)
To be sure, Americans have not been obsessed with the distribution of income but have instead placed much greater emphasis on
the need to provide equality of opportunity. But equal opportunity
requires equal access to knowledge. We cannot expect everyone to
be equally skilled. But we need to pursue equality of opportunity to
ensure that our economic system works at maximum efficiency and
is perceived as just in its distribution of rewards.
—Alan Greenspan (2004)

The issue of economic opportunity for the disadvantaged has grown
in importance. It is well known that inequality in economic outcomes
has increased. Those at the lowest end of the wage spectrum, with less
education and fewer skills, have limited opportunities for economic
mobility. These people may be working, but nonetheless they remain
poor.
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The adverse consequences of substandard wages and poverty on
individuals, families, communities, and even the economy are numerous
and interconnected. From a macroeconomic perspective, if increased
inequality is accompanied by considerable decreases in consumption and
in lifetime income for a growing segment of the population, this could
lead to marginalization and welfare losses (Heathcote, Storesletten, and
Violante 2004; Krugman 1994). Growing income inequality reinforces
social ills, including class tensions and residential segregation along
racial and income lines (Freeman 1998; Jencks 2002).
Poorer families generally have little in savings to deal with unanticipated events. That is, they have less of a cushion to absorb exogenous shocks and deal with adverse circumstances, such as a serious
health problem. As noted in Bernanke (2006), based on the Survey of
Consumer Finances, the median net worth for households in the lowest
income quintile—the bottom fifth of the population—was only $7,500
in 2004 versus $93,000 for all families. These households are significantly less likely to maintain a checking or savings account: almost 25
percent of those families were “unbanked,” compared with less than 10
percent of families in the other income quintiles. Low-income individuals without a relationship with the mainstream financial markets may be
at a disadvantage, as it may prove more difficult for them to establish
credit, obtain financing, and build equity.
Living in a poor family increases the chances of living in a poor
neighborhood. For the year 2000, nationwide about 1 in 10 individuals
below the poverty line lived in communities classified as “concentrated
poverty,” where at least 40 percent of the population is poor (Berube
2006). Forty-six of the nation’s 50 largest cities contained at least one
neighborhood that met the 40 percent concentrated poverty threshold.
According to the same author there is a trend toward increased concentrated poverty. Although poverty became less concentrated in certain
neighborhoods within cities during the 1990s, this progress appears to
be threatened by recent dynamics (Berube 2007b).
Ethnic minorities are disproportionately affected by concentrated
poverty in urban areas. While only 13 percent of the U.S. population
is black, just over 65 percent of the population of the urban census
tracts with the worst employment rates is black, and another 18 percent
are members of other minority groups (Dickens 1999). Neighborhoods
with concentrated poverty tend to lack adequate housing, jobs, business
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and financial services, and transportation infrastructure, and as a result
residents tend to face higher local prices for goods and services. Also,
living in distressed neighborhoods increases one’s exposure to health
hazards and violence (Berube 2006). Residents in areas that are characterized by concentrated poverty tend to experience higher unemployment. Some may not have the social networks necessary to find good
jobs, a critical asset since informal referrals tend to be one of the most
popular and potentially most effective ways to connect job seekers and
employers in low-wage markets (Henly 1999). Being socially isolated,
these residents may be more unfamiliar with the demands of employers.
For example, they may not understand the importance of what William
Julius Wilson, in his famous book When Work Disappears: The World
of the New Urban Poor, refers to as soft skills (such as proper work
attire) and a proper work ethic (such as arriving to work on time or notifying employers of absences), both of which could prevent low-skilled
workers in areas of concentrated poverty from finding or keeping a job
(Wilson 1996).
Alex Kotlowitz, the award-winning author and journalist who
chronicled the lives of inner-city youth on Chicago’s South Side, refers
to the “unraveling” of these communities. He writes, “The number one
reason for this unraveling of community has to do with the absence of
work, because . . . work is the very thread that holds [the] social fabric
together. And what we see in these communities where work has disappeared, are communities in which the very institutions that we take for
granted are absent. Often there are no banks, there are no movie theaters, no libraries, no skating rinks or bowling alleys for the kids, there
are few grocery stores . . . there are few restaurants. Again, these neighborhoods are devoid of the very private and public institutions which
help create communities” (Kotlowitz 2008).1 In his keynote address to
the conference Kotlowitz shared the ways in which youth in these communities experience particular challenges as they confront violence, a
lack of role models, low school quality, and lack of employment.
While the employment rates of poor single mothers improved quite
dramatically in the 1990s, the labor force activity of less-educated black
men has been declining for the past several decades (Holzer 2009).
According to research, this lack of access can be attributed to lack
of information, lack of informal contacts, transportation challenges,
employer discrimination, and a variety of additional reasons. Consis-
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tent with Kotlowitz, Holzer notes that the research suggests these young
men, growing up in poor and fatherless families and in highly segregated schools and neighborhoods, become disconnected from school
at very early ages. Once this disconnection occurs, they often fail to
obtain formal work experience. Furthermore, they also become more
likely to engage in other detrimental behaviors, such as illegal activity
and fathering children out of wedlock. Many among these young men
will become incarcerated and also receive child support orders. Upon
release from prison, their ex-offender status will further inhibit their
labor market prospects, as employers are reluctant to hire them. These
individuals are classified as the hard-to-employ.
From a labor market perspective, understanding what happens to the
hard-to-employ is important (Tyler and Berk 2009). As of June 2007,
roughly 1.5 million people are in the nation’s federal and state prisons,
and an additional 2.2 million in jail. Ninety-five percent of these people
will be released from prison, the bulk of them into already distressed
communities. About 650,000 people a year are released from incarceration into our communities and neighborhoods, and they tend to have
low levels of education: 60 percent of the prisoners in state and federal
prisons lack a high school diploma. The outcome of this situation is that
very low-educated, very low-skilled individuals are being released into
a high-skill economy.
How can we address the specific needs of low-wage workers and
households in poor communities and help open the door to greater economic opportunity? This question was explored at the conference mentioned in the introduction, “Strategies for Improving Economic Mobility of Workers.”2 This chapter provides an overview of the research
discussion at the conference and addresses the specific contributions
of the papers included in this volume.3 I conclude with an outline of
the recurring themes of the chapters, drawing from some of the lessons
learned from the diverse perspectives and identifying key challenges
and opportunities.

Strategies for Improving Economic Mobility 

Trends in Work, Wages, and Poverty
Data suggest that a substantial percentage of American citizens are
poor; and that the percentage has remained fairly constant over time.
As shown in Figure 2.1, the percentage of individuals who are poor has
seldom risen above 12 percent or dipped below 10 percent for the past
30 years. The figure also shows that from 1994 onward, more than half
of the poor work during the whole year, and nearly one-quarter work
full-time the whole year.4 They are the working poor.
What are the demographic characteristics of the working poor?
Gleicher and Stevans (2005) find that blacks and Hispanics are twice as
likely as whites to be among the working poor. Less-educated individuals also tend to be more likely to be among the working poor: of those
in the labor force with a college degree, only 1.7 percent are members of the working poor, compared to 15.2 percent of those without
Figure 2.1 Percent of Population under the Poverty Level
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a high school diploma. The working poor tend to have weaker labor
market attachment (i.e., tend to work part-time) and are in occupations
or industries where the average pay is lower—namely, services, sales
and office work, and production. Most of the former welfare recipients
who entered the labor market as a result of changes in welfare policy
in the late 1990s also entered low-wage occupations or industries and
added to the pool of the working poor.
Arguably, the typical poor family appears to have fallen further
behind the average family. Figure 2.2 shows the average real hourly
wages for workers at different quartiles of the wage distribution over
time. On average, workers at the bottom of the income distribution have
not seen their wages grow as fast as those at the top. In fact, the average
wage for those at the bottom is stagnating, indicating increased income
inequality.
David Autor confirms that economic inequality has increased. In his
chapter, “Past Trends and Projections in Wages, Work, and Occupations
in the United States,” he calculates that for 2005 the median real hourly
wage rates for workers in service jobs working full-time was approximately $20,000. He notes that while such an income level would exceed
the poverty threshold of $19,350 for a family of two adults and two
dependent children, this wage is probably insufficient for families to
make optimal investments in child-rearing and education. This suggests
that mobility over the lifetime of family members and across generations could be more limited for such families.
The extent to which families experience economic mobility remains
somewhat unclear. Figure 2.2, since it is based on cross-sectional data,
provides only a snapshot of all workers at different points in time. It
does not convey the extent to which workers are actually experiencing mobility, that is, are moving up (or down) the income ladder over
the course of their lifetimes or across generations. This is important to
know in order to access the extent to which there is actual improvement
in the economic well-being of people. Such a question is best answered
with time-series and panel data that can trace the same individuals over
an extended period of time. These data are more limited, which make
the mobility question harder for researchers to address.
In general, families in the United States experience upward mobility
over the life cycle and across generations (Bernanke 2005). However,
Gottschalk and Danziger (1998) and Gottschalk (1997) examined the

Strategies for Improving Economic Mobility 11
Figure 2.2 Average Real Hourly Wages, 1979–2006 (2005 $)
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extent to which people change positions within the income distribution
and found that mobility patterns have not changed in a way that would
offset rising inequality. Other researchers found, not surprisingly, that
mobility largely depends on the income and education level of the family
to start with. Over the previous 25 years, a child born into a low-income
family had a 20 to 25 percent chance of earning above median income
as an adult and less than a 5 percent chance of moving into the highest
fifth of the income distribution (Hertz 2007; Lee and Solon 2006). It
has also been found that within generations, among families who started
in the bottom fifth of the income distribution in 1988, more than half
remained there in 1998, and fewer than one-quarter managed to achieve
at least middle-income status by the end of the decade (Bradbury and
Katz 2002).5 Aaronson and Mazumder (2008) estimate trends in intergenerational economic mobility and find that mobility increased from
1950 to 1980 but has declined sharply since 1980. Their results suggest
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that earnings are regressing to the mean more slowly now than at any
time since World War II, causing economic differences between families to become more persistent. These studies together provide evidence
that some families in the population have relatively more limited prospects for upward economic mobility.
Individual wage data may not give us the full picture of the true
economic conditions of low-wage workers since families share income
and may receive income assistance and in-kind benefits, such as food
stamps and Medicaid. Bruce D. Meyer makes the point in his chapter, “Reflections on Economic Mobility and Policy,” that we must also
think of the trends in terms of the overall material circumstances of
workers. That is, we should have in mind not only wages, but also food
consumption, housing quality, purchases of other goods, and access to
health care. An important finding from his research is that if we look at
consumption poverty numbers, there are causes to be somewhat more
optimistic about the true material circumstances of people. As explained
in Meyer’s chapter, from 1988 to 2005 the percentage of people who
are poor, as measured by “consumption poverty,” actually has fallen
consistently. Meyer notes that, similarly, the living standards of people
in the United States over time have improved more than official measures suggest, once one accounts properly for inflation. For example, by
2004, while the official income poverty rate was close to 14 percent, if
measured by consumption with an improved measure of price changes
the rate was only 5 percent.
A similar message to Meyer’s comes from Dahl (2007), who shows
that income for low-income families (income including earnings and
assistance such as the Earned Income Tax Credit [EITC], Social Security, child support, and public and subsidized housing) increased on
average from $12,400 in 1991 to $16,800 by 2005. Following the same
female-headed households as well as other types of families over a period of time (from 2001 to 2003), she finds that overall average income
for the low-income families (those in the bottom twentieth percentile)
increased. Averages of course mask differences in the actual experience
of different families. Most of these households did experience improvement in their income: 60 percent of the low-income households with
children experienced income growth from 2001 to 2003. However, 25
percent saw large declines, and 15 percent experienced no changes.
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More research is needed to ascertain whether these income changes
were sufficient to allow these low-income families to make optimal
financial decisions and adequate investment in their children’s future.
We should also consider the extent to which families are able to leverage their resources and, if they are not able to, whether they accumulate
more debt than they can afford. Evidence suggests that this can be the
case. According to analysis of data from the 2004 Survey of Consumer
Finances, lower-income households are less able than others to manage
their debts. A greater fraction of these households had debt-to-income
ratios of 40 percent or more or had a payment at least sixty days past
due (Bernanke 2007).
Dahl’s research shows that 25 percent of families over a two-year
period experienced declines in earnings. We do not know the sources
of these income variations and losses nor do we know the duration.
Some journalistic reports suggest that families have been experiencing greater income risks and uncertainty.6 For example, Gosselin and
Zimmerman (2007) find a substantial increase in the transitory variance of family income over time. Admittedly, as Meyer noted in his
chapter, it is unclear how to interpret trends in “volatility.” There are
many factors that can contribute to temporary variation in income that
do not necessarily convey negative experiences, such as going back to
school or taking time out to raise children. However, concerns arise in
instances where volatility is due to circumstances that negatively affect
workers, such as loss of jobs or job displacement. This could have some
implications for the prospect of economic mobility. Displaced workers
are more likely, in their new positions, to be downgraded relative to
previous earning levels and job quality. They are more likely to suffer
longtime earnings losses and standard of living declines. For society the
loss of the productive capacity of these workers can be costly (Butcher
and Hallock 2004, 2005).
Although Meyer’s research and others’, such as Dahl’s, that has
looked at overall economic resources of low-income households and
has shown improvement over time is encouraging, it does not mean that
there is no need for policy. On the contrary, as Meyer proposes, some of
the policies and initiatives such as the EITC and welfare reform (along
with past economic growth) have worked to some extent and should be
maintained and extended.

14 Toussaint-Comeau

Low-Income Assistance Policy
There have been tremendous changes in policy on income assistance for the poor in recent years, notably welfare reform and the
expansion of the EITC. A good deal of research is being done to evaluate the impact of these programs for families, in particular for single
women with children and for former welfare recipients. Sessions of the
conference discussed these issues. To give a brief background, Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), part of the Social Security
Act of 1935, provided cash assistance to low-income single mothers;
this program was phased out in the 1990s. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) was enacted in 1996. Effective July 1, 1997, Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF) replaced AFDC (as well as the Job Opportunities and
Basic Skills (JOBS) training program of 1988). Welfare reform added
a requirement for individuals to work as soon as they are job-ready or
no later than two years after coming on assistance. It also imposed a
lifetime limit of five years on benefits received from the federal government. The program is funded through block grants to states, so the
states have some latitude in designing their own systems (e.g., Wisconsin Works, WorkFirst), although they have to meet some federal
requirements.
EITC began in 1975 as a program designed to offset payroll taxes
for low-income families with children. It is a refundable federal tax
credit so that if the EITC exceeds the amount of taxes owed, it results
in a tax refund to those who claim and are qualified for the credit. To
become eligible one must have income below a specified amount. The
program was expanded in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) and
again through the Omnibus Reconciliation Acts of 1990 and 1993
(OBRA90, OBRA93).
Hilary Williamson Hoynes gives a brief history of the EITC and
welfare reform and analyzes what they entail for trends in employment.
In her chapter, “The Earned Income Tax Credit, Welfare Reform, and the
Employment of Low-Skilled Single Mothers,” she shows that employment (defined as any work over the prior calendar year) increased by
16 percentage points from 1992 to 1999 for single mothers and by 20
percentage points for single mothers with low education—who tend
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to be more affected by EITC and welfare reform. No such improvement occurred for any other groups. Hoynes argues that it is difficult
to disentangle the effects of EITC, welfare reform, and an expanding
economy, all three of which were happening over the period covered
by her analysis, during which she observed increased employment and
earnings. Empirical research by Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) suggests
that between 1992 and 1996, a period in which employment of single
mothers increased by 8 percentage points, about one-third of those gains
can be attributed directly to the EITC and another one-fifth to welfare
reform. Over the longer period from 1984 to 1996, the EITC might have
been responsible for about 60 percent of the increase in employment.
The implication of these studies is that the EITC has several positive effects. In fact, in his chapter, Bruce D. Meyer proposes expanding
it. Currently the benefit structure is the same for those with three or
more children as for those with two, he notes. He proposes that there
should be a more generous schedule for those families with three or
more children.
An important question concerns the types of employment former
welfare recipients end up taking: are they the types of jobs that truly
help them achieve economic mobility? Research suggests that many
former welfare recipients end up in low-wage service jobs and parttime or temporary jobs. As Autor and Houseman (2007) report, in the
Detroit WorkFirst program in Michigan, a disproportionate number of
workers were placed in the temporary help sector (the authors note that
this is also the case nationwide). While some may view the temporary
help sector as providing a stepping stone toward more permanent and
stable jobs, Houseman and Autor find that temporary placements do not
help workers transition to direct-hire and more stable or regular jobs
and, as such, may not improve long-term labor market outcomes for
these workers.
To assess the effectiveness of work incentive programs, we should
not only focus on impacts on employment and family income, we
should extend our view to look at impacts on child outcomes and what
is happening to parenting and child care arrangements. A number of
income supplement programs and nonearning supplement employment
programs have been evaluated for their effects on children, according to
Greg Duncan.7 The income supplement programs include, among others, the MDRC Welfare-to-Work policy evaluations, which drew data

16 Toussaint-Comeau

from information on about 30,000 children in various programs and
was evaluated with random assignment; Minnesota’s welfare reform
program, called the Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP),
which was also evaluated with random assignment; the Connecticut
Jobs First program, a generous program but with a time limit; and the
New Hope program, a Milwaukee program that had both income supplement and employment features. The employment programs include
a Florida program mandating work and Los Angeles County’s GAIN
(Greater Avenues for Independence) program.
Duncan noted that programs that supplemented income were found
to have impacts on mothers’ earnings (of about $1,000) and on family income (of $2,000). The nonearnings supplement employment programs had a big impact on employment and, as expected, a smaller
effect on earnings (about $720 in this case) and an insignificantly small
effect on family income. The nonearnings supplement programs generally had an insignificant impact on young children. Both the earnings
and the nonearnings supplement sets of programs had negative impacts
on adolescents. The lesson to draw: it is not universally true that these
programs were beneficial for kids.
According to Duncan, the more comprehensive approach of the New
Hope program made it work better, particularly for children. New Hope
was created and backed by a coalition of community activists, business leaders, and academics in Milwaukee. By the time it was launched
in 1994, 1,400 low-income families had volunteered for a chance to
participate. New Hope participants had to show they had worked 30
hours a week or more; then, they were entitled to a suite of benefits:
an earnings supplement that raised income above the poverty line, a
child care subsidy, and a health insurance subsidy. If they could not find
work in the private sector to get up to the 30 hours a week, a temporary
community services job that paid the minimum wage was available.
The program was delivered by the New Hope staff in a very respectful
and competent way. Furthermore, it was available to all adult men and
women, not just mothers with kids; the idea was that anyone who was
working full time and had a low income ought to be eligible for these
kinds of support.
The earnings impact of New Hope was mixed, but it seems to have
benefited single men and children in particular. For certain demographics the impact persisted beyond the three-year demonstration period.8

Strategies for Improving Economic Mobility 17

An important feature of the New Hope model was that it allowed people
to select the benefits that would work best for their family. People were
very strategic about taking up benefits. Most people didn’t take up all
the benefits all the time, but they picked and chose from the potential
benefits that were available and put together a package that made the
most sense for them; sometimes it involved working more, and sometimes it involved working less.

Education—Low-income adult student
retention programs and financial aid
There is general agreement that investment in early childhood education is the most promising venue to enhance human capital. It has
been found to yield very large personal, economic, and societal benefits (Carneiro and Heckman 2002; Karoly, Kilburn, and Cannon 2005;
Sachs and Shatz 1996). Education is one of the cornerstones of American
public policy. Among the education initiatives, the Head Start program,
Project Upward Bound, and, more recently, the No Child Left Behind
Act of 2001, are examples of federal programs that aim at redressing
educational inequality. At the level of higher education, the Education Amendments of 1972 created the Basic Educational Opportunity
Grants, renamed Pell Grants in 1980, which provide federal financial
aid to undergraduates from low-income families.
Edward Lazear, chairman of the President’s Council of Economic
Advisers, in a keynote presentation, “Mobility of Factors of Production
and Economic Growth,” touched on the Bush II administration’s education policy. He argued that the No Child Left Behind Act has been one
of the greatest achievements of the administration, adding, “it made
clear that it is unacceptable for schools to fail to provide the necessary skills to allow their graduates to compete in a modern society.”
Still, Lazear pointed out that a number of academic studies have found
that the students are inadequately prepared from kindergarten through
twelfth grade and that the system is still in need of major improvement
(Lazear 2008).
Although education is unanimously viewed as important, access to
education by low-income students requires the availability of adequate
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financial aid. A report by the Commission on National Investment in
Higher Education found that funding for educational programs has
diminished sharply in recent years. For example, in 1975 Pell Grants
covered about 80 percent of tuition costs. By 1999, that share had fallen
to 40 percent (King 2000). At the same time, it is well known that the
cost of a college education has risen significantly. Such trends would
suggest a compounded problem of access and affordability for poorer
students and those from moderate-income households at a time when
the value of education in the job market is enhanced.
The question remains of how to promote education among adult
low-wage workers whose skills may not be readily transferable or
adaptable to the changing labor marketplace. What type of education
is best for these workers, and how should it be provided? How do we
design financial assistance that will help meet the needs of nontraditional students?
To address these questions, it is instructive to first understand some
of the causes behind the trends in wages and income for low-skilled
workers mentioned and their particular implications. David Autor discusses in his chapter the many factors behind the trends. One factor that
merits attention is the skill-biased technological changes in today’s marketplace.9 Autor points to the fact that hourly wage growth from 1973
through 1989 did indeed fall at the bottom and grow modestly at the
top. However, what is less well known, he observes, is that from 1989
through 2005 wage growth was in fact polarized, with high growth at
the bottom and the top, and little growth between the thirtieth and the
seventieth percentiles. Autor suggests that this trend can be explained
by the growing use of computer technology, which tends to substitute
for workers in accomplishing routine tasks (in the middle), and to complement workers in performing nonroutine, education-intensive, conceptual tasks (at the top).10 Those two mechanisms of substitution and
complementarity explain a preference in the job market for levels of
education (and related job skills) beyond high school. At the same time,
manual jobs are arguably not easily performed by computers; hence the
growth in demand for manual, low-skilled jobs as well.
How should education policy respond to this challenge, Autor asks?
He suggests that we should not necessarily pursue a bimodal human
capital investment strategy of training for bottom jobs and providing
high-level education for an elite group for top jobs. This is because
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although earnings growth in low-education jobs exceeds that in middleeducation jobs, earnings levels are still considerably higher in middlelevel education jobs than in low-level education jobs. Therefore, in
his opinion, universal, high-quality education remains the best public
investment that we can make to foster opportunity, raise earnings, and
increase well-being.
The challenge is to equip workers with the training that will allow
them to adapt to a changing global economy, according to Alan Blinder, in a keynote lecture delivered at the conference.11 Blinder argued
that with advances in information and communication technologies,
the array of services that can be performed outside the United States
continues to expand. Unfortunately, as he noted, we still do not have
reliable data on what jobs and services will be offshored or which ones
will remain. As a result, it remains a challenge to know what specific
training should be provided. In the meantime, it is imperative that we
have some kind of safety net for those workers who get displaced as a
result of outsourcing.12
Community colleges can potentially help redress mismatch of
skills with jobs. In “Low-Wage Workers and Postsecondary Education Persistence: A Review of Several Community College Strategies,”
Lashawn Richburg-Hayes argues that, indeed, community colleges play
a critical role in American higher education, and most importantly for
low-wage workers, who might need to upgrade their skills. But in reality many students, especially low-wage workers, who begin attending
community colleges end up leaving prematurely. Family obligations,
academic underpreparedness, and financial constraints may make this
group particularly vulnerable to retention problems. Hayes describes
various strategies, in particular the Opening Doors Demonstration by
the MDRC, which are in place to improve persistence and retention of
low-wage workers in community colleges.
An important policy topic is the access and affordability of education
and training for low-income adult students. Bridget Terry Long makes
the case in her chapter, “Financial Aid and Older Workers: Supporting
the Nontraditional Student,” that given the importance of education,
particularly postsecondary education, larger percentages of older workers are returning to higher education than ever before. However, these
nontraditional students confront a major hurdle with finances. Simply
put, Long’s research finds that the financial aid system is designed with
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the traditional-age college student in mind and fails to address the needs
of older, nontraditional students. Nontraditional students are often displaced or unemployed workers, or welfare recipients, and often have
dependent children. Financial aid is therefore particularly relevant for
these groups. Yet, Long explains, the different ways in which the design
elements of the current system work, such as how needs analysis is
applied to the nontraditional students and the number of hours needed
to meet enrollment requirements, do not cater to the circumstances of
these students. Long suggests several creative ways to reform the financial aid system and support low-income workers. For example, states
could expand their use of TANF dollars, which currently support only
short-term training, to fund training longer than 12 months. Also, community colleges could create employment-linked programs that could
be supported by the Workforce Investment Act (WIA), as opposed to
the typically brief training programs generally supported by the WIA.

Spatial mismatch—Moving to opportunity
Spatial mismatch between poor inner-city areas (where poor residents are concentrated) and other areas (where there is job growth)
has been heavily documented. As a Brookings Institute report states,
job growth in suburbs “in sectors most vital to low-skilled inner-city
residents” increased at a much faster rate than central city job growth
(Katz and Allen 1999). Transportation remains a problem for many
low-income workers. According to a report by the Century Foundation,
citing research from the Community Transit Association of America,
40 percent of the 10 million daily public transit riders are low-income.
Low-skilled workers who rely on public transportation and who work
evenings or night shifts may in particular confront limitations, as many
of the public transportation systems do not have services during these
odd hours. Those who have to drop off children in day care on their way
to work and pick them up on their way from work may also find it particularly difficult to rely on public transportation (Rhodes and Malpani
2000). Housing and transportation mismatch remains an issue worth
considering as part of a comprehensive strategy to address economic
mobility.
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Spatial economic disparities and concentrated poverty and their
implications for poor residents in distressed communities threaded
through the discussion at the conference. The concept of spatial mismatch can be traced back to a seminal paper by Kain (1968) that suggests that residential segregation (among blacks) in inner-city neighborhoods, combined with dispersal of low-skilled jobs from central cities
to suburbs, could be responsible for higher rates of unemployment and
low earnings of workers in inner cities. This so-called spatial mismatch
between residents in poor inner-city communities and areas with job
growth has captured the attention of researchers and policymakers
alike.13 As Kain (1992) explains, the genesis of the policy interest in
the spatial mismatch problem began in response to sporadic violence
in poverty-stricken neighborhoods throughout the United States that
erupted in the 1960s. As a result, a number of studies were commissioned. The McCone Commission, which studied the causes of the
Watts (Los Angeles) riots in 1965, as well as other studies, such as the
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (the Kerner Commission) in 1968, identified unemployment and lack of access to jobs
as major problems for “isolated” inner-city residents. These kinds of
mismatches were compounded by the fact that poor inner-city residents
relied more on public transportation, and such transportation between
the inner cities and the areas with job growth was often inadequate.
These commission findings prompted a variety of policy suggestions
among researchers and programs to address inner-city poverty and
unemployment arising from spatial mismatch.14
Housing allowances help potential workers move outside areas of
poverty concentration. These residential mobility programs, by moving individuals to better environments, create the potential for very
quick changes in their lives, especially with regard to safety. James E.
Rosenbaum addresses the subject in his chapter, “Can Residential
Mobility Programs Improve Human Capital? Comparing Social Mechanisms in Two Different Programs,” in which he analyzes the effects
of two programs, the Gautreaux Assisted Housing Program and the
Moving to Opportunity (MTO) program. The Gautreaux program was
a court-ordered demonstration project in Chicago that moved lowincome black families from housing projects to two different kinds of
locations—white, middle-income suburbs or black, low-income urban
neighborhoods. Rosenbaum reports that, compared to city moves, the

22 Toussaint-Comeau

suburban moves led children to have better educational outcomes,
mothers to have better employment rates, and both to feel much safer.
The MTO program—a U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development program that offers housing vouchers to families in public housing—is a random-assignment experiment that includes a control
group that didn’t move through MTO. So the MTO program is a more
rigorously designed program than Gautreaux, according to Rosenbaum.
Recent MTO studies have found that residential moves have a small
impact on wages and employment, but have a significant impact on
safety (Liebman, Katz, and Kling 2001). Rosenbaum argues that the differences in the economic outcomes of the two programs could be due to
the differences in the programs themselves. For example, the Gautreaux
program had real estate staff to help people identify units that are not
in low-income enclaves and that are located some 25 miles away from
participants’ old addresses. In addition, participants received counseling advice on locations with better schools and better job opportunities. As a result, people’s moves changed their social experiences—they
were placed in different schools, different labor markets, and engaged
in more positive social interactions with new neighbors. Rosenbaum
draws the following conclusion: building best practices into the program delivery is as important as evaluating the outcome.
Daniel McMillen discussed the papers that were presented on spatial mismatch. Going back to the fundamentals of the premises of spatial mismatch and putting aside for a moment the problem of transportation, he asked, “Why aren’t people simply moving to suburbs where
the jobs are?” His answer: lack of affordable housing in suburbs. Then
he raised the question of why developers weren’t building more lowincome housing in the suburbs. His answer: zoning regulations make it
difficult to build multiple family housing in suburban areas.
“Now that cars are so readily available, why is it so difficult to get
people to commute to work in the suburbs?” McMillen continued. He
argued that either people have social networks in place and are reluctant
to leave their neighborhoods, or they do not have the types of networks
that would provide them with information about where job growth is
taking place. In any case, McMillen said, the kind of (low-skilled) jobs
that are often available may not be worth the fairly expensive and long
commute. So the issue may have less to do with location than with the
mismatch between jobs that pay well and the skills that people have.
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Commuting costs certainly make it harder to take a job in another location, McMillen said, but if the gains (in terms of the pay and the quality
of the job) were big enough, people would move, as migration history
has proven.
From a policy point of view, a clear implication is that one ought
to have an encompassing approach, beyond transportation, to address
the consequences of spatial mismatch, given the multifaceted aspects
of the problem. McMillen proposes allowing more multiunit housing
to be built in suburban locations (in the context of the Chicago housing market). As mentioned earlier, a goal of the conference was to
align research with practice. Frank Beal, executive director of Chicago
Metropolis 20/20, and Robin Snyderman, housing director for the Chicago Metropolitan Planning Council (CMPC), were asked to share their
experiences in addressing spatial mismatch issues.
Beal explained that a few years ago his organization engaged in
efforts that led to the drafting of legislation to mandate that Illinois
develop a state housing plan. Now the state has a plan. “It isn’t action,”
he said, “but at least we have policymakers sensitive to the issue and the
Illinois House and Senate now have committees on housing, and they
didn’t ten years ago.” The state housing policy, Snyderman explained
further, is a comprehensive plan that puts state resources to work on
housing from different perspectives to advance five underserved populations—people who can’t afford to live near their jobs, seniors, people
with disabilities, people struggling with homelessness, and people living in housing that’s at risk of becoming unaffordable to its current
residents. Beal noted that there is also draft legislation to create a new
regional planning agency with accountability for land use that, among
other goals, would take into account the job/housing mismatch. Finally,
working with the State Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity, the Illinois legislature has passed a law that gives incentives to
businesses that locate in job-poor neighborhoods. These organizations
are also working to get more funding for public transit.
Snyderman gave some examples of action plans her organization
is engaged in to respond to the challenge of spatial mismatch.15 First,
CMPC engaged business leaders as active participants and talked to
them about the menu of options and ways they can get involved, either
to help make accessible to people affordable housing that is out there
already, or, more and more, to look at addressing supply-side issues.
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Snyderman said that as a result there were 66 or so other employers
contracting with non-for-profit organizations that assist their employees with affordable housing, and about 1,300 employees had purchased
homes with those employers’ support. Now, Snyderman said, the organization has a tax-credit incentive for other employers who do this and
matching funds for the employees themselves. Finally, Snyderman noted that the bills passed aren’t all about workforce housing. The rental
housing support bill that passed the Illinois state legislature in 2005
provides rent subsidies for people earning less than 30 percent of the
median income for the area.

Workforce Development Policy and Evaluation
Policies and programs that provide a job-centered approach to combating poverty and address specific needs of targeted disadvantaged
individuals generally fall under the umbrella of workforce development.
Some of the major programs started in the 1960s with the Manpower
Development and Training Act (MDTA, 1962–72), the Comprehensive
Employment and Training Act (CETA, 1973–82), and the Job Training
Partnership Act (JTPA, 1982–98). The JTPA was replaced in 2000 by
the current Workforce Investment Act (WIA).
The current WIA operates like the JTPA, which it replaced, as a
joint public/private federal/state/local program.16 The federal government provides most of the money ($3 billion a year). The money is given in block grants to the states, which set up oversight and coordinating
councils of various kinds. Local boards of private and public officials
supervise the activities carried on by the public and private training and
educational institutions that run the programs. One-third of the money
is for adult training for the more disadvantaged. For example, in 2000,
just under $1 billion was spent on 380,000 adults for training, support,
and job placement.
The act provides for work experience and subsidized on-the-job
training (OJT) arrangements. The act also provides for training to workers who were displaced by plant closings or outsourcing by assisting
them with job search and relocation (in the year 2000, about $1.6 billion
went to helping 840,000 displaced workers).
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Critics of the WIA argue that the funding level is not enough and
therefore the program does not cover many who are eligible. Moreover,
the elimination of stipends to program participants, starting in 1982,
caused serious retention problems for program trainees. Some say the
training periods of these programs may be too short to make them effective (training usually lasts on average less than 20 weeks). Furthermore,
some employers may be reluctant to train “less than desirable” workers
for only small and temporary subsidies.
Three chapters in this volume focus on the state of research on
employment and related workforce program evaluations, including
major federal programs like the current WIA and ex-offender reentry
programs such as the Center for Employment Opportunity.
Harry J. Holzer, in “What Might Improve the Employment and
Advancement Prospects of the Poor?” proposes various potential alternatives and discusses the effectiveness of existing programs that have
been targeted to three different groups: 1) the working poor, 2) disadvantaged youth, and 3) “hard to employ” ex-offenders. He suggests that
the prospects of the more disadvantaged would be better served by a
combination of further job training, job placement assistance, and other
supports and services that would promote access to better jobs. One
way this objective is being achieved is with labor market intermediaries (i.e., nonprofit community organizations, or educational institutions
such as some community colleges) that help link workers to existing
jobs and employers. These strategies may include sectoral training programs (in which training is targeted towards key high-demand sectors
in the economy).
Holzer supports prisoner reentry programs, such as the Center for
Employment Opportunity, which provides a paid but temporary transitional job for each participant. He also advocates legislative efforts
to reduce the many legal barriers at the state level that limit employment options for ex-offenders. For disadvantaged youth, Holzer proposes strategies to improve early outcomes and prevent disconnection,
such as youth development efforts aimed at adolescents (for example,
Big Brothers/Big Sisters or the Harlem Children’s Zone); creating
“multiple pathways to success” in high schools, including high-quality Career and Technical Education (CTE) options (such as the Career
Academies) and apprenticeships as well as those stressing direct access
to higher education; “second chance” programs (like YouthBuild and

26 Toussaint-Comeau

the Youth Service and Conservation Corps) and dropout prevention or
recovery efforts; and the resurrection of community-based models like
the Youth Opportunity Program, which created employment centers in
low-income neighborhoods that tracked at-risk youth and referred them
to available services.
Burt S. Barnow and Jeffrey A. Smith focus on the bottom-line question: whether or not the programs have measurable and economically
relevant impacts on labor market outcomes. In their chapter, “What We
Know about the Impacts of Workforce Investment Programs,” they discuss the state of knowledge based on more robust research evaluations
of the effectiveness of various programs, including the WIA, Job Corps,
and Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS). Barnow
and Smith also discuss employer-focused programs, which provide onthe-job training, customized training, and sectoral training.
The WIA currently has no published econometric evaluation, but
in November 2007, the U.S. Department of Labor announced a random
assignment evaluation of the WIA. As for what we know from various
evaluations about the effectiveness of the programs that preceded the
WIA—CETA and JTPA—these programs typically had either no effect
or a very small positive effect. Generally, these employment and training programs work best for adult women and least well for males and
youth.
Job Corps provides vocational and academic activities as well as
support services to disadvantaged youth, ages 16–24. The first key finding is that removing disadvantaged young men from their local neighborhood dramatically reduces their criminal behavior in the short run.
Second, there is a notable effect on educational attainment in the short
run, as measured in terms of hours, literacy and numeracy, and General Educational Development (GED) and vocational certificate receipt.
Third, the Job Corps program generates substantial sustained earnings
impacts for 20–24 year old recipients, but not for younger recipients.
Barnow and Smith argue that this program is fairly costly and may not
pass cost/benefit tests, though it may be worth continuing on equity
grounds.
The WPRS system assigns mandatory reemployment services to
new Unemployment Insurance (UI) claimants predicted to have long
spells of benefit receipt or high probabilities of benefit exhaustion. The
research suggests that the WPRS system reduces UI usage without
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imposing a large cost on referred claimants through lower quality job
matches. The program also has a substantial effect relative to its (very
small) cost, with that effect consisting largely of a deterrent effect—
some claimants immediately find employment upon receiving notice of
the requirement that they receive services.
On-the-job training (OJT) can be attractive to employers because
it reduces their costs; they usually pay only about half the wages and
they incur less risk: because the trainees are not real employees until
after the OJT period is up, employers can dismiss them if they choose.
Customized training programs are ones where the employer has a lot
of input into the training. The employer approves and actually develops the curriculum for the training. The employer has the authority to
establish the eligibility criteria in terms of who can go into the program,
and there’s generally a commitment by the employer to hire successful program completers. Case studies have indicated that the placement
rates are 80 to 90 percent, as Barnow noted during his presentation.
Similarly, sectoral training programs also involve customized training
but aim at a whole industry, such as construction.
Barnow and Smith note that most evaluations suggest positive impacts of OJT on participant employment and earnings. But
three qualifications should be noted: first, none of the OJT evaluations have used random assignment; second, it is expensive to
set up these on-the-job training slots; and, third, on-the-job training can be abused—it can basically pay employers for what they
would have done anyway. Barnow illustrated this in his presentation
with a quick example: while visiting an OJT site, “an employer . . .
pointed out that his program used to have a six-month dishwasher
on-the-job training program,” and clearly, he said, it does not take six
months to learn to wash dishes. Barnow concludes, “We need to monitor [OJT programs] to make sure that [OJT] is not just welfare for the
corporations.”
Continuing with the theme of work training program evaluation but
targeted to hard-to-employ and ex-offender populations, John H. Tyler
and Jillian Berk discuss the research results on programs designed to
help ex-offenders reintegrate into mainstream society. The programs
include the Center for Employment Opportunities (CEO) program and
the Serious and Violent Offender Reentry Initiative (SVORI). Their
chapter, “Correctional Programs in the Age of Mass Incarceration: What

28 Toussaint-Comeau

Do We Know about What Works?” also discusses research findings on
the effect of education and vocational programs on ex-offenders’ earnings, based on administrative data from the state of Florida.
Berk and Tyler report the results of the first year after random assignment for the CEO evaluation. They qualify the results on employment
as being “not impressive.” The treatment group does not seem to do
well past the transitional jobs in terms of enhanced probability of being
employed. However, the CEO program seems to be more effective for
offenders who come to the program and get employment assistance
soon after release. Furthermore, early results of the CEO evaluation
show that program participation reduces recidivism but has no employment effects. As for the SVORI program, it has smaller impacts. Tyler
and Berk contend that the important lesson to be learned is that in reality there is a “paucity of programs in prison” (the prisoners do not really
participate in the programs) and that this is not surprising, given that the
institutional realities of prisons and prison life make it difficult to deliver rehabilitative programs as originally designed. The SVORI program
has a small impact because the program is small. The actual services
are far below what is needed: prerelease, only 39 percent of the treatment group and 24 percent of the comparison group had received any
employment, education, or skill-building services. Postrelease, only 15
percent of the treatment group and 24 percent of the comparison group
received any services.
Reinforcing Tyler and Berk’s arguments, Kristin F. Butcher, who
served as discussant for the session on research evaluation, said that we
must ask whether in some cases there is in fact a program at all. Butcher
explained that when she worked for the MacArthur Foundation and was
looking into prison program funding, she visited a number of prisons
in Illinois. In one prison she saw a huge machine for doing computeraided design. “It looked hard to operate, and it looked really like something that took training to use,” she said, “and that if you knew how
to use that, you could get a real job, and that would be good.” Butcher
asked someone, “How do you select who gets trained on that machine?”
The response was, “We train the lifers.” “Why do you train the lifers?” she asked. “Because it takes a long time to train the people on the
machine, and we don’t want to train somebody and have them leave,”
the person said. Tyler and Berk note that when one looks at people who
go into prison industries and compares them with those who do not, one
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may not see very big effects. Butcher said this could be explained by
the fact that for most of the people who are getting out, even if they’ve
participated in prison industries, there is no incentive for those prison
industries to train them in the more skilled jobs.
On a broader sense, Butcher agrees that we must have more realistic
goals concerning programs, especially since very often the expenditures (per participant) of typical programs are quite small. To illustrate,
a Job Search Assistance program, the Louisville Work Incentive (WIN)
laboratory experiment, which was rigorously evaluated, was found to
have effects that exceeded its costs, but the costs of this program were
pretty small—net cost was $223 per participant in 2007 dollars. The
National Supported Work Demonstration was found to have a fairly
big impact in terms of income, which exceeded its costs, but its net
cost per participant was also much higher at $11,000 (LaLonde 1995).
The implication is that with a federal poverty threshold of $20,516 for
a family of four (in year 2006), the chances that a program like the Job
Search Assistance program, with an expenditure of $223 per participant, would get somebody out of poverty are very low.

Community-Based Program Services
and Evaluation
Robert J. LaLonde provides a nuanced view of program evaluation.
In “Comparing Apples to Oranges when Evaluating Community-Based
Programs and Services,” he discusses the inherent problems and challenges associated with evaluating the impact of programs from small,
community-based organizations.
As he illustrated in his presentation at the conference, a government
employment training program raises annual income by about $1,000 per
year (according to research, for women that’s a pretty fair assessment
of what programs provide). These programs typically combine general
skills, vocational skills, and also job-search assistance. Let’s suppose
that the cost of producing these programs is $5,000 per year (to give a
high estimate of how much these programs really cost). Ignoring other
indirect costs and what economists call opportunity costs, the question
is, is this $1,000 impact per year permanent? Will earnings increase by
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$1,000 per year every year for the rest of the person’s career? (Research
has found that these programs typically have an impact for women who
are about 30 years old, and this is the only group that, according to
research, will work consistently for another 30 years.) One must think
of this initial cost of providing the service to that woman as an investment, a stock, LaLonde says: if you go through the calculation, you
will find that the real rate of that return is 25 percent, which is huge. It’s
far better than a year of schooling. So a $1,000 impact is quite a large
impact, if it can persist.
But the problem, LaLonde points out, lies in trying to reach the
point of being able to say that the program impact is going to be $1,000
a year and the program is therefore a good and effective program. Doing
so is hard because of several analytical problems. First, there is the
problem of missing data. One might ask, “Why is the program operating in community A—is it due to strong community leaders compared
to community B, which does not have the program?” In such a case,
one could expect their outcomes to differ even if the program had no
impact on community A. The challenge then comes from the fact that
the evaluation is unable to account for these decisions. Second, there is
a selection problem among evaluators, which arises from the following two possibilities: 1) participants choose to participate in programs
based on their own assessments of whether they will benefit from them,
or 2) program operators select applicants that they believe will benefit
from the program. In other words, as Butcher, the session discussant,
noted, in evaluations we want to ask these questions: How do we know
a program works? What is the counterfactual? Wouldn’t the participant
have made progress anyway? These are very difficult questions; nevertheless, they are important to address given that the programs entail
spending public monies.
LaLonde’s chapter recommends that small organizations should
not focus on impact evaluation or cost-effectiveness, but simply on
measuring and collecting data on program services. He argues this can
provide valuable information about how the program operates or how
services are delivered and the challenges that need to be overcome in
order to affect recipients’ outcomes. At the very least this information
can improve program management. This information also is essential
for considering whether it is appropriate and a good use of resources to
initiate an impact evaluation of these programs and services.
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As mentioned above, one goal of the conference was to align the
interests of researchers and practitioners. We asked Edwin Meléndez,
who has also been in positions where he spearheaded specific work
development programs, to discuss program service delivery from a
research and practice perspective. Meléndez noted that these programs
vary tremendously not only in the resources they use but also in the
practices they implement and how they actually think about the factors
that affect outcomes. An example is labor market intermediaries. Intermediaries are in essence “firms” that mediate the collective actions of
employers in the provision of general training. Some of them are very
effective in bringing employers together to structure a training program.
In terms of the practices they implement, some are too specific to be
replicable in other industries. Many intermediaries are very contextdependent, and practices in one industry are likely to be ineffective in
others. We have a highly disconnected system, Meléndez said: “Intermediaries have scrap money from all kinds of places.”
The problem of coordination raised by Meléndez corroborates comments made by Bob Giloth, who talked about the problem of “multiple
silos” in the workforce development field. Giloth illustrates the scope of
the problem: “A few years ago, GAO counted a hundred different federal workforce programs. Pennsylvania alone had 49. In neighborhoods,
you often see seven or eight public investors spending $8 million to
$10 million with different, unrelated objectives, and different perceptions of the problem.” He adds: “It is important to make these pieces
work together, because it’s not simply an inefficient use of money, it
means that the transitions for a lot of the folks we work with are not
well crafted.”
One final challenge Meléndez noted is that we need more effort
to create ongoing evaluation mechanisms, with practitioners thinking
about the logic of the service model that affects outcomes for participants. Learning about effective program design and practices works
best when these are embedded within the program and function on dayto-day operations. Practitioners have to be trained to be critical thinkers
who can incorporate analysis, systematize data collection, implement
effective practices, and reflect on what they do. Success depends on
empowering the staff on the front line to assess and change the program as they implement it and to effect change in the services that they
deliver.
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Conclusion
Opportunities and Challenges
In conclusion, I outline below challenges and opportunities we face
as we move forward in addressing the economic mobility of workers. I
draw from the research findings as well as the more compelling examples of best practices, program evaluations, and social and institutional
challenges illustrated by researchers and practitioners.
Educating and training workers to redress mismatch of skills
with jobs
The chapter by David Autor highlights that job growth will be concentrated among both highly education-intensive “abstract” jobs and
comparatively low-education “manual” jobs. This bifurcation presents
both challenges and opportunities. As Autor says, the rising productivity
of highly educated workers is good news. But the growing importance
of manual and service tasks presents a challenge. As he points out, “the
positive news about rising demand for in-person service occupations is
that it will tend to increase the earnings of less-educated workers. The
less favorable news is that wages for those at the bottom will remain
low and will not be enough to ensure mobility for these workers. This
result suggests that it is still important to improve economic opportunities for these workers.
From an education policy perspective, although earnings growth
in low-education jobs exceeds that in middle-education jobs, earnings
levels are still considerably higher in middle- than in low-education
jobs. Such investment in high-quality universal education remains vital
to endow future workers with better earnings prospects when they later
enter the workplace. On an immediate basis, the question remains how
to promote education among adult low-wage workers whose skills may
not be readily transferable or adaptable to the changing labor market.
Advances in information and communication technology are changing the labor market in an unpredictable fashion. For example, the range
of services that can be outsourced and performed outside the United
States continues to expand, as Alan Blinder discussed. Consequently,
many workers will become displaced. The effects of this are uncertain.
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To the extent that resources are reallocated to areas where we have comparative advantage, it is possible that the net effect on jobs in the future
could still be positive. However, it is also possible that the loss of jobs,
if not addressed, could lead to downward economic mobility of workers
and large societal losses. It is challenging at best to predict what specific
jobs in what industries and occupations will see rises or declines in the
future, and when and how to equip workers with the training that will
enable them to adapt to a changing economic landscape.
Vocational education opportunities, such as community college
education and job training programs for adult workers and nontraditional students, must be part of a comprehensive strategy to address
mismatches between job requirements and worker skills. The challenge
remains to improve retention in educational programs and ensure accessibility and affordability for many low-wage working students and nontraditional students who could benefit most by enhancing their skills.
Several creative suggestions, such as tying low-income assistance dollars (TANF and WIA) to longer community college training, have been
offered.
Extending low-income assistance like the EITC and supporting
work in a comprehensive manner
Programs such as the EITC that provide support and incentives
for employment have been shown to increase earnings and employment. This result was particularly evident for former welfare recipients
and single women with children when the economy was healthier. It
remains a challenge for policymakers to structure income redistribution
programs like the EITC in a way that retains incentives for productive work. Currently, researchers suggest the possibility that the EITC
(which is available only to working taxpayers) could lead individuals
who are in the phaseout region of the credit to reduce the number of
hours worked. Even so, most experts agree that the EITC should be
continued and even expanded. A number of groups, such as single men,
single women, and some low-income married couples, do not benefit
from the current EITC structure. Moreover, the current benefit structure
is the same for a family with three or more children as it is for one with
two children—although it has been found that the former have fewer
resources to devote to food, housing, and other consumption items compared to single mothers with two or fewer children. The EITC should
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be expanded for these larger families. Indeed, it will be important to
consider amounts by which the EITC should be expanded.
Earnings supplement programs (which encourage work by either
directly subsidizing earnings or easing the benefit reductions from the
welfare system) do not only affect a family’s income, they have been
found to have generally positive developmental effects for young children. Early childhood seems to be a particularly sensitive period, when
a higher income can allow families to avail themselves of higher-quality
child care and provide more learning tools at home. As such, earnings
and employment programs that approach mobility in a broader sense—
those that target intervention to match the various needs of low-income
families to balance their lives, such as programs with child care components—remain possibly one of the best ways for society to allocate its
scarce resources.
There are many promising and innovative for-profit and nonprofit efforts and programs, which generally come under the umbrella
of workforce development, that help connect low-wage workers and
more disadvantaged workers, including hard-to-employ ex-offenders,
to greater economic opportunities. Most practitioners agree that workforce development programs work best when they are woven into an
overall strategy to address the multipronged issues that prevent employment and result in economic distress. A combination of simultaneous
efforts is likely to work best. These efforts would include addressing
transportation, housing, and child care needs, as well as an emphasis on
early prevention, job training, and placements into high-quality jobs.
Addressing the spatial mismatch between inner cities and areas
with job growth
Spatial mismatch between residents in the inner city and areas
with job growth remains a potential problem. Housing allowances help
potential workers move outside areas of minority and poverty concentration. These residential mobility programs, by moving individuals
to better environments, create the potential for quick changes in their
lives, especially with regard to heightened safety.
Attention must be given to how the housing voucher programs are
crafted procedurally in order to ensure changes in labor market outcomes. One best practice noted is the necessity to incorporate counseling in service delivery.
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Consideration must also be given to the supply side aspect of the
housing mismatch problem, i.e., where people can afford to move and
can be accepted. Efforts are needed to ensure greater affordability of
housing in suburban job centers. Other possible responses include giving incentives to businesses to locate in poorer communities, and working with businesses to ensure affordable housing for their workers.
Evaluate the effectiveness of workforce development program
and service delivery
While a number of employment and related workforce development
programs have been evaluated, the cost-effectiveness of many programs
has still not been established. Some programs may have high costs but
still be viable on grounds of equity. Other programs have expenditures
(per participant) that are quite small. Thus, even if they are effective,
given the small level of funding, they may not be sufficient to lift people out of poverty. Policymakers must grapple with difficult choices,
inherent in income redistributive initiatives, to ensure that they strike
the right balance between upholding the right economic incentives for
productive behaviors while providing insurance against economic and
financial risks (Bernanke 2007).
Often community-based organizations are required by foundations
and other entities that fund them to demonstrate a measurable impact of
their programs. For example, an organization that is providing training
to former welfare recipients may be called on to demonstrate the effectiveness of its training programs. With scarce resources on the line, it is
reasonable to ask whether programs have measurable and economically
relevant impacts. While this is a legitimate question, inherent problems
with evaluation make it in some cases impractical for small, community-based organizations to engage in rigorous evaluation. For small,
community organizations running workforce development programs,
even if rigorous impact evaluation may not be feasible, measuring and
collecting data on program services is still worthwhile. Practitioners
trained and equipped to gather information can improve program management and help determine whether further assessment is necessary.

Final Thoughts
The conference “Strategies for Improving Economic Mobility of
Workers,” on which this book is based, was unique in that it brought
together groups of researchers and practitioners, individuals who too
often do not come together, yet have a lot in common. The mixing of perspectives can be extremely helpful and enlightening, yet few opportunities exist to capture these diverse points of view. In the short term, these
exchanges may have generated more questions than answers. However,
I hope that the information in this book will spur more research on
this important topic, and, even more importantly, will encourage more
mutually beneficial interactions among researchers, practitioners, and
policymakers.

Appendix 2A
Conference Agenda
Welcoming remarks by:
Charles L. Evans, president and chief executive officer,
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Randall W. Eberts, president, W.E. Upjohn Institute
for Employment Research
Day 1
Session I: Setting the Stage–Trends in Work, Wages, and Poverty
Chair: Maude Toussaint-Comeau, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Presentations by:
David Autor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Alan Berube, Brookings Institution
Peter Gosselin, Los Angeles Times
Session II: Spatial Mismatch—Moving to Work,
Networks, Business Incentives
Chair: William Testa, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Presentations by:
James E. Rosenbaum, Northwestern University
William Spriggs, Howard University
Frank Beal, Chicago Metropolis 2020
Robin Snyderman, Metropolitan Planning Council
Discussant: Daniel McMillen, University of Illinois at Chicago
Session III: Income Support, EITC, Welfare-to-Work
Chair: Bhashkar Mazumber, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Presentations by:
Molly Dahl, Congressional Budget Office
Hilary Williamson Hoynes, University of California, Davis
Susan Houseman, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Discussant: Thomas DeLeire, University of Wisconsin–Madison
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Session IV: Workforce Development—The Power of Public/Private
Partnerships
Chair: Maria Hibbs, The Partnership for New Communities
Panelists:
Evelyn Diaz, Mayor’s Office, City of Chicago
Donald Sykes, Mayor’s Office, City of Milwaukee
Robert Straits, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Brenda Palms-Barber, North Lawndale Employment Network
Bob Giloth, Annie E. Casey Foundation
Keynote address: Alex Kotlowitz
Keynote lecture: Alan S. Blinder, Princeton University
Day 2
Welcoming Remarks: Daniel Sullivan, Senior Vice President
and Director of Economic Research
Session 1: Evaluations of Training and Vocational Programs
Chair: Alicia Williams, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Presentations by:
Robert J. LaLonde, University of Chicago
Burt S. Barnow, Johns Hopkins University
John H. Tyler, Brown University
Discussant: Kristin F. Butcher, Wellesley College
Session 2: Financial Aid, Education, Employment Prospects
Chair: Lisa Barrow, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Presentations by:
Harry J. Holzer, Georgetown University
Bridget Terry Long, Harvard University
Lashawn Richburg-Hayes, MDRC
Session 3: Where to Go from Here—Policy Panel
Chair: Unmi Song, Lloyd A. Fry Foundation
Panelists:
Bruce D. Meyer, University of Chicago
Greg Duncan, Northwestern University
Edwin Meléndez, New School University
Keynote address: Edward Lazear, chairman,
President’s Council of Economic Advisers
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Notes
The views expressed are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago or the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
I thank Ludovic Comeau Jr. for planting the seed of the idea of the conference in my
mind and for valuable assistance. I thank Alicia Williams, Dan Aaronson, and Bruce D.
Meyer for valuable comments and suggestions.
1. The full text of his essay is contained in the September 2008 issue of Profitwise News
and Views, a newsletter published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s Consumer and Community Affairs Division. It can be found at http://www.chicagofed
.org/community_development/files/PNV_Sep2008_ReEd_FINAL_WEB.pdf
(accessed April 28, 2009).
2. For the conference agenda, see Appendix 2A.
3. This chapter makes specific mention of and reviews presentations that were given
in a formal manner. Although not discussed in this chapter, a panel of practitioners
at the conference talked about their programs in a less structured format. They
include Evelyn Diaz, deputy chief of staff to Mayor Daley; Bob Giloth, director
of Family Economic Success at the Annie E. Casey Foundation; Don Sykes, president and CEO of the Milwaukee Area Workforce Investment Board; Bob Straits,
administrator of the W.E. Upjohn Institute and director of the Kalamazoo County
and St. Joseph County Michigan Works Agency; Brenda Palms-Barber, CEO of
the North Lawndale Employment Network in Chicago; and Maria Hibbs, executive director of the Partnership for New Communities, who served as moderator
for the practitioner panel. See my article in the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s
Consumer and Community Affairs publication Profitwise News and Views, September 2008, for a detailed description of their programs and related comments
(Toussaint-Comeau 2008).
4. A low-wage worker, or a member of the working poor, is defined as one who
works at least 37 weeks a year but whose total annual family income falls below
the federal poverty level (an annual threshold based on census data). In 2005, this
figure was $15,735 for a family of three.
5. Cited in Berube (2007a).
6. See for example, Hacker (2006) and Gosselin (2005).
7. Greg Duncan made these comments at the “Strategies for Improving Economic Mobility of Workers” conference as one of the panelists (along with Bruce
D. Meyer and Edwin Meléndez) in the last session, “Where to Go from Here—
Policy Panel.” This panel helped synthesize the messages from the papers and
presentations.
8. Greg Duncan led the evaluation of the program. See Duncan, Huston, and Weisner
(2007).
9. Debates about causes of the trends in wage inequality are plentiful. More recent
trends in wage inequality have been linked to a number of factors. To mention
a few, Pierce (2001) suggests that nonwage compensation patterns contribute to
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10.

11.

12.

13.
14.

increased inequality in total compensation. That is, nonwage income and benefits,
which primarily go to high-wage workers, have increased with such significance
in recent decades that they also are contributors to the spread between top and
bottom wage levels. Other arguments point to institutional factors instead, such as
decrease in unionization. For example, Card, Lemieux, and Riddell (2003) suggest that the deceleration of unionization rates in the 1970s and 1980s has negatively impacted earnings equality. Various aspects of globalization have also been
reported to be linked to wage inequality (Sachs and Shatz 1996). Interestingly, the
lack of uniformity in wage distributions has been traced as far back as the beginning of the twentieth century (Steelman and Weinberg 2005). In the 1900s wage
inequality widened because of the introduction and increased use of electricity and
new machineries, which decreased the demand for ordinary laborers. However, by
the middle part of the century, demand- and supply-side factors (e.g., increases in
the supply of college-educated workers and an upsurge in the demand for laborintensive skills) depressed wages at the top and caused “compression” in the wage
structure, thus reducing inequality. The trend towards wage dispersion resumed
only around the 1970s, when information technology started spreading.
Some authors suggest that the increase in the wage gap in the 1980s may have
been a temporary shock. They point to the fact that the 1990s experienced more
modest growth in wage inequality despite the fact that there was strong technological progress (Card and DiNardo 2002; Lemieux 2006). Another argument that
challenges the skill-biased technological growth idea is the occurrence of residual
inequality, that is, inequality within groups with similar education or experience.
For example, people with the same level of education may have differences in
wages—although some might argue that these differences may be due to unobservable characteristics, such as school quality or motivation of workers.
The keynote presentation was based on two Princeton University Center for
Economic Policy Studies working papers: “How Many U.S. Jobs Might Be Offshorable?” (Blinder 2007a) and “Offshoring: Big Deal or Business as Usual?”
(Blinder 2007b).
Trade adjustment assistance and unemployment insurance are ways to address
workers’ displacement. Title III of the Work Investment Act provides for the Dislocated Worker and Employment and Training activities, which allocate about $1
billion a year to helping workers who are displaced by plant closings or outsourcing. It does this by providing them with job search and relocation allowances and
trade adjustment allowances after their unemployment insurance has run out, so
long as the individuals show proof of continuing certified training (Page and Simmons 2002).
A comprehensive summary of the academic literature on the spatial mismatch
hypothesis is provided in Kain (1992).
For example, Hughes (1989) outlines the following mobility strategies to combat
spatial mismatch: 1) provision of job training to the would-be workers for suburban labor market–specific jobs in retail, back office, etc.; 2) creation of a job
information system to match the residents to suburban employers; 3) restructuring the transportation system; 4) provision of day care facilities and subsidies
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to parents of young children; 5) increasing the level of earned income tax credit
for the low-income in entry-level jobs; and 6) modifying policing and correctional practices to protect residents in the ghetto from predatory criminals in
their midst. Some of Hughes’ policy prescriptions were also offered by Kain and
Persky (1969) much earlier. In addition, Kain in various publications recommended some more entrenched measures. In the area of schooling, Kain proposed various strategies to ensure increased integration of schools, including busing and giving generous federal or state subsidies that pay participating suburban communities significantly more than the marginal costs of educating minority children from
the central cities. In the area of housing he advocated the following: 1) aggressive
enforcement of federal, state, and local fair-housing statues and strong enforcement of HUD affirmative marketing plans for federally assisted rental housing;
2) continued efforts to provide scattered-site public housing and a prohibition
on the construction of new subsidized units in minority neighborhoods; and 3) a
housing allowance that would allow minorities to move outside of areas of minority concentration to reduce racial segregation.
15. The Metropolitan Planning Council is a regional policy-advocacy and technicalassistance organization that broadly focuses on the issues of sensible growth, economic competitiveness, and equity of opportunity. Created in 1934, it was originally called the Metropolitan Housing Council.
16. The description of the WIA in this section is drawn from Page and Simmons
(2002).

References
Aaronson, Daniel, and Bhashkar Mazumder. 2008. “Intergenerational Economic Mobility in the United States, 1940 to 2000.” Journal of Human
Resources 43(1): 139–172.
Autor, David H., and Susan N. Houseman. 2007. “Do Temporary Help Jobs
Improve Labor Market Outcomes for Low-Skilled Workers?” PowerPoint
Presentation at the Chicago Federal Reserve and Upjohn Institute conference “Strategies for Improving Economic Mobility of Workers,” held in
Chicago, IL, November 15–16. http://www.chicagofed.org/community_
development/files/11_2007_houseman_ppt_pres_session3.pdf (accessed
April 28, 2009).
Bernanke, Ben S. 2005. “Economic Opportunity.” Speech given at the National Economists Club, Washington, DC, October 11. http://cssp.us/pdf/
Bernanke on Economic Opportunity.pdf (accessed February 3, 2009).
———. 2006. “Increasing Economic Opportunity: Challenges and Strategies.” Speech, Fifth Regional Issues Conference of the Fifteenth Congressional District of Texas, Washington, DC, June 13. http://www
.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/Bernanke20060613a.htm (accessed
February 3, 2009).

42 Toussaint-Comeau
———. 2007. “The Level and Distribution of Economic Well-Being.”
Speech given before the Greater Omaha Chamber of Commerce, Omaha, NE, February 6. http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
bernanke20070206a.htm (accessed February 3, 2009).
Berube, Alan. 2006. “Metropolitan Poverty in the United States.” Presentation at the Cambridge-MIT Institute’s “Poverty and Place Workshop,”
Cambridge, UK, September 28. http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/
20060928metropolitanpolicy_berube.aspx?rssid=welfare (accessed February 4, 2009).
———. 2007a. “The Geography of U.S. Poverty and Its Implications.” Testimony before the Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on
Income Security and Family Support. U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. 110th Cong., 1st sess. http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2007/
0213childrenfamilies_berube.aspx (accessed April 1, 2009).
———. 2007b. “Geographic Dynamics in Income and Poverty: Recent U.S.
Trends.” PowerPoint presentation at the Chicago Fed and Upjohn Institute
conference “Strategies for Improving Economic Mobility of Workers,” held
in Chicago, IL, November 15–16. http://www.chicagofed.org/community_
development/files/11_2007_berube_ppt_pres_session1.pdf (accessed April
1, 2009).
Blinder, Alan S. 2007a. “How Many U.S. Jobs Might Be Offshorable?” CEPS
Working Paper No. 142. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University. http://www
.princeton.edu/~blinder/papers/07ceps142.pdf (accessed April 28, 2009).
———. 2007b. “Offshoring: Big Deal, or Business as Usual?” CEPS Working Paper No. 149. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University. http://www
.princeton.edu/~blinder/papers/07juneCEPSwp149.pdf (accessed April 2,
2009).
Bradbury, Katharine L., and Jane Katz. 2002. “Women’s Labor Market Involvement and Family Income Mobility When Marriages End.” New England
Economic Review 2002(4): 41–74.
Butcher, Kristin F., and Kevin F. Hallock. 2004. “Job Loss: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Responses.” Chicago Fed Letter 2004(207): 1–4.
———. 2005. “Bringing Together Policymakers, Researchers, and Practitioners to Discuss Job Loss.” Economic Perspectives 2005(2): 2–12.
Card, David, and John E. DiNardo. 2002. “Skill-Biased Technological Change
and Rising Wage Inequality: Some Problems and Puzzles.” Journal of
Labor Economics 20(4): 733–783.
Card, David, Thomas Lemieux, and W. Craig Riddell. 2003. “Unionization
and Wage Inequality: A Comparative Study of the U.S., the U.K., and Canada.” NBER Working Paper 9473. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of
Economic Research.

Strategies for Improving Economic Mobility 43
Carneiro, Pedro, and James J. Heckman. 2002. “The Evidence on Credit Constraints in Post-Secondary Schooling,” NBER Working Paper 9055. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Dahl, Molly W. 2007. “Changes in the Economic Resources of Low-Income
Households with Children.” PowerPoint presentation at the Chicago Federal Reserve and Upjohn Institute conference “Strategies for Improving
Economic Mobility of Workers,” held in Chicago, IL, November 15–16.
http://www.chicagofed.org/community_development/files/11_2007_dahl_
ppt_pres_session3.pdf (accessed April 24, 2009).
Dickens, William T. 1999. “Rebuilding Urban Labor Markets: What Community Development Can Accomplish.” In Urban Problems and Community
Development, Ronald F. Ferguson and William T. Dickens, eds. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, pp. 381–436.
Duncan, Greg J., Aletha C. Huston, and Thomas S. Weisner. 2007. Higher
Ground: New Hope for the Working Poor and Their Children. New York:
Russell Sage Foundation.
Freeman, Richard B. 1998. “Is the New Income Inequality the Achilles’ Heel
of the American Economy?” In The Inequality Paradox: Growth of Income
Disparity, James A. Auerbach and Richard S. Belous, eds. Washington, DC:
National Policy Association, pp. 219–229.
Gleicher, David, and Lonnie K. Stevans. 2005. “A Comprehensive Profile of
the Working Poor,” Labour 19(3): 517–529.
Gosselin, Peter G. 2005. “How Bedrock Promises of Security Have Fractured
across America: Companies Are Discarding Traditional Pensions—or Making Government Foot the Bill.” Los Angeles Times, December 30, A:1.
Gosselin, Peter G., and Seth Zimmerman. 2007. “Trends in Income Volatility and Risk, 1970–2004.” PowerPoint presentation at the Chicago Federal
Reserve and Upjohn Institute conference “Strategies for Improving Economic Mobility of Workers,” held in Chicago, IL, November 15–16. http://
www.chicagofed.org/community_development/files/11_2007_gosselin_
ppt_pres_session1.pdf (accessed April 27, 2009).
Gottschalk, Peter. 1997. “Inequality, Income Growth and Mobility: The Basic
Facts.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 11(2): 21–40.
Gottschalk, Peter, and Sheldon Danziger. 1998. “Family Income Mobility—
How Much Is There, and Has It Changed?” In The Inequality Paradox:
Growth of Income Disparity, James A. Auerbach and Richard S. Belous,
eds. Washington, DC: National Policy Association, pp. 92–111.
Greenspan, Alan. 2004. “The Critical Role of Education in the Nation’s Economy.” Remarks by the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the U.S.
Federal Reserve System at the Greater Omaha Chamber of Commerce 2004
Annual Meeting, held in Omaha, NE, February 20.

44 Toussaint-Comeau
Hacker, Jacob S. 2006. The Great Risk Shift: The Assault on American Jobs,
Families, Health Care and Retirement, and How You Can Fight Back. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Heathcote, Jonathan, Kjetil Storesletten, and Giovanni L. Violante. 2004.
“The Macroeconomic Implications of Rising Wage Inequality in the United
States.” New York University working paper. New York: New York University. http://www.econ.nyu.edu/user/violante/Workingpapers/hsv_final.pdf
(accessed April 27, 2009).
Henly, Julia R. 2000. “Mismatch in the Low-Wage Labor Market: Job Search
Perspective.” In The Low Wage Market: Challenges and Opportunities for
Economic Self-Sufficiency, Kelleen Kaye and Demetra Smith Nightingale,
eds. Washington, DC: Urban Institute, pp. 145–168. http://www.urban.org/
publications/309642.html (accessed April 27, 2009).
Hertz, Tom. 2007. “Trends in the Intergenerational Elasticity of Family Income
in the United States.” Industrial Relations 46(1): 22–50.
Holzer, Harry J. 2009. “What Might Improve the Employment and Advancement Prospects of the Poor?” In Strategies for Improving Economic Mobility of Workers: Bridging Research and Practice, Maude Toussaint-Comeau
and Bruce D. Meyer, eds. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research, pp. ____.
Hughes, Mark Alan. 1989. Fighting Poverty in Cities: Transportation Programs as Bridges to Opportunity. Washington, DC: National League of Cities.
Jencks, Christopher. 2002. “Does Inequality Matter?” Daedalus 131(1): 49–65.
Kain, John F. 1968. “Housing Segregation, Negro Employment, and Metropolitan Decentralization.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 82(2): 175–197.
———. 1992. “The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis: Three Decades Later.”
Housing Policy Debate 3(2): 371–392.
Kain, John F., and Joseph J. Persky. 1969. “Alternatives to the Guilded Ghetto.” Public Interest 14(Winter): 74–87.
Karoly, Lynn A., M. Rebecca Kilburn, and Jill S. Cannon. 2005. Early Childhood Interventions: Proven Results, Future Promise. Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation.
Katz, Bruce, and Katherine Allen. 1999. “Help Wanted: Connecting Inner-City
Job Seekers with Suburban Jobs.” Brookings Review 17(4): 31–35.
Katz, Lawrence F., Jeffrey R. Kling, and Jeffrey B. Liebman. 2001. “Moving
To Opportunity in Boston: Early Results of a Randomized Mobility Experiment.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(2): 607–654.
King, Jacqueline E. 2000. 2000 Status Report on the Pell Grant Program.
Washington, DC: American Council on Education.
Kotlowitz, Alex. 2008. “Strategies for Improving Economic Mobility of Work-

Strategies for Improving Economic Mobility 45
ers Conference: Keynote Speech.” Profitwise News and Views 2008(September): 3–5. http://www.chicagofed.org/community_development/files/
PNV_Sep2008_ReEd_FINAL_WEB.pdf (accessed April 28, 2009).
Krugman, Paul. 1994. “Past and Prospective Causes of High Unemployment.”
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review 79(4): 23–43.
LaLonde, Robert J. 1995. “The Promise of Public Sector–Sponsored Training
Programs.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 9(2): 149–168.
Lazear, Edward. 2008. “Mobility of Factors of Production and Economic
Growth.” Keynote address at the Chicago Federal Reserve and Upjohn
Institute conference “Strategies for Improving Economic Mobility of Workers,” held in Chicago, IL, November 15–16.
Lee, Chul-In, and Gary Solon. 2006. “Trends in Intergenerational Income
Mobility.” NBER Working Paper No. 12007. Cambridge, MA: National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Lemieux, Thomas. 2006. “Increasing Residual Wage Inequality: Composition
Effects, Noisy Data, or Rising Demand for Skill?” American Economic
Review 96(3): pp. 461–498.
Meyer, Bruce D., and Dan T. Rosenbaum. 2001. “Welfare, the Earned Income
Tax Credit, and the Labor Supply of Single Mothers.” Quarterly Journal of
Economics 116(3): 1063–1114.
Page, Benjamin I., and James R. Simmons. 2002. What Government Can
Do: Dealing with Poverty and Inequality. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Pierce, Brooks. 2001. “Compensation Inequality.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(4): 1493–1525.
Rhodes, Eric, and Sonal Malpani. 2000. “A Metropolitan Approach to Workforce
Development.” New Ideas for a New Century Idea Brief No. 17. New York:
Century Foundation. http://www.tcf.org//Publications/EconomicsInequality/
WorkforceDevelopment.pdf (accessed April 27, 2009).
Sachs, Jeffrey D., and Howard J. Shatz. 1996. “U.S. Trade with Developing
Countries and Wage Inequality.” American Economic Review 86(2): 234–
239.
Steelman, Aaron, and John A. Weinberg. 2005. “What’s Driving Wage Inequality?” Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly 91(3): 1–17.
Toussaint-Comeau, Maude. 2008. “Strategies for Improving Economic Mobility of Workers: A Conference Report.” Profitwise News and Views 2008
(September): 1–10. http://www.chicagofed.org/community_development/
files/PNV_Sep2008_ReEd_FINAL_WEB.pdf (accessed April 28, 2009).
Tyler, John H., and Jillian Berk. 2009. “Correctional Programs in the Age of
Mass Incarceration: What Do We Know about ‘What Works’?” In Strategies for Improving Economic Mobility of Workers: Bridging Research and

46 Toussaint-Comeau
Practice, Maude Toussaint-Comeau and Bruce D. Meyer, eds. Kalamazoo,
MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, pp. ____.
Wilson, William Julius. 1996. When Work Disappears: The World of the New
Urban Poor. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

3
Past Trends and Projections in
Wages, Work, and Occupations
in the United States
David Autor
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and NBER

It is widely recognized that inequality of labor market earnings in
the United States has increased dramatically in recent decades. This may
be seen in Figure 3.1, adapted from Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008),
which plots the growth of real hourly wages of U.S. workers (both male
and female) by earnings percentile for the years 1973 through 2005.
Over the course of more than three decades, wage growth was weak
to nonexistent at the bottom of the distribution, strong at the top of the
distribution, and modest in the middle. While real hourly earnings of
workers within the bottom 30 percent of the earnings distribution rose
by no more than 10 percentage points, earnings of workers at the ninetieth percentile and above rose by more than 40 percentage points.
What is less widely known, however, is that this smooth, monotonic
growth of wage inequality is a feature of a specific time period—and
that this time period has passed.1 Figure 3.2, adapted from Autor, Katz,
and Kearney (2006), shows that, consistent with common perceptions,
the growth of wage inequality between 1973 and 1989 was strikingly
linear in wage percentiles, with sharp drops in real wages at the bottom
of the distribution and modest increases at the top.2 Yet, starting in the
late 1980s, the growth of wages became polarized, as wages experienced strong, ongoing growth in the top of the earnings distribution (at
or above the seventieth percentile) and modest growth in the lower tail
of the distribution (at or below the thirtieth percentile). Notably, the
portion of the wage distribution that saw the least real earnings growth
between 1989 and 2005 was the middle, roughly the group of earners between the thirtieth and seventieth percentiles of the distribution.3
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Figure 3.1 Changes in Real Male and Female Hourly Wages by
Percentile, 1973–2005
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NOTE: Figure represents March CPS data for earnings years 1963–2005, full-time,
full-year workers ages 16 to 64 with 0 to 39 years of potential experience whose class
of work in their longest job was private or government wage/salary employment. Fulltime, full-year workers are those who usually worked 35-plus hours per week and
worked 40-plus weeks in the previous year. Weekly earnings are calculated as annual earnings divided by weeks worked. Calculations are weighted by CPS sampling
weights and are deflated using the personal consumption expenditure (PCE) deflator.
Earnings of below $67/week in 1982 dollars ($112/week in 2000 dollars) are dropped.
Allocated earnings observations are excluded in earnings years 1967 forward using
either family earnings allocation flags (1967–1974) or individual earnings allocation
flags (1975 earnings year forward).
SOURCE: Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008).

Thus, the periods of 1973 to 1989 and 1989 to 2005 present two distinct
periods of rising inequality: one of diverging wages throughout the distribution, a second of polarizing wage growth.
What explains the polarization since 1990?4 It is fair to say that
the question has not yet received an entirely satisfactory answer. One
potentially promising—though surely incomplete—explanation lies in
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Figure 3.2 Change in Real Male and Female Hourly Wages by
Percentile, 1973–1989 and 1989–2005
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Source: Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006), and author’s calculations based on data
from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey, produced by Unicon
Research Corporation.

the changing demand for job tasks spurred by the remarkable spread of
computerization. The price of computer power has fallen by roughly
one-third to one-half each year for several decades (Berndt and Rappaport 2001). Processing tasks that were unthinkably expensive 30 years
ago, such as searching the full text of a university’s library for a single
quotation, are now so cheap that the expense is trivial. This rapid, secular price decline creates enormous economic incentives for employers to substitute cheap computers for expensive labor in performing
workplace tasks. Simultaneously, it creates significant advantages for
workers whose skills become increasingly productive as computerization advances.
But what are the tasks that computers perform?5 One is immediately tempted to answer, “Everything.” Indeed, it is hard to think of
a quotidian activity—from checking the weather forecast to investing
our retirement savings—that doesn’t involve using a computer in one
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way or another. Yet, although computers are everywhere, they don’t
do everything—far from it. In fact, computers have a very specific set
of capabilities and limitations. Ultimately, the ability of a computer to
accomplish a task is dependent upon the ability of a programmer to
write a set of procedures (“rules”) that directs what the machine does
at each possible contingency. This means that computers are “good” at
the things that people can program them to do—and inept at everything
else.
For example, computer programs can play an unbeatable game of
checkers and a nearly unbeatable game of chess. These games follow
well-described rules and so are reasonably straightforward to program.
In the workplace, computers accomplish countless data processing and
clerical activities such as sorting, filing, calculating, storing, retrieving,
and manipulating information. Similarly, computers now handle many
of the repetitive assembly and monitoring tasks on the factory floor. I
refer to these procedural, rule-based activities as “routine” tasks.
Yet there are many essential tasks that workers perform daily for
which programmers and engineers do not know “the rules.” One such
set of tasks is abstract thinking—for example, developing a hypothesis,
making a persuasive argument, creating a new idea or product, or motivating and managing a group of workers. These abstract thinking tasks
require creativity, intuition, and insight. Though all of us have ideas
and insights, the science of programming computers to do likewise is
still in its infancy. Thus, for the moment, abstract thinking tasks require
educated, creative, and clever people. Moreover, computerization likely
raises the productivity of workers performing abstract tasks. For example, lawyers accomplish faster and more thorough case research by
tapping into legal databases. Engineers develop products more quickly
when assisted by computer-aided design tools. Financial professionals
using powerful machines handle much larger volumes of client money
than was feasible in the paper-based era. There is abundant evidence
that the demand for highly educated “abstract” workers has increased
in the computer era, and it is likely that the complementarity between
computerization and abstract work is part of the explanation.
But education-intensive, abstract tasks are not unique in their (partial) immunity from automation. A second group of tasks that have
proved remarkably hard to computerize are so-called manual tasks.
These are tasks that require on-the-spot flexibility and adaptabil-
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ity. Driving a truck through city traffic, waiting tables at a restaurant,
checking passengers’ IDs at the airport—these are all tasks that are easy
for people but “hard” for computers. Why? Because they require complex and rapid interactions with unpredictable factors—erratic traffic,
hungry restaurant patrons, and unfamiliar faces. Notably, these manual
tasks do not require high levels of formal education.
One can glimpse the impact that computerization—more recently
complemented by international outsourcing—is having on job tasks by
considering the changing occupational structure of U.S. employment.6
Table 3.1, adapted from Autor and Dorn (2008), reports the educational
level and employment shares in six major occupational groups covering all of U.S. employment: 1) managerial and professional specialties;
2) technicians, sales, and administrative support; 3) precision production, craft, and repair; 4) service occupations; 5) operators, fabricators,
and laborers; and 6) farming, fishing, and forestry occupations. The
highest skilled of these occupational categories is managerial and professional specialty occupations, followed (at some distance) by technicians, sales, and administrative support. The four remaining categories—each averaging half the size of the first two—are demonstrably
less education-intensive. Whereas in the year 2000 high school dropouts made up 2.2 percent of employment in professional and managerial jobs and 6.7 percent of employment in technical, sales, and administrative support jobs, they composed 20-plus percent of employment in
the four remaining categories.
Growth has not been uniform across these six categories. Figure
3.3 shows that managerial and professional specialty occupations—
the highest-skilled category—experienced consistent, rapid growth
between 1980 and 2005, gaining 7.1 percentage points as a share of
overall employment over those 25 years, a 30 percent increase. In contrast, employment in the “middle skill” group of technical, sales, and
administrative support occupations showed an inverse U-shaped pattern over this period, expanding in the 1980s and then contracting to
below its initial 1980 level over the next 15 years (consistent with the
growing substitution of technology for routine tasks). Most strikingly, employment shares in three of the four low-skill occupations fell
sharply in each decade.7 For the entire period of 1980–2005, farming,
forestry, and fishery occupations contracted by more than 50 percent as
a share of employment; operators, fabricators, and laborers contracted
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Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics for Main Census Occupation Groups in 2000
Median
% high
Employment
hourly
school
share
wage ($)
dropout % no college % female
All occupations
100.0
13.58
12.1
39.3
42.1
Service occupations
13.4
9.40
21.3
55.1
51.3
All occupations except
86.6
14.42
10.7
36.8
40.8
service occupations
Managerial and professional
30.2
19.23
2.2
11.4
46.5
specialty occupations
Technicians, sales, and
28.8
12.50
6.7
35.0
58.8
administrative support
Farming, forestry, and
1.3
7.50
33.0
67.2
14.9
fishery occupations
Precision production, craft,
12.3
14.40
19.9
60.4
8.6
and repair occupations
Operators, fabricators,
14.0
11.49
27.3
71.9
22.2
and laborers

% nonwhite
21.6
30.8
20.1

% foreignborn
14.2
19.7
13.3

16.2

11.8

20.8

11.6

20.6

22.3

18.7

14.3

28.3

18.6

NOTE: Statistics are calculated from census IPUMS 2000, 5 percent sample. All calculations are weighted by hours of annual labor supply
and exclude those under age 18 or over age 65.
Source: Autor and Dorn (2008).
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Figure 3.3 Employment Share of Major Census Occupation Groups,
1980, 1990, 2000, and 2005
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by 33 percent; and precision production, craft, and repair occupations
contracted by 19 percent.
Standing in sharp contrast to these patterns of declining employment, however, is the experience of service occupations.8 Despite being
among the least educated and lowest paid occupations in the U.S. economy, service occupations had an employment that expanded in each
decade between 1980 and 2005, rising from 11.0 percent of employment in 1980 to 11.8 percent in 1990, to 13.7 percent in 2000, and
to 14.9 percent in 2005. Overall, employment in service occupations
gained 35 percent, which is 6 percentage points more than the gain in
employment shares of managerial and professional occupations during
the same period. In fact, service occupations constitute the only major
occupational category that is growing among noncollege workers (that
is, those with high school or lower education).
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Why should service occupations be the exception? Table 3.2 lists
the major service occupations, the largest of which are food preparation
and service, health service support (a group that excludes registered
nurses and other skilled medical personnel), and buildings and grounds
cleaning and maintenance. These are low-paying jobs; in 2005, 75 percent had hourly wages below the overall hourly median. However, from
the perspective of our conceptual framework, what distinguishes these
occupations is that each is highly intensive in “nonroutine manual”
tasks—activities requiring interpersonal and environmental adaptability yet little in the way of formal education. These are precisely the job
tasks that are difficult to automate with current technology because they
are nonroutine. Moreover, these jobs are difficult to outsource because,
in large part, they must (at least at the moment) be produced and performed in person.
Employment projections from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS)
Occupational Outlook Handbook, 2006–2007 (BLS 2006) support the
view that low-education service jobs are likely to be a major contributor to U.S. employment growth going forward. The BLS forecasts that
employment in service occupations will increase by 5.3 million, or 19
percent, between 2004 and 2014.9 The only major occupational category with greater projected growth is professional occupations, which
are predicted to add six million jobs, a 21.2 percent increase.10 Like all
forecasts, these should be treated as tentative. Historically, the BLS has
underpredicted the growing demand for professional and managerial
occupations (Bishop and Carter 1991; Freeman 2006).
This process of employment polarization—in which job growth is
concentrated among both highly education-intensive, abstract jobs and
comparatively low-education, manual jobs—presents both challenges
and opportunities for the United States, as well as for other industrialized economies. The rising productivity of highly educated workers is
good news; the return on investments in higher education has perhaps
never been greater. But the growing importance of manual and service
tasks presents a challenge. The positive news about rising demand for
in-person service occupations is that it will tend to increase the earnings
of less-educated workers. The less favorable news is that, even given
rising demand, labor supply to services may be sufficiently elastic that
wages stay low. Median real hourly wages in service jobs were $8.86 in
1980, $9.01 in 1990, $10.24 in 2000, and $10.28 in 2005 (all expressed

Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics for Service Occupations in 2005, and Employment Growth Rates for 1980–2005
Median
Employment hourly wage
share in 2005 in 2005 ($)
All service occupations
Housekeeping, cleaning,
laundry
Protective service
Food preparation and
service
Health service support
Building/grounds
cleaning/maintenance
Personal appearance
Child care
Recreation and
hospitality
Other personal service

% female
in 2005

%
%
%
employment employment employment
% nonwhite % foreigngrowth
growth
growth
in 2005 born in 2005 1980–1990 1990–2000 2000–2005

14.9
0.9

9.07
7.09

51.9
82.1

32.2
43.9

23.4
48.2

6.7
−11.0

16.2
2.5

17.8
12.0

2.3
4.0

15.55
7.21

20.1
53.5

27.0
31.5

77.0
27.5

16.1
4.7

8.7
11.6

12.3
14.4

3.0
2.6

9.93
9.09

75.0
19.7

34.7
32.5

17.8
31.3

4.5
9.1

65.0
−7.9

21.6
31.7

0.7
0.8
0.4

8.64
6.91
10.37

82.0
94.4
47.9

34.2
32.0
29.6

26.6
19.8
18.0

5.4
8.9
17.6

0.0
59.2
85.0

20.3
−5.1
10.8

0.4

10.80

57.8

20.3

15.5

17.2

0.0

47.1

Note: All calculations are weighted by hours of annual labor supply and exclude those under age 18 or over age 65.
Source: Autor and Dorn (2008), calculated from census IPUMS of 1980, 1990, and 2005, 5 percent sample, and from the American
Community Survey 2005, 1 percent sample.
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in 2005 dollars). These hourly wage rates imply annual, full-time earnings of approximately $20,000 a year (of course, many service jobs do
not provide full-time, full-year earnings). This income level exceeds
the poverty threshold for the year 2000 of $19,350 for a family of two
adults and two dependent children. Yet this is probably insufficient for
families to make optimal investments in child-rearing and education.
How should education policy respond to this challenge? One might
be tempted to reason that if earnings growth is concentrated among the
most- and least-educated workers, educators should pursue a bimodal
human capital investment policy: equipping all students with a solid
foundation in basic skills while reserving high levels of preparation
(leading to college and graduate education) for an elite. For a number
of reasons, this argument is unattractive. First, as stressed above, the
returns to human capital investments are quite high. In the late 1990s,
the college wage differential stood at a near-historic level, and it has
risen further in the subsequent decade (see Goldin and Katz 2008), so
that it now stands at an all-time high.11 Second, though earnings growth
in low-education jobs exceeds that in middle-education jobs, earnings
levels themselves are considerably higher in middle- than in low-education jobs—and this ranking is unlikely to reverse itself any time soon.
Finally, universal, high-quality education is perhaps the only public
investment proven to reliably foster opportunity, raise earnings, and
increase well-being over the life cycle.12 Thus, while it appears to be
a legitimate worry that the polarization of earnings levels among U.S.
households may serve to thwart economic mobility, the best insurance
policy we have against this undesirable outcome is equipping citizens
with skills that permit them to take full advantage of the opportunities
that the future offers. It is not an overstatement to say that the case for
extensive, universal investments in human capital is as strong at the
outset of the twenty-first century as it has been at any time in the last
century.
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Notes
1. This observation was, to my knowledge, first offered by Mishel, Bernstein, and
Boushey (2003).
2. The public-use Current Population Survey and Census of Populations data analyzed here do not cover the top several percentiles of the earnings distribution,
where the most dramatic increases in real earnings have occurred during these
decades (see Piketty and Saez 2003). Including these top percentiles would reveal
even greater growth at the top throughout the years studied.
3. It bears noting, however, that all percentiles of the distribution fared better in the
second half of the time period (1989 through 2005) than in the first (1973 through
1989), reflecting the acceleration of U.S. productivity growth commencing in the
mid-1990s.
4. To my knowledge, Goos and Manning (2007) were the first to refer to the simultaneous growth of low- and high-skill jobs (at the expense of the middle) as a
“polarization” of employment, thus coining that usage of the term to describe this
phenomenon.
5. The “task view” of computerization presented here is formalized by Autor, Levy,
and Murnane (2003) and elaborated on and advanced by Autor, Katz, and Kearney
(2006, 2008); Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Schönberg (2007); Goos and Manning
(2007); Levy and Murnane (2004); and Spitz-Oener (2006). Bartel, Ichniowski,
and Shaw (2007) present detailed, representative evidence on the relationship
between computerization, work organization, and productivity. Goldin and Katz
(2008) provide a longer-term historical perspective on the relationship between
technical change, work organization, and skill demand.
6. There is vast uncertainty about the degree to which international outsourcing will
ultimately affect domestic labor demand. At present, most quantitative assessments
of these potential impacts are preliminary or impressionistic (Blinder 2007; Kletzer
2006). Levy and Murnane (2006) consider the relationship between computerization and outsourcing through the lens of the “task” framework exposited above.
7. Operator, fabricator, and laborer occupations fell from 19.2 percent of employment in 1980 to 14.5 percent in 1990, to 13.9 percent in 2000, and to 13.0 percent in 2005. Production, craft, and repair occupations fell from 14.3 percent of
employment in 1980 to 12.4 percent in 1990, to 12.1 percent in 2000, and to 11.6
percent in 2005. Farming, forestry, and fishery occupations fell from 2.8 percent of
employment in 1980 to 1.8 percent in 1990, to 1.3 percent in 2000, and to 1.3 percent in 2005. The sources for these calculations are the census Integrated Public
Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) files for 1980, 1990, and 2000, and the American
Community Survey for 2005.
8. It is important to distinguish service occupations, a relatively narrow group of loweducation occupations composing 13.4 percent of employment in 2000 (author’s
calculation from the census IPUMS), from the service sector, a broad category of
industries including everything from health care to communications to real estate
and constituting 81 percent of nonfarm employment in 2000 (BLS 2009).
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9. The service employment measure used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Occupational Outlook Handbook, 2006–2007 (BLS 2006) indicates a service employment share that is several percentage points higher than our calculations given in
endnote 8 (17.7 percent versus 13.4 percent). The discrepancy stems from three
factors: unlike our calculations, which are based on household data from the census, the BLS numbers use Current Employment Statistics (CES) data. The CES, as
an establishment survey, double-counts workers who hold multiple jobs; our census-based numbers are weighted by hours of labor supply, and so part-time jobs
(common in service occupations) are weighted down, whereas the CES data count
all jobs equally. Furthermore, our census calculations exclude workers younger
than 18, whereas the CES data include workers ages 16 and above. The service
occupation in which the census and CES data are most different is in food preparation and service, where our data show a 3.5 percent employment share and the
CES data show a 7.4 percent employment share. Despite these discrepancies in
levels, we have no reason to believe that the qualitative employment trends in the
census and CES data are at odds with each other.
10. The BLS category of professional occupations excludes managerial occupations
and so is more disaggregated than the census category of professional and managerial occupations. Combined growth in professional and managerial jobs is projected at 8.2 million jobs, or 18.8 percent.
11. The college wage differential is at its highest level since 1915, which is as far back
as representative U.S. data are available.
12. Recent work by Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2007) finds little change in mobility
over the course of a career among U.S. cohorts born between 1920 and 1950.
However, these data do not speak to economic mobility across generations—in
particular, to how likely children of low-income households are to reach higher
echelons of the earnings distribution during their careers.
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4
The Earned Income Tax
Credit, Welfare Reform,
and the Employment of
Low-Skilled Single Mothers
Hilary Williamson Hoynes
University of California, Davis

Cash assistance for low-income families with children underwent
tremendous change in the 1990s. Welfare reform led to a dramatic
reduction in the generosity of state cash assistance and an elimination
of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. At
the same time, cash assistance through the tax system, in the form of the
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), increased substantially. In fact, the
EITC is now the largest federal cash transfer program for lower-income
families, generating a total cost (in 2005) of $34 billion, compared
with $24 billion in Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
expenditures.
This shift in the structure of cash assistance for low-income families, away from welfare and toward tax-based assistance, is the outcome
of a long-standing criticism that traditional welfare programs generate
adverse incentives for work and family. Importantly, the policy changes
to welfare and the EITC in the 1990s both provided incentives (financial and otherwise) for single mothers with children to increase their
employment. Indeed, employment rates of single mothers with children
rose 11 percentage points over a 20-year period, from 73 percent in
1987 to 84 percent in 2006. Even more striking is the 16-percentagepoint change (from 72 to 88 percent) that occurred between 1992 and
1999. During this span, gains were even larger for single mothers
without a high school diploma; among this group, employment rates
increased by 20 percentage points between 1992 and 1999. No other
group of women (single women without children, married women with
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or without children) or men experienced such a dramatic increase in
employment. In this chapter, I describe these important policies, as well
as present trends in employment for single mothers, and I summarize
what is known about how the changes in welfare and the EITC have
affected employment.

Welfare Reform and the Earned Income
Tax Credit
The AFDC program provided cash assistance to low-income single
mothers with children from the 1930s to the 1990s. The program was
designed to provide an income transfer for needy families in an era
when women with children had minimal labor-market attachment. Consequently, AFDC benefits were phased out at a very high rate: after a
small disregard, benefits were reduced by one dollar for every additional dollar in earned income. This, by design, created a targeting of
benefits to those with the lowest income levels, but it also inadvertently
created a disincentive to enter the labor force because the increase in
earnings was offset by a reduction in the cash transfer.
Concerns about the labor supply disincentives in the AFDC program had an important impact on welfare reform at the state and federal
level. Beginning in the early 1990s, many states were granted waivers
to change their AFDC programs, and by 1995 about half of the states
had implemented some sort of welfare waiver. On the heels of this
state experimentation, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) was enacted in 1996, replacing
AFDC with TANF. The key elements of reform in the state waivers
and TANF legislation include work requirements, lifetime time limits,
financial sanctions, and enhanced earnings disregards. These changes
were designed to increase work and reduce welfare participation. Figure 4.1 shows the dramatic decline in welfare caseloads that occurred
during this period.
The EITC began in 1975 as a modest program aimed at offsetting
Social Security payroll taxes for low-income families with children. It
was the outcome of a vigorous policy debate surrounding the efficacy of
a negative income tax (NIT) as a means of reducing poverty. The con-
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Figure 4.1 AFDC/TANF Caseload, 1970–2006
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cern was that the NIT would discourage labor market activity as it was
gradually phased out. Ultimately the EITC was born out of a desire to
reward work. The EITC provides a cash transfer to low-income working families through the tax system. The EITC is refundable so that a
taxpayer with no federal tax liability, for example, would receive a tax
refund from the government for the full amount of the credit. Eligibility for the credit requires one to have positive earned income and also
requires one’s adjusted gross income and earned income to be below a
specified amount; in 2007, the maximum allowable income for a single taxpayer with one child was $33,241 ($37,783 with two or more
children).1
The amount of the credit to which a taxpayer is entitled depends on
the taxpayer’s earned income, adjusted gross income, and, since 1991,
the number of EITC-eligible children in the household. There are three
regions in the credit schedule: the phase-in region, the flat region, and
the phase-out region. The credit for those in the phase-in region is equal
to the subsidy rate times their earnings. The subsidy rate is quite high—
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34 percent for taxpayers with one child and 40 percent for taxpayers
with two or more children. In the flat region, the family receives the
maximum credit (in 2007 it was $2,853 for one child and $4,716 for
more), whereas in the phase-out region the credit is discontinued at the
phase-out rate (16 and 21 percent). As shown in Figure 4.2, the program
expanded under the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) and the Omnibus
Reconciliation Acts of 1990 and 1993 (OBRA90 and OBRA93). Figure
4.2 illustrates these expansions in the program by plotting the (real)
EITC payment schedule by (real) earnings for selected years between
1984 and 2006, separately for families with one child (Panel A) and for
those with two or more children (Panel B).2 The figure clearly shows
that not only was the 1993 expansion the largest of the three but that it
was much larger for families with two or more children. For example,
between 1993 and 2006, single mothers with two children and earning
between $15,000 and $25,000 (in 2006 dollars) experienced a morethan-doubling of their real transfer from the EITC. In contrast, single
mothers with one child and earning $15,000 (in real 2006 dollars) experienced about a 40 percent increase in the real EITC, while those earning $25,000 experienced about a 25 percent increase in the real EITC.
These expansions have led to a dramatic increase in the total cost of
the EITC in recent years. Figure 4.3 plots the number of EITC recipients (taxpaying units or families) and the total tax cost of the EITC (in
2006 dollars) over the period from 1975 to 2005. The figure clearly
shows the rising expenditures and number of recipients associated with
the 1986, 1990, and 1993 tax acts. Importantly, between 1990 and 1996,
real EITC costs increased more than threefold.3
Finally, Figure 4.4 contrasts the aggregate cost of the EITC with
the cost of AFDC/TANF from 1975 to 2005. In a very short time, the
EITC has overtaken AFDC/TANF and become the largest cash transfer
program for low-income families.

Policy Changes and Expected Impacts
on Employment
Labor supply theory suggests that welfare reform and EITC expansions should increase employment of low-income single mothers.4 Vir-
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Figure 4.2 Real EITC Schedule for Single Mothers, by Real Earnings
Panel A:
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Figure 4.3 EITC Recipients and Expenditures, 1975–2005
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Figure 4.4 Comparing Cost of AFDC/TANF to EITC, 1975–2005
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tually all of the provisions implemented in the state and federal welfare
reform should lead to more employment through removing the entitlement nature of welfare (time limits), increasing the costs of participation in welfare (work requirements, financial sanctions), and reducing
the financial work disincentives (reducing the phase-out rate, increasing
work disregards).
The expansions in the EITC also are expected to lead to more
employment among single mothers. Because the EITC is available only
to taxpayers with earned income, standard labor supply theory predicts
that the EITC will encourage labor force participation. While this effect
is not the focus of this paper, the EITC is expected to reduce hours
worked for those women already working whose earnings are in the flat
and phase-out regions of the credit.5

Trends in Employment of Single Mothers
Figure 4.5 presents annual employment rates for women aged 19–
44 between 1983 and 2006.6 We show the employment rates for four
groups: 1) single women with children, 2) single women without children, 3) married women with children, and 4) married women without
children. These groups are chosen to illustrate the dramatic changes
particular to single women with children—the group most affected by
welfare reform and the EITC.
The figure shows the dramatic increase in employment rates for
single women with children during this period. For example, between
1983 and 2006 employment rates of single mothers increased by 13 percentage points—from 71 percent in 1983 to 84 percent in 2006. Most of
this change occurred between 1992 and 1999, when employment rates
increased by an amazing 16 percentage points (from 72 to 88 percent).
This coincided with the largest expansion in the history of the EITC
and the dramatic reform of the welfare system. Of course, not all the
gains can be attributed to the EITC’s growth and welfare reform; they
also happened during the strong 1990s economic expansion—a time of
rising wages and falling unemployment rates. However, it is clear from
this simple figure that the gains in employment experienced by single
mothers were not shared by all demographic groups.
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Figure 4.5 Annual Employment Rates for Women Aged 19–44, by
Marital Status and Presence of Children
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To refine the analysis, and recognizing that EITC recipients are
more likely to have lower skill and education levels, Figure 4.6 presents the annual employment rates when limiting the sample to women
with 12 or fewer years of education. While employment rates are lower
among less-educated women, the same pattern is evident—large gains
in employment for single mothers over the period, as shown by a tremendous increase of 20 percentage points between 1992 and 1999.
The last figure, Figure 4.7, shows the employment rates for single
women by number of children (none, one, or two or more). Breaking
down the data in this way reveals that the increases in employment were
concentrated among single women with two or more children.
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Figure 4.6 Annual Employment Rates for Women Aged 19–44 with a High
School Education or Less, by Marital Status and Presence of
Children
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Figure 4.7 Annual Employment Rates for Single Women Aged 19–44, by
Number of Children
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Did Welfare Reform and the EITC Contribute to
the Increases in Employment?
Separately identifying the impact of welfare reform, the EITC, and
the strong economy on single women is a challenge, as the three factors were all at play in the mid- to late 1990s. The literature on the
subject documents many approaches that have been taken in an attempt
to disentangle the impacts. One approach is to take advantage of the
variation across states in welfare reform, the business cycle, and the
state EITCs. A second approach uses comparison groups. Yet another approach parameterizes the gains to work and utilizes variation in
gains to work for women over time, across states, and in different skill
groups. From all of these approaches, there is strong evidence that welfare reform, the EITC, and the strong economy all played a role in the
rising employment rates experienced by single mothers in the 1990s.
This section provides a brief summary of the large literature on the
impact that the EITC and welfare reform have had on the labor supply
of single mothers.7
Much of the work in this area concentrates on the impact of either
welfare reform or the EITC. In the EITC literature, the studies suggest
a strong positive relationship between the EITC and employment rates
of single women with children. Furthermore, the results are remarkably
consistent across different policy expansions, different control groups,
and different methodologies. Several studies (Ellwood 2000; Rothstein
2005; Meyer and Rosenbaum 2000) find that groups with the most to
gain from EITC expansions (e.g., single women and women with lower
wages, lower education levels, and more children) experienced larger
gains in employment rates. The welfare reform studies also find positive impacts on employment, with magnitudes somewhat smaller and
less statistically significant than those of the EITC studies.
Few studies provide a direct comparison of welfare reform and the
EITC. Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) is an important exception. Their
analysis examines the impact of taxes, welfare generosity, welfare
reform, other policies (minimum wages, in-kind transfer programs), and
demographics on the employment of single mothers. They find that of
the 12-percentage-point increase in employment rates of single mothers
between 1984 and 1996, fully 60 percent of the increase was attribut-
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able to the EITC and other tax changes, and 15 percent was attributable to welfare reform. The results on the relative importance of EITC
versus welfare reform are sensitive to the particular time period analyzed. For the period from 1992 to 1996, however, Meyer and Rosenbaum find that the importance of welfare reform rose relative to that of
the EITC—specifically, 35 percent of the increase in employment was
linked to the EITC and other tax changes, and 20 percent was linked to
welfare reform.

Conclusion
The 1990s were a period of tremendous change in policies affecting
single mothers with children. The expansion of the Earned Income Tax
Credit and welfare reform both raised the financial rewards to welfare
recipients for moving into the labor force. Furthermore, the gains in
employment for single mothers during this period were sizable, and no
such gains were experienced by other groups of workers. There is an
extensive body of research that looks at these facts and, using a wide
variety of methodologies, concludes that these changes in taxes and
transfers contributed in an important way to these increases in employment. The research suggests that the expansions in the EITC were the
most important contributor to these changes.

Notes
This chapter was originally a paper prepared for the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Conference on “Strategies for Improving Economic Mobility of Workers,” November
15–16, 2007.
1. There is also a small credit for childless taxpayers. We ignore that here and focus
on the main recipients, families with children.
2. Figure 4.2 plots the EITC schedule that applies to single taxpayers. Beginning
in 2002, the flat and phaseout regions were expanded modestly (by $1,000 from
2002 to 2004, by $2,000 from 2005 to 2007, and by $3,000 from 2008 onwards)
for married filers.
3. In addition to the federal EITC, an increasing number of states offer state EITCs.
As of 2004, a total of 18 states had introduced state EITCs that supplement the
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4.

5.

6.

7.

federal credit. Almost all states structure their credits as a share of the federal
credit, ranging between 5 percent (Illinois) and more than 40 percent (Minnesota
and Wisconsin), and almost all make the credit refundable like the federal credit
(Llobrera and Zahradnik 2004).
The focus in this chapter is on single mothers, who represent the vast majority of
AFDC/TANF recipients and over 75 percent of EITC claims (Eissa and Hoynes
2006a). The labor supply impacts of the EITC expansion on married couples are
more complicated and are likely to lead to reductions in employment for some
married women (Eissa and Hoynes 2004, 2006a,b).
In the phase-in region, the EITC has an ambiguous impact on hours worked
because of the negative income effect and positive substitution effect. In the flat
region, the EITC produces a negative income effect, leading to an unambiguous
reduction in hours worked. In the phase-out region, the EITC produces a negative
income and negative substitution effect, leading again to an unambiguous reduction in hours worked. Eissa and Hoynes (2006a) show that about three-quarters
of single EITC recipients have earnings in the flat and phase-out regions of the
credit—thus, the expectation is that the EITC will reduce the number of hours
worked by most eligible single taxpayers already in the labor force.
These tabulations are calculated using the 1984–2007 March Current Population
Surveys. The sample includes all women aged 19–44 who are not in school or
disabled. We also drop the relatively small number of women who report working
positive hours but have zero earnings or report positive earnings but zero hours.
For these calculations, employment is defined as any work done over the previous
calendar year.
Individual papers are cited where particularly relevant. The interested reader
should consult the recent and comprehensive reviews of this literature by Blank
(2002), Eissa and Hoynes (2006a), Grogger and Karoly (2005), and Hotz and
Scholz (2003).
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5
Reflections on Economic
Mobility and Policy
Bruce D. Meyer
University of Chicago and NBER

This chapter comments on presentations from the “Strategies for
Improving Economic Mobility of Workers” conference and discusses
trends in the material circumstances of Americans. I will also briefly
discuss some policies that have been used to equalize the distribution
of resources.
In looking at trends over the past 30 years in the material circumstances of U.S. residents (I am defining “material circumstances” to
include wages, income, and poverty, as well as food consumption, purchases of other goods, housing quality, and access to health care), there
are two main patterns one should keep in mind. The two patterns are
1) increased inequality in income and consumption and 2) improvements at almost all points of the distribution of material circumstances,
when properly measured. These patterns may not be apparent in all
measures of material circumstances, but they are the general tendency.
Often only one of these patterns is emphasized by researchers or pundits, but the two patterns really should be discussed together because
each one by itself gives a distorted impression of how the economy has
changed.
A third pattern I am going to mention, increased income volatility,
is different. It is not clear whether volatility has increased in recent
years, since there is conflicting evidence. Moreover, if income volatility
is indeed increasing, what that means for the well-being of the population is not clear at all.
Regarding the first pattern, increased inequality, Autor (2009) has
shown in the first chapter of this book that hourly wage growth from
1973 through 1989 was remarkably linear across the various percentiles. In other words, wages fell somewhat at the bottom, changed little
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in the middle, and grew modestly at the top. From 1989 through 2005,
in contrast, wage growth was polarized, with high growth at the bottom
and the top and little growth between the thirtieth and the seventieth
percentiles. Autor suggests that the growing use of computers and the
changing demand for job tasks form a large part of the explanation for
this pattern. He suggests that policies should encourage investment in
human capital to take advantage of likely future growth in educationintensive “abstract” jobs.
Berube (2007) emphasizes that regional growth in productivity and
employment and regional changes in poverty have been uneven. While
cities continue to have higher poverty rates than suburbs, suburban
growth has meant that slightly more than half of the poor now reside
in suburbs. He notes that when poverty rises, it seems to rise more for
children. He also notes that although poverty became less concentrated
in particular neighborhoods within cities during the 1990s, this pattern
appears to have reversed so far during the current decade.
Gosselin and Zimmerman (2007) examine trends in income volatility and risk. They find a substantial increase in the transitory variance
of family income over time in data from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID). This pattern of increased variance seems to be much
more pronounced in the PSID than in the alternative data set they examine, the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).
The PSID data indicate a large increase in the likelihood of a 50percent drop in family income over two years. This increase comes not
through a greater likelihood of a bad event occurring (such as unemployment or disability), but through a greater likelihood that a bad event
will be associated with a 50-percent drop in family income.
On this issue of volatility, I do not believe that the facts are clear;
nor is it clear how any trends should be interpreted. First, what are the
facts? As mentioned, there is some conflicting evidence on the trends
in income variability. In contrast to Gosselin and Zimmerman (2007),
Dahl, DeLeire, and Schwabish (2007), in a Congressional Budget Office
report, examine Social Security records and find a decline in income
variability in recent years. Their evidence is at the individual level,
rather than the family level, which clouds the interpretation. Another
research team that uses a version of the same data, Kopczuk, Saez, and
Song (2007), finds the same pattern. Thus, there is a question as to what
have been the changes over time in income variability (also see the
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recent working paper by Shin and Solon [2008], who find little change
in volatility since 1980 until an upward trend in the last few years).
Leaving aside this puzzle, a deeper question is whether these measures of volatility are good measures of people’s material circumstances. The Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2007) paper argues that more
variability is good. The authors say such variability makes possible the
American dream of upward mobility. On the other hand, Gosselin and
Zimmerman (2007) argue that trends in family income volatility reflect
increased economic risk and are thus bad.
To better understand the two ways of looking at volatility, consider
the situation in which the share of people in poverty is roughly constant over time. In fact, the official income poverty measure (pretax
money income, which is similar to the Gosselin and Zimmerman [2007]
income measure) was exactly the same in 1970 and 2005 (and has fallen
only slightly since). If the level of poverty is roughly constant, then
if more people are falling into poverty, more people must be leaving.
Gosselin and Zimmerman emphasize the former, while Kopczuk, Saez,
and Song (2007) emphasize the latter. The patterns are merely opposite
sides of the same coin.
It should be clear from this discussion that for research and policy
we probably should focus on changes in the distribution of resources
over time, rather than on volatility or mobility measures. We know that
if the bottom of the resource distribution shifts down but the remainder
of the distribution is unchanged, society is worse off. Similarly, if the
entire distribution shifts up, we know society is better off. Volatility
measures are of secondary or tertiary importance because their interpretation is unclear. This discussion also suggests that we might be better
off looking at the frequency with which people have extended periods
of poverty.
In any case, if we are examining severe drops in income, their
interpretation depends on whether or not the decrease in income means
families are hungry, ill-housed, or suffering from other types of material
deprivation. Families have many ways to shield their standard of living
as their income falls. These ways include obtaining resources from government programs, borrowing money for the short term, and drawing
down savings. While it is difficult to examine some of these patterns
directly, researchers and policy analysts can study the consumption patterns of families. As I will describe in greater detail below, consump-
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tion measures show a decline in poverty overall, with the decline being
especially large for measures of severe poverty.
Dahl (2007) shows that the incomes of households with children
have grown over time. Low-income households with children (i.e. the
bottom 20 percent) have had increases in income over the past 15 years.
Single-mother households have seen their income rise noticeably over
the past 15 years, mostly because of increases in earnings and to a lesser
extent because of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). The growth in
earnings in percentage terms has been greatest in the bottom 20 percent
of households with children (but it started at a low level). Dahl notes
that she is not able to account for the effects of the Food Stamp Program and public health insurance coverage in her calculations. I should
also mention that her measure excludes public and subsidized housing
benefits.
I am more upbeat about the living standards of most people than
even Dahl. Most researchers rely on government income statistics that
overadjust for inflation. This overadjustment makes it seem that living standards have not improved. The official government adjustment
for price changes does not adequately account for new goods, does not
consider lower prices at discount stores such as Wal-Mart, and misses
much of the quality improvements in existing goods. It also does not
fully account for the fact that when the price of one good rises relative
to similar goods, people move away from purchasing it, substituting
cheaper alternatives in its place.
The Boskin Commission (Boskin et al. 1996), a group of eminent
economists appointed by the Senate Finance Committee, concluded
that the official government price measure is biased upward by 1.3
percentage points per year. Subsequent research has mostly supported
this conclusion. The implication of this mismeasurement of inflation
is that median family incomes have actually risen faster than reported
by the Census Bureau (Meyer and Sullivan 2007). Figure 5.1 shows
the evolution of median income using better measures of inflation and
accounting for taxes and noncash benefits. In addition, many other
factors affecting measurement suggest we are better off than official
reports indicate. Measures of income-based poverty that account for
taxes and transfers have fallen sharply since 1980. Measures of poverty
based on what people are able to purchase in food and housing—i.e.,
consumption poverty measures—have fallen even faster, as can be seen
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Figure 5.1 Real Median Family Income, 1980–2004
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in Figure 5.2. The fraction of those with consumption below half of the
poverty line, so-called deep poverty, has fallen faster yet (Meyer and
Sullivan 2009).
All of these trends in material circumstances provide the background for policy to address the situation of workers today. Bettermeasured numbers indicate that we are not as badly off as official statistics and news reports suggest. One might conclude from this that there
is less need for policy. On the contrary—the numbers show that some
past policies have been successful and suggest that additional policies
might be able to build on that success. Two types of policies that come
up repeatedly are 1) education or other human capital building and
2) work subsidies, such as the EITC.
Just as Autor (2009) and Berube (2007) propose investing in human
capital, Blinder (2007) contends that we need to think about how to edu-
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Figure 5.2 Consumption and Income Poverty Rates, 1972–2005
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Meyer and Sullivan (2009) for details.

cate the next generation of workers. Both Autor and Blinder acknowledge that it is hard to predict which industries and occupations will see
employment increases, which will see declines, and when these changes will occur. They make general predictions but provide few specifics.
There remain tough decisions to be made about whose human capital
should be enhanced and what skills these people need. We have little
guidance from research to date on these questions.
Both Dahl (2007) and Berube (2007) discuss how the EITC is targeted to families with children; Holzer (2009) suggests expanding the
EITC; and Hoynes (2009) addresses the impact of the EITC. Hoynes
notes that the tax credit sharply increased the employment of single
mothers in the 1990s, and for much of the recent period it had perhaps as big a role in employment changes as welfare reform. She, like
Holzer, suggests that we should consider expanding the EITC, since
there are groups that do not especially benefit from the current EITC,
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such as childless men and women and some groups of low-income married couples.
In thinking about these possible expansions in the EITC, we should
keep a couple of points in mind. First, by expanding the credit to reach
more people, our policy could encourage work while transferring
resources to low-income individuals. Second, the EITC likely was successful in increasing the employment of single mothers because 1) they
had a low employment rate to start with, and 2) before the EITC, their
net financial reward for work was low because working often meant
losing welfare, food stamps, and other benefits. Neither of these conditions will be as true for other groups, such as childless men and women.
Thus, while such a reform may have favorable distribution effects, it
should not be expected to increase employment sharply.
Hoynes (2009) suggests that we should consider raising the maximum EITC amount and raising the implicit tax rate over the phaseout
portion of the credit (such a change could be revenue-neutral). This
suggestion is based on the repeated finding that the credit has little
effect on the hours worked by those already working (Eissa and Hoynes
2006; Meyer 2007). While I believe this idea has substantial merit, I
have concerns that in the long run individuals will come to understand
the structure of the credit, in particular the very high penalty on additional earnings that this change would create. In general, it is good for
credit recipients to understand the tax rules, but we should be aware that
such an understanding in this case might very well lead to a negative
response on their part in terms of the number of hours worked.
I would like to offer one addition to the list of possible EITC reforms.
The current benefit structure is the same for those with three or more
children as for those with two. A more generous schedule for those with
three or more children would help to support families that appear to be
particularly needy. As can be seen in Table 5.1, those with three or more
children have less resources they are able to devote to food, housing,
and other consumption than single mothers with one or two children.
Overall, the evidence suggests that while we have seen a sharp
increase in inequality in recent years, those at the bottom are still much
better off than they were 30 years ago. This improvement in well-being
can be taken as either of two things: 1) an indication that poverty is
less of a problem than advertised or 2) evidence that past policy efforts
(and economic growth) have been successful and should be expanded.
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Table 5.1 Percentiles of Annual Income of Single Mothers, by Number of
Children, 2001–2003
Income percentile
1 child
2 children
3+ children
Fifth
Tenth
Twentieth
Thirtieth
Fortieth
Fiftieth
Ninetieth

$3,567
5,593
9,025
12,374
15,366
19,351
41,246

$3,558
5,949
9,874
12,207
15,151
19,353
47,637

$3,675
6,186
8,843
11,406
13,464
16,394
36,291

SOURCE: Author’s calculations using Consumer Expenditure Survey data. See Meyer
(2007) for details.

We have several options for expanding earnings subsidies such as the
EITC. Besides this, a common suggestion for improving the earnings
of the worst-off is improved education and training. We need more evidence on what type of education would be most effective and for what
type of person targeted efforts would prove most beneficial.

Note
This chapter was originally a paper prepared for the conference “Strategies for Improving Economic Mobility of Workers,” organized by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and the W.E. Upjohn Institute, November 15–16, 2007.
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Helping Low-Wage Workers
Persist in Education Programs
Lessons from Research on Welfare
Training Programs and Two Promising
Community College Strategies
Lashawn Richburg-Hayes
MDRC

The policy context
Employment has long been held to be an important deterrent against
poverty, and work is at the heart of a range of federal efforts to improve
the economic well-being of low-income families. However, full-time,
stable work alone is not sufficient to alleviate poverty: more than half of
the families, with children, that have income below 200 percent of the
poverty line (a standard commonly used to define low income) do have
at least one full-time, year-round worker, implying that low wages are
a problem for many. One study that followed prime-age workers who
earned less than $12,000 a year for three consecutive years found that
most of these low earners enjoyed earnings growth in subsequent years,
but only about a fourth consistently earned more than $15,000 a year at
the end of the period—a figure that still placed them firmly in poverty
(Andersson, Holzer, and Lane 2005).
While there is some debate about the relative effect on the labor
market of factors such as globalization, technological change, declining union membership, and immigration, most agree that the dominant
labor market trends have been quite unfavorable for less-skilled workers. One of the clearest trends is that real wages have risen much more
for workers with more education, resulting in a growing disparity in
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hourly wages between workers with and without postsecondary education. For example, between 1979 and 2005, real hourly wages for
people with advanced degrees rose by 28 percent, wages for college
graduates rose by 22 percent, wages for high school graduates remained
stagnant, and wages for high school dropouts fell by 16 percent (Mishel,
Bernstein, and Allegretto 2007). This is particularly damaging for lowincome workers in families with children, since fewer than a third have
more than a high school degree and about a third are high school dropouts (Acs and Nichols 2007).
This chapter summarizes what is known from evaluations of worker
postsecondary education programs about the effectiveness of education
acquisition to advance the earnings and careers of low-wage workers.
The chapter then reviews several popular community college strategies intended to increase academic success among low-wage workers.
Finally, the chapter presents findings from two random assignment
evaluations of interventions intended to increase the success of such
students and concludes with a discussion of new strategies and their
implications for future studies to advance knowledge of what works for
this population.

What is known about education acquisition
among low-wage workers
There is compelling evidence that additional years of schooling and
advanced education credentials are associated with higher earnings.
Students who complete an associate’s degree or certificate program earn
more than those with a high school diploma or General Educational
Development (GED) certificate (Grubb 1999), and those having about
a year of college study appear to reap increased earnings, although not
as much as with the completion of a degree (Grubb 1999; Kane and
Rouse 1995).
Yet evaluations of education and basic skills training programs have
yielded mixed results concerning their ability to increase earnings. In
the welfare context, the National Evaluation of Welfare to Work Strategies—a random assignment demonstration—showed that “education
first” programs, which require people to initially participate in edu-
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cation or training (typically, remedial reading and math, GED exam
preparation, or English as a Second Language [ESL] classes), did not
increase the likelihood of their becoming employed in “good” jobs or
produce more earnings growth when compared with “job search–first”
programs, which emphasize getting people into jobs as quickly as possible (Hamilton 2002). However, the program that had the largest effect
on stable employment and earnings growth in this study was one that
allowed some individuals to participate in short-term training or education before they searched for work. Nevertheless, in most cases, recipients dropped out of education programs quickly.
One site in the Employment Retention and Advancement Demonstration Project, another random assignment study, is currently testing
two strategies for promoting participation in education and training
among welfare recipients who are employed. Thus far, the results show
that neither approach has been able to induce many people to enroll in
education or training who would not have enrolled on their own (Hamilton et al. forthcoming). New Visions, a community college bridge
program that sought to increase the job retention and advancement of
welfare recipients in California, also had difficulty increasing college
enrollment above the levels of the control group and ensuring program
participation. After a two-and-a-half-year period, this program resulted
in slightly higher college-going (6 percentage points) but reduced total
earnings (about $2,300) relative to a control group that attended other
employment and training services (Fein and Beecroft 2006).
Other studies that examine voluntary education and training programs outside the welfare system have found similarly mixed results.
The National Job Training Partnership Act Study found some modest
earnings impacts for adult women, with on-the-job training producing
larger gains than classroom training (Orr et al. 1996). Similarly, a metaanalysis of voluntary training programs found larger effects for women
than for men or youth, particularly for classroom skills training, onthe-job training, and mixed classroom and workplace training (Greenberg, Michalopoulos, and Robins 2003). Another project that tested
voluntary training, the Minority Female Single Parent Demonstration,
found positive results at one of four sites, the Center for Employment
Training (CET), which was known for integrating vocational and basicskills instruction and maintaining tight links to employers (Burghardt et
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al. 1992). However, the evaluation of a multisite replication of CET’s
model found few positive effects (Miller et al. 2005).
In sum, while the link between skills and wages suggests education
and skills training may offer the best hope for substantial wage growth,
encouraging people to enroll in education and training, to persist in it,
and to complete it may be a key component. Furthermore, to enable
education to lead to advancement for low-wage workers, several barriers to higher education will need to be addressed: access to postsecondary education, affordability, and academic success (Clymer, Roberts,
and Strawn 2001; McSwain and Davis 2007). Of all higher education
institution types, community colleges may be best situated to address
the diverse barriers of low-wage workers (Kazis et al. 2007).

The role of community colleges
Community colleges play a critical role in American higher education. According to the U.S. Department of Education, nearly half of
all students who begin postsecondary education start at a community
college (U.S. Department of Education 2002). Because community colleges have open admissions policies and relatively low tuition and fees,
they are particularly important to the millions of adults who may lack
preparation or may otherwise be unable to afford college. In addition,
their flexible schedules and long history as sponsors of employment and
training programs targeting both disadvantaged populations and local
industries make them a key player in the development of a more skilled
workforce (Melendez et al. 2004).
Despite the accessibility and relative affordability of community
colleges, however, many students who begin programs at community
colleges end their formal education prematurely. One study of adult
undergraduates who work found that 62 percent of students who considered themselves workers first and students second had not completed a certificate or degree and were no longer enrolled, compared with
39 percent of adults who described themselves as being students first
and working only to cover minor expenses (Berker, Horn, and Carroll
2003). Longitudinal studies of postsecondary student populations indicate that 46 percent of those who begin at community colleges do not
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complete a degree or enroll elsewhere within a six-year time frame (U.S.
Department of Education 2002). Clearly, persistence and retention are
not issues isolated to low-wage workers pursuing advanced education.
However, characteristics of jobs (absence of paid leave, lack of flexible work hours, unpredictability of hours or shift work), in addition to
the limited financial aid for independent persons with dependents, academic underpreparedness, and family obligations, all contribute to this
group’s low enrollment and completion (Golonka and Matus-Grossman
2001; Levin-Epstein 2007; Matus-Grossman and Gooden 2001).
In recent years, several notable programs have been designed at
community colleges to serve the unique needs of low-wage workers—
with mixed success. For example, the New Visions program discussed
above was codesigned and operated by Riverside (Calif.) Community
College and Riverside County’s Department of Public Social Services to build on earlier welfare reform approaches that had resulted in
increased employment and earnings. As noted, this program did not
meet its intended goals, perhaps because the intervention was less beneficial than other education and training programs available. Another
example is the ACCESS Project at Hamilton College in Clinton, New
York, which serves welfare-eligible single mothers. This program has
reported student retention levels in excess of 90 percent and completion
rates comparable to rates of the college’s traditional students; moreover, ACCESS students have achieved these rates while working (Adair
2003). Findings from the Parents as Scholars program in Maine suggest
that the program increased wages among TANF-eligible students who
graduated (Butler, Deprez, and Smith 2003). There are similar findings
from other programs in Boston and California (Polakow, Butler, Deprez,
and Kahn 2004). While these findings suggest that targeted programs
with wraparound services work, most programs are very small and not
rigorously evaluated, so one cannot interpret the causality of these positive associations.
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Strategies to improve persistence
and retention
MDRC launched the Opening Doors demonstration to learn how
community colleges can implement reforms that may help greater numbers of students achieve their goals, particularly their academic and
career goals, and that may lead to longer-term success in the labor market and in life for those students (Brock and LeBlanc 2005). Specifically, the demonstration is examining various programs or interventions
that represent enhancements to community college teaching, student
services, and financial aid to determine their effects on student persistence and other outcomes, including degree attainment, labor market
experiences, and personal and social well-being. Opening Doors measured the effects of these enhancements by randomly assigning students
who participate in the research either to a program group that receives
the enhanced services or to a comparison group that receives the standard services offered by the college. By comparing the experiences of
both groups over a period of several years, MDRC is able to measure
the difference, or impact, that the interventions make in students’ lives,
both in the short and in the long term.
The Opening Doors project evaluates four popular strategies (two
of which are widely implemented in community colleges) that are
intended to increase student success and retention. These consist of 1)
learning communities, 2) enhanced counseling with a small scholarship, 3) an incentive-based scholarship, and 4) enhanced student services. Table 6.1 provides a summary of the interventions and the target
populations. The evaluations of the enhanced student services and the
incentive scholarship are particularly relevant to the concern about lowwage workers and persistence, or success, in academic course work at
community colleges.
Enhanced Student Services
The Opening Doors project comprising Lorain County Community
College and Owens Community College in Ohio targeted new and continuing students who had completed fewer than 13 credits.1 The linchpin of the program was an adviser with whom students were expected
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to meet at least once a month for two semesters to discuss academic
progress and any other issues that might be affecting their schooling.
Advisers carried a caseload of no more than 125 students, which stood
in sharp contrast to the academic advising services available to students
in the comparison group, where the ratio of counseling staff to students
not enrolled in Opening Doors was about 1 to 1,000. In addition, designated staff members from other student service departments—including
financial aid and career services—functioned as a team, so that at least
one staff member from each department served as a point person for
the Opening Doors program. While students in the comparison group
could access these same departments, they generally would have had to
initiate such contact on their own rather than through a direct referral.
Finally, students in the Opening Doors group were given a $150 scholarship for each of two consecutive semesters that they could use for
any purpose. The scholarship payments were approved by the academic
adviser and were made at the beginning and middle of the semester as
a way of making sure that students stayed in contact with the adviser.
Students in the comparison group did not receive these scholarships.
Even though academic guidance and counseling may arguably be
the most important student service, most students receive minimal help.
Nationally, the average community college employs one adviser for
approximately every 1,000 students (Grubb 2001). While colleges differ in how their advisers deliver services and the topics they cover, the
necessity of working with many students tends to drive them toward
a traditional problem-solving approach in which a student presents an
issue and the adviser offers a quick response. The National Academic
Advising Association urges community colleges and four-year colleges and universities to provide sufficient staffing, so that students and
advisers can have ongoing, interactive relationships. The association
also urges these institutions to adopt a developmental approach whereby advisers help students clarify personal goals and objectives rather
than simply approving their choice of courses (Gordon, Habley, and
Associates 2000). Research suggests that this is even more important
for low-wage workers, who may need more help than their younger
counterparts in navigating their way to a credential (Kazis et al. 2007).
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Incentive Scholarship
The Opening Doors project comprising Delgado Community College and the Louisiana Technical College–West Jefferson campus in
Louisiana offered a $1,000 scholarship for each of two semesters (for
a total of up to $2,000) to parents with children under age 18 whose
family incomes were below 200 percent of the federal poverty level.2
The scholarship was tied to academic performance: an initial payment
of $250 was made after students enrolled at least half-time; a second
payment of $250 was made after midterms for students who remained
enrolled at least half-time and earned at least a C average; and a final
payment of $500 was made after students passed all their courses. The
scholarship was paid in addition to any other financial aid students
received. Each student was assigned to a counselor, and counselors
monitored the students’ grades, arranged tutoring or other help as needed, and approved scholarship disbursements. Table 6.1 summarizes
each intervention and the students targeted for the study.
This intervention developed out of focus groups with low-income
parents who were attending or wanted to attend community college; it
also sprang from interest among Louisiana state officials in a financial
incentive plan similar to those implemented to move welfare recipients
into employment (Brock and Richburg-Hayes 2006; Richburg-Hayes
et al. 2009). Many of the focus-group students worried about the cost
of tuition, books, and child care (Matus-Grossman and Gooden 2002).
While most students may have qualified for the federal Pell Grant program (the primary need-based financial aid program for college students in the United States) and loan programs, worries about how to
pay for college inevitably led some students to reduce their hours of
attendance (thereby increasing the time it takes to earn a degree) or to
drop out altogether. Given the high cost of attending college, many Pell
Grant recipients have a significant amount of unmet need, especially
those recipients who are independent and working (Mercer 2005). The
incentive-based scholarship was intended to meet some of those needs
while still being accessible to a large group typically missed by scholarship programs.
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Findings
Table 6.2 presents some background characteristics of the students
in each community college sample. The table shows that the samples
consist largely of women and older adults, an outcome that mirrors
the community college population more than the target criteria, since
adults over the age of 24 make up close to 45 percent of all undergraduate enrollments (Berker, Horn, and Carroll 2003). A large proportion of the sample were parents and low-wage workers at the point of
random assignment, and more than half of the students who worked
earned about $8 an hour—in fact, more than 80 percent worked at least
half-time in the preceding 12 months (not shown). Again, this mirrors
the population of community college students nationally, as close to 80
percent balance their studies with full-time or part-time work (Phillippe
and Patton 2000). Most of the students in the samples are financially
independent, and more than half received their high school diploma or
GED five or more years prior to the study. In short, the sample may be
representative of the pool of low-wage workers discussed at the beginning of this chapter.
Table 6.3 shows selected impacts for each intervention during the
first three semesters since random assignment. Each entry shows the
difference in outcomes, or the impact, between the treatment group
and the control group (which represents what would have happened in
the absence of the intervention). The asterisks show the statistical significance of the differences between the two groups—in other words,
whether the difference was a result of the program.
The first panel (Panel A) shows outcomes in the first Opening Doors
semester. The first row shows no difference in registration rates in any
of the samples. This result was expected given that random assignment
was conducted for those students who had already matriculated at the
college or showed considerable interest in enrolling. While there are
no differences in the remaining outcomes for the enhanced student
services intervention, the performance-based scholarship intervention
resulted in treatment-group students passing slightly more courses (0.4
of a course more), earning more total credits (1.1 more), and withdrawing from courses at lower rates (6.9 percentage points lower).
The second panel (Panel B) shows academic performance for the
second Opening Doors semester. Encouragingly, the Opening Doors
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program had a positive effect on student retention at two of the three
sites. While the proportion registering for college courses dropped
somewhat among both Opening Doors students and the control group
(not shown), the Opening Doors program resulted in a 5.6-percentagepoint increase (over a control-group base of 57.2 percent) in registrants
at Owens Community College and an 18.2-percentage-point increase
(over a control-group base of 57.5 percent) at the two community colleges in Louisiana. This latter result is quite large, and effects of this
magnitude are seldom seen in program evaluations that use rigorous
random assignment designs. In addition to registration gains, Opening
Doors students are more likely than their control group counterparts to
attempt more courses (and thus register for more credits) and earn more
developmental credits at one Ohio site and at both of the Louisiana
sites. In Louisiana, Opening Doors students also passed more courses
and earned more regular credits (latter outcome not shown in table).
The third panel (Panel C) shows a few results from the first postprogram semester, or the first semester that the intervention was not in
place. The first two columns show small, insignificant impacts, which
indicate that the outcomes for the treatment group largely mirror those
for the control group. In contrast, the last column shows continued
effects for the incentive scholarship intervention.
Overall, the interventions seem to have affected outcomes related
to academic success in the semesters in which they operated. With the
exception of the performance-based scholarship, the impacts appear to
fade after the program ends. Nevertheless, there may still be delayed
effects in subsequent semesters, and future work will examine these
in addition to other outcomes that may be affected by education acquisition in the longer term, such as social and psychological outcomes,
health behaviors, and labor market outcomes.

Implications for future work
In light of the long-term labor market trends that have resulted in
stagnant wage growth for those in the lowest quintile of the income distribution because of global competition, declining union membership,
and increased immigration, it appears that most low-wage workers will
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need to increase their skill levels in order to raise their earnings substantially. While results from previous studies of education and training
programs for adults have been mixed at best, several new strategies
emerging in the field offer the possibility of better results. For example,
there are several promising efforts to provide employer-focused training
to low earners that, in some cases, operate on a large scale (Martinson
2007). These include incumbent worker training programs (state grants
to businesses for collaborating with training providers on training existing workers) and sectoral initiatives (providing training to a cluster of
employers in one segment of the labor market).
While it is far too early to conclude that the Opening Doors program in Louisiana is an unequivocal success, the early results are large
and compelling. For example, the third-semester retention impact of
11.2 percentage points is larger than most nonexperimental analyses of
other scholarship programs would have predicted.3 Clearly, the Louisiana results suggest that a performance-based scholarship can have a
large positive effect on academic achievement among a predominantly
female, single-parent student population that faces multiple barriers to
completing college.
Nonexperimental research has also associated student aid programs
with higher enrollment in postsecondary education (Abraham and Clark
2003; Turner 2007). However, the existing research is far from definitive, and more tests are needed. Several states have developed innovative financial assistance programs for nontraditional students (such
as those without a high school diploma or those attending part-time)
who pursue postsecondary education or skills training (Martinson and
Holcomb 2007).
The research to date clearly shows that the success of employer
training programs or community college–based programs largely
depends on addressing the barriers to education acquisition faced by
low-wage adults. The current system of instruction and financial aid is
largely based on “traditional” students—those entering postsecondary
education out of high school, for whom work is of secondary importance. Future research in this area will need to examine the implications
of relaxing some of the barriers the current system imposes.
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Notes
I would like to thank Thomas Brock for reviewing an early draft of this chapter. I would
also like to acknowledge the work of the Employment and Self-Sufficiency Strategies
team for background on the evaluation of education initiatives. All errors and omissions
remain my own.
1. See Scrivener and Au (2007) and Scrivener and Pih (2007), respectively, for more
detail on the study at Lorain County Community College and Owens Community
College.
2. They did not need to be on welfare.
3. While his results are not directly comparable to this retention estimate, Bettinger
(2004) finds that a $1,000 increase in Pell Grant eligibility increases persistence
between the first and second year of college attendance by 2 to 4 percentage points.
Dynarski (2005) finds that merit aid of about $3,000 increases the probability of
persistence by 5 to 11 percentage points among those who would still have gone
to college in the absence of the financial aid.
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Table 6.1 Opening Doors Interventions and Students’ Eligibility Determinants, by Community College

Intervention

Criteria
Age
Household
income
Other

Lorain County
and Owens (Ohio)
Enhanced student services
and a modest scholarship:
students assigned to a
dedicated adviser with
whom they had to meet
frequently; students eligible
for $150 scholarship for
each of two semesters after
meetings with adviser.

Delgado and Louisiana
Tech–West Jefferson (La.)
Incentive scholarship:
students were eligible for
a $1,000 scholarship for
each of two semesters;
scholarship tied to
maintaining at least halftime enrollment and a grade
point average of 2.0 (a “C”
average).

Chaffey College (Calif.)
College survival skills and
enhanced student services:
students assigned to a twosemester guidance course
that provided instructional
support as well as advising;
students required to visit the
college’s success centers for
extra academic support.

17–34
Not screened.a

18–34
Below 250 percent of
federal poverty level.

18–34
Below 200 percent of
federal poverty level.

18–34
Below 250 percent of
federal poverty level.

Only new freshmen. English
as a Second Language
(ESL) students are
excluded.

Continuing students must
not have completed more
than 12 credits; must
have shown indications
of academic difficulty (as
determined by low grades or
withdrawal from courses).

Must be a parent of at least
one dependent under age
19. Must have a high school
diploma or GED and have
passed a college entrance
exam. Must not have an
occupational certificate or
college degree.

Only continuing students.
Students must be on
probation for having a grade
point average below 2.0 or
completing less than half of
their attempted credits.

Kingsborough (N.Y.)
Learning communities and
a book voucher: groups
of students were assigned
to take three linked credit
courses together; students
received enhanced advising
and tutoring and vouchers to
pay for textbooks.
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NOTE: See Bloom and Sommo (2005), Richburg-Hayes, Visher, and Bloom (forthcoming), and Bloom et al. (forthcoming) for more information on the Opening Doors program at Kingsborough Community College. See Brock and Pih (forthcoming) for more information
about the Opening Doors program at Chaffey College.
a
The majority of students enrolled at Kingsborough were low-income, so the Opening Doors study did not impose additional income
screening.

Malea
Age
18–20 years old
21–25 years old
26–30 years old
31 and older
Average age (years)
Number of children
None
One
Two
Three or more
Among sample members with children:
Age of youngest child (years)
Financially dependent on parents
Currently employed
Among those currently employed:b
Number of hours worked per week in current job
1–10 hours
11–20 hours
21–30 hours

Owens
Community
College (Ohio)

Lorain County
Community
College (Ohio)

Delgado
Community
College (La.)

Louisiana
Technical–West
Jefferson (La.)

28.1

20.5

5.5

15.8

38.0
32.4
19.5
10.2
23.3

16.1
39.6
27.9
16.4
25.4

19.8
37.6
29.1
13.5
24.9

10.4
28.2
35.1
26.2
27.0

48.7
24.4
15.3
11.6

17.8
36.7
24.1
21.4

—
53.9
26.3
19.8

—
38.8
30.8
30.3

3.0
23.4
57.1

3.3
10.3
54.0

3.0
17.9
51.4

3.6
14.4
52.5

5.1
22.7
29.4

4.6
21.9
26.9

4.8
16.8
25.6

4.9
15.5
20.4
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Table 6.2 Characteristics of Community College Sample Members at Baseline in the Opening Doors Project

31–40 hours
More than 40 hours
Average hourly wage at current job ($)
Highest grade completed
8th grade or lower
9th grade
10th grade
11th grade
12th grade
Date of high school graduation/GED receipt
During the past year
Between one and five years ago
Between five and ten years ago
More than ten years ago
Main reason for enrolling in collegec
To complete a certificate program
To obtain an associate’s degree
To transfer to a 4-year college/university
To obtain/update job skills
Other
Sample size

32.6
10.2
8.10

33.1
13.6
8.60

47.0
5.8
8.00

51.5
7.8
7.10

1.3
3.3
5.0
6.6
83.8

1.1
4.6
6.7
12.2
75.5

0.6
3.2
4.9
7.6
83.7

1.5
1.5
4.5
5.5
87.1

27.8
32.8
23.9
15.5

13.5
30.8
29.5
26.2

11.7
33.7
33.7
20.9

6.8
23.4
31.3
38.5

8.9
44.0
27.5
14.3
8.4
1,214

11.1
55.7
20.7
9.8
4.8
477

10.8
60.4
17.9
9.7
5.7
817

24.5
39.5
6.0
28.0
7.5
7.5
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NOTE: Distributions may not add to 100 percent because of rounding or because subcategories are not mutually exclusive. — = data not
available.
a
All categories, including this one, are in percentages unless otherwise noted.
b
Figures for this category are calculated for a proportion of the full sample.
c
Distributions may not add to 100 percent because categories are not mutually exclusive.
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from a baseline information survey.

Owens Community
College (Ohio)

Lorain County
C.C. (Ohio)

Delgado C.C. & Louisiana
Technical–West Jefferson

Panel A
First Opening Doors semester
Registered for any courses (%)
Number of courses attempted
Number of courses passed
Total credits registered for (regular + developmental)
Total credits earned (regular + developmental)
Developmental credits earned
Withdrew from one or more courses (%)

0.7
0.1
0.1
0.3
0.3
0.2
3.5

1.7
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.3
6.4

4.5
0.2
0.4***
0.4
1.1***
0.2
6.9*

10.5
0.4
0.2
1.4
0.7
0.3
5.3

18.2***
0.5***
0.4***
1.4***
1.2***
0.4***
4.3

Panel B
Second Opening Doors semester
Registered for any courses (%)
Number of courses attempted
Number of courses passed
Total credits registered for (regular + developmental)
Total credits earned (regular + developmental)
Developmental credits earned
Withdrew from one or more courses (%)

5.6***
0.2**
0.1
0.7***
0.4
0.2*
3.8***
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Table 6.3 Impacts on Academic Performance during the First Three Semesters since Random Assignment in
Selected Opening Doors Sites

Panel C
First postprogram semester
Registered for any courses (%)
Number of courses attempted
Total credits registered for (regular + developmental)
Summary outcomes
Total number of semesters enrolled
Total credits earned (regular + developmental)
Sample size

3.2
0.2
0.5
0.1
0.7
1,241

3.6
0.1
0.4
0.3***
1.1
478

11.2***
0.5***
1.4***
0.3***
3.3***
537

NOTE: Data from the Ohio sites use all observations. Data from the Louisiana sites consist of the two earliest cohorts, which represent 53
percent of the full sample of 1,019 students. Each column entry represents the regression-adjusted difference in treatment and control
means for the specified outcome. A two-tailed t-test was applied to differences between the research groups. Statistical significance levels
are indicated as follows: *significant at the 0.10 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; ***significant at the 0.01 level.
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from college transcript data.
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7
Financial Aid and Older Workers
Supporting the Nontraditional Student
Bridget Terry Long
Harvard University

THE INCREASING ROLE OF NONTRADITIONAL
STUDENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION
Educational trends increasingly highlight the growing numbers of
older students who are seeking postsecondary training. According to
figures from the 2006 Digest of Education Statistics (NCES 2007), only
28 percent of the college population was age 25 or above in 1970. However, by 1995, this had risen to 43 percent of students; currently 39 percent of students are age 25 or above. These trends mirror an important
need in the country: changes in the labor market suggest that employers
are demanding more-educated workers with different types of skills.
Therefore, it has become important for many older workers to “retool.”
Workers are increasingly expected to utilize a broad base of knowledge
in their jobs, as well as handle multiple responsibilities and changing
procedures (Stuart and Dahm 1999). Voorhees and Lingenfelter (2003)
estimate that currently 56 percent of American workers need education
beyond a high school degree to do their jobs, and this proportion will
most certainly increase in the future. Voorhees and Lingenfelter highlight studies that suggest eight out of ten new jobs created over the next
two decades will require some postsecondary education. For workers
without these skills, the punishment is severe. As noted by Acs, Phillips, and McKenzie (2000), working full-time at a low-wage job will
not lead to long-term economic well-being. They estimate that 80 percent of families who are part of the working poor would be low-income
even if all able-bodied adult members worked full-time.
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The potential role of education, particularly postsecondary training, to improve outcomes for families is significant, as the returns to
college attendance are likely large for older workers. Leigh and Gill
(1997) find that the returns to associate degree and nondegree community college programs are not only positive but, for returning adults,
similar to the returns for recent high school graduates. In the same vein,
Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (2005) conclude that the impact of a
year of community college schooling increases long-term earnings by 7
percent for men and 10 percent for women. Carnevale and Desrochers
(1999), focusing on welfare recipients with basic skills equal to a high
school diploma, estimate than an additional 200 hours of education and
training could lead to jobs that pay $5,000 to $10,000 more. This is
equivalent to a semester of postsecondary courses.
Beyond trends in the labor market, demographic change related
to the aging of the baby boomers also explains part of the increase in
nontraditional, older students. Because this group now forms a larger
cohort, even if its members were to attend college at the same rates as
older students have in the past, the proportion of college students who
are older would have increased. However, it is also clear that larger percentages of older workers are returning to higher education than ever
before. Pent-up demand for higher education may also explain increased
enrollments among older working women and racial minorities. Some
suggest that opportunities for college attendance were more limited
when these groups were of traditional college age, but as norms have
changed, these workers are now better able to access postsecondary
training (Goldin, Katz, and Kuziemko 2006). Changes in social policies
such as welfare may also explain some of the fluctuation in trends.
However, the financial concerns of nontraditional students are a
serious issue. Research suggests that the financial aid system, originally designed to meet the needs of traditional-age college students,
does a poor job of addressing the circumstances of older, nontraditional
students. Particularly with such a diverse population in terms of background, situations, and goals, a key issue is whether one set of financial
aid policies can meet all students’ needs. The following sections detail
how the financial aid system currently works and the ways it does or
does not address the needs of nontraditional students. First, however,
the rest of this section gives additional background on the characteristics and enrollment patterns of nontraditional students.
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Defining the “Nontraditional” Student
While age captures much of what is considered to define a nontraditional student, the definition has become much more nuanced with
the growth of such a diverse population. In contrast to “nontraditional”
students, researchers and practitioners often refer to “traditional” students as those who earn a regular high school diploma, enroll in college full-time immediately after graduation, depend on their parents for
financial support, and either do not work during the school year or only
work part-time. Therefore, the definition of nontraditional has become
much more inclusive of students who do not fit the traditional mold.
Using a much broader definition, Choy (2002) defines a nontraditional
undergraduate as one who fits any of the following criteria:
• Delays enrollment after high school
• Attends part-time
• Works full-time while enrolled
• Is considered financially independent
• Has dependents other than a spouse
• Does not have a regular high school diploma (i.e., has a GED or
other certificate)
• Is a displaced worker or unemployed
• Is a welfare recipient
• Is an immigrant
By her calculations, nearly three-fourths of undergraduates are nontraditional. This would include working adults, parents, welfare recipients, immigrants, displaced workers and the unemployed, and single,
financially independent students.
In terms of financial aid, this last group of financially independent
students is the most relevant. Independent students are treated differently in the calculation of need for government aid sources. Students can
qualify for this designation in one of several ways. First, students age
24 or above are automatically considered independent. However, students who are married, have dependents, or are veterans also qualify as
independent. Students whose parents are deceased or who were wards
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of the court before the age of 18 are likewise automatically considered
independent.
Another category of nontraditional students are those who engage in
training outside of formal programs, such as individuals who take particular courses for job-related skills. In 2002–2003 approximately 68.5
million people took courses or training that was not part of a traditional
degree, certificate, or apprenticeship program for reasons related to their
job or career (O’Donnell 2005). These courses included seminars, training sessions, or workshops offered by businesses, unions, and government agencies, as well as classes taken at colleges or universities that
were not part of a degree program. Most (90 percent) of these workers
did so to maintain or improve skills they already had. Employers often
required or recommended participation in the courses for those who
were already employed. A fifth of participants took courses to secure
a pay raise or promotion (DeBell and Mulligan 2005). Voorhees and
Lingenfelter (2003) estimate that by the end of the current decade more
than half of American adults will take advantage of formal learning
opportunities at some point in their lives.

A DESCRIPTION OF AID RESOURCES FOR
NONTRADITIONAL STUDENTS
Need Analysis and the Nontraditional Student
The financial aid process begins with the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA). The FAFSA collects information on family
income and assets in order to determine the Expected Family Contribution (EFC), the amount the federal government determines a family is
able to contribute to higher education expenses. Other information that
affects this calculation is the size of the family, the number of family members in college, and the age of the older head of household
(assuming two parents in the household), as well as information on the
student’s earnings and assets. To calculate a student’s financial need,
the government subtracts the EFC from the total cost of attendance.1
A student’s financial need, in combination with his or her EFC, determines whether he or she is eligible for certain grants and loans. For
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example, students who have a low EFC and financial need are eligible
for federal need-based aid, like a Pell Grant. While the FAFSA is the
federal application, it is also used by most states and institutions likely
to enroll nontraditional students.
Being an independent (i.e., nontraditional) student affects the aid
calculation in one important way. Because independent students may
have their own dependents and are not expected to rely on parental
contributions, the federal system does not expect them to contribute as
much as the families of dependent students. Therefore, their EFCs tend
to be lower. However, the amount an independent student is expected
to contribute can be substantial, and it can vary substantially with only
small changes in income. A single adult with two children who made
an income at the poverty threshold ($16,242) would not be expected
to contribute anything to his or her postsecondary training. However,
at 150 percent of the poverty level ($24,363), the EFC would be $401,
and at 200 percent of the poverty level ($32,484), the amount would
be $2,116 (FinAid 2008).2 Meanwhile, a married adult with two children who made an income at 150 percent of the poverty level ($30,666)
would be expected to contribute $718; the amount would be $2,877 at
200 percent of the poverty level ($40,888). Therefore, as also noted
by Choitz and Widom (2003), although there is not much difference
between 150 and 200 percent of the federal poverty line, the difference
in EFC can be large.
There are several major criticisms of the way federal need analysis
is applied to nontraditional students. Foremost is that the system was
designed with a traditional, dependent student in mind. Therefore, it
assumes that the earnings of the potential student are relatively minor
(i.e., the result of a summer job) and a large proportion of the student’s
earnings should be used to cover college expenses. Moreover, the calculation assumes that the parents’ income, the main source of support for
the child, will continue even while the student is in college and should
be used to help cover expenses. In contrast, independent students do not
have other major sources of support to rely upon. Most nontraditional
students are formally engaged in the labor market when applying for
financial aid, and while the government assumes this income level will
remain the same even after college enrollment, the nontraditional student is actually likely to experience a reduction in earnings while pursuing a degree. Therefore, assumptions about the amount of earnings
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available to that person while in school are incorrect. As an extension of
this, the EFC for many nontraditional students may be too high, as they
are penalized for their earnings the year before starting school.
Beyond the EFC and need calculation, independence is not a major
consideration in the award of financial aid. However, other criteria can
disproportionally reduce aid eligibility for nontraditional students. For
example, some programs require students to be enrolled at least parttime or even full-time. Because nontraditional students often attend
part-time or less than half-time, this excludes them from qualifying for
some aid. Nontraditional students are also less likely to be enrolled in a
degree program and more likely to pursue a particular skill without the
goal of completing a certificate or other credential. They are therefore
excluded from programs requiring students to be enrolled in a degree
program. Finally, some programs require a regular high school diploma, whereas many nontraditional students instead have a GED or other
certificate (Bosworth and Choitz 2002). The next section describes several of the major financial aid programs and how they apply to nontraditional students.
Federal Financial Aid Programs and Nontraditional Students
The Pell Grant is the largest U.S. need-based aid program and serves
as the foundation for other aid. This means that if students are eligible,
the Pell Grant is awarded first. The majority of Pell recipients come
from families with incomes in the lowest economic quartile; families
earning between $30,000 and $40,000 begin to be phased out of Pell
eligibility. The Pell Grant has been a particularly important program
for nontraditional students. In 2006–2007, 59 percent of Pell Grants
went to independent students (College Board 2007). However, students
are required to attend at least part-time to receive a Pell Grant, and this
excludes many working adults. According to analysis by FutureWorks,
few working parents who had an income of less than 200 percent of
the federal poverty level received a Pell Grant (Bosworth and Choitz
2004). Additionally, students must be enrolled in an institution eligible
for federal Title IV funds in order to receive aid such as the Pell Grant.
Students with financial need may also be eligible for federal work-study
funds, which subsidize the wages of students employed in on-campus
jobs. However, these awards rarely go to nontraditional students.
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Students with higher EFCs usually will not qualify for Pell Grants or
work-study funds, but they are eligible for government loan programs.
The federal government sponsors several major loan programs. The
largest is the Federal Stafford Loan Program, which offers subsidized
and unsubsidized loans. Interest on subsidized loans, available only to
needy students as determined by the FAFSA, is paid by the government
while the students are in college. During their first year of undergraduate education, students may receive up to $3,500; the limit increases
in subsequent years and is higher for independent students. However,
many community colleges, a common destination for nontraditional
students, do not participate in the federal loan program because of penalties that would be incurred if their students had high default rates. The
Perkins Loan Program is another federal program, and it is distributed
by campuses on the basis of financial need. Finally, the Federal PLUS
Loan Program (Parent Loans for Undergraduate Students) is available
to the parents of dependent college students as well as to independent
students themselves. PLUS loans have no annual or aggregate limit,
except that one may not borrow more than the cost of attendance, net of
other financial aid. All of the federal loan programs require repayment
after the student stops attending college, regardless of whether or not he
or she has completed a degree.
In addition to grant, loan, and work-study programs, the federal government offers aid through the tax code. The Hope and Lifetime Learning Tax Credits provide a benefit to families who pay tuition expenses
and incur tax liability (Long 2004). Relative to the Pell Grant, the higher
education tax credits maintain a much higher level of income eligibility,
phasing out at an adjusted gross income of $90,000 to $110,000 for joint
filers, or $45,000 to $55,000 for single filers (IRS 2006). The Lifetime
Learning Tax Credit (LLTC) is particularly relevant for nontraditional
students. It was designed for adults in their later years of postsecondary study and for those returning to school to upgrade their skills or
prepare for a new career. The student does not need to be enrolled in a
particular degree program. The LLTC targets postsecondary study after
the first two years of college and is equal to 20 percent of tuition expenditures up to a tax credit of $2,000. However, the tax credits are not
refundable, and therefore lower-income workers without tax liability
are not eligible for a benefit. Additionally, the more generous Hope Tax
Credit requires at least part-time attendance and was designed to meet
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the needs of more traditional-age students during their first two years
of college.
There are also a number of tax benefits for families who save for college, such as 529 Plans and Coverdell Savings Accounts. The government does not tax investment gains in these accounts if they are used to
pay for tuition. Finally, there are several federal programs that indirectly
target nontraditional students. Among them are veteran’s and military
benefits and job training programs, such as the Workforce Investment
Act (WIA). The WIA is the primary national workforce development
program, and it focuses on employment services and basic training for
the unemployed. While much of the funding is targeted for job search
assistance for unemployed adults, there is also a little support for the
training of current workers (Bosworth and Choitz 2004).
State Financial Aid Programs and Nontraditional Students
Most state financial aid programs have eligibility requirements similar to those of federal programs. This in turn often makes them less
accessible to nontraditional students for the reasons mentioned above:
EFC cutoffs and enrollment requirements, such as attending at least
part-time and in a particular educational program. Additionally, many
state programs are explicitly designed for students who recently graduated from high school, which means they favor traditional students.
However, according to Choitz and Widom (2003), approximately 15
states have programs or policies that provide special funding to students
who are enrolled less than half-time or do not exclude students at any
enrollment intensity level (including less than half-time). According to
Choitz and Widom’s survey, for example, Illinois and Minnesota allow
less-than-half-time students to participate in the state’s main needbased student grant program. Georgia, Ohio, Oregon, Washington, and
West Virginia also have tuition-assistance programs for less-than-halftime students. Other states such as Louisiana allow the use of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) dollars for postsecondary
training.
Golonka and Matus-Grossman (2001) note additional examples of
innovative state models. California has used multiple aid sources to provide comprehensive financial support for students. The state’s “75/25”
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work-study program combines state work-study funds for TANF students with employer and college contributions. Employers must pay at
least 25 percent of students’ off-campus work-study wages while colleges pay the rest. The work-study earnings are excluded from income
when calculating TANF eligibility. Unfortunately, while food stamps,
Medicaid, and other federal programs do not count federal work-study
income in determining eligibility, the same is not true for this state-created work-study program. Washington is an example of a state that has
developed a program for working parents interested in job training. The
Work-Based Learning Tuition Assistance Program gives aid to students
who have one or more children and are TANF-eligible or have family income at or below 175 percent of poverty level. The aid can be
applied to any job-related vocational training or continuing education
program.
The Role of Employers in Supporting the Training of
Working Adults
Many question whether employers have incentives to invest in the
training of their workers. Economic theory suggests that firms will not
bear the costs of general training because of the risk of losing the worker without reaping the benefits of the human capital investment (Becker
1964). However, in many cases firms catering to working adults with
little education do provide free skills training (Autor 2001; Autor, Levy,
and Murnane 1999). Stokes (2006), citing Training magazine, notes that
American corporations spent more than $51 billion on training in 2004.
According to other estimates, seven out of ten businesses provide some
form of formal employee training, and between 35 and 65 percent of all
workers participate (Lerman, McKernan, and Riegg 2001). While the
authors find training to be more common among workers with higher
earnings and levels of education, the training appears to be more intensive for younger, part-time, and less-experienced workers.
Although the majority of this $51 billion in training dollars went to
the salaries of internal training staff, more than $13 billion was devoted
to purchasing services from third-party providers (Stokes 2006). These
include commercial training companies, government agencies, and professional associations. Colleges and universities had only a 5 percent
share of these expenditures, according to estimates from Eduventures.
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Stokes suggests these institutions could therefore do much more to support older students by taking on this mission more seriously.

RESEARCH ON AID AND NONTRADITIONAL STUDENTS
Does the Aid System Serve the Needs of Nontraditional Students?
A key question about the current financial aid system is how well
it meets the needs of nontraditional students. Numerous studies point
to the significant unmet financial need traditional students face after
accounting for all sources of government and institutional financial aid
(ACSFA 2001, 2002). Similar patterns are found for nontraditional,
independent students. The total amount of unmet need was slightly
lower on average for independent students, at $4,800, than it was for
dependent students, at $5,900 (Berkner and Wei 2006). However, the
incidence of unmet need was higher among nontraditional, older students. After all forms of financial aid were allocated, 54.4 percent of
independent students still had financial need, in comparison to 45.6 percent of dependent students.
To summarize, nontraditional students appear to face financial hurdles to attending college that are just as high or higher than those of their
younger counterparts. Such hurdles arise from several of the design elements of the aid system and programs. As noted above, the EFC calculation assumes that students will continue to make the same income
while attending college as they did during the year before enrolling.
Each dollar of student income greatly reduces eligibility for financial
aid, with the assumption that most of the earnings can be applied to
pay college costs. Additionally, by attending part-time or less than halftime and not enrolling in a particular educational program, independent
students are often not eligible for financial aid. As noted by Berkner
and Wei (2006), the type of institution attended can also influence the
aid and need calculations because of differences in the average cost of
attendance. The need for aid is highest at private for-profit and not-forprofit colleges and universities.
The differences between dependent and independent students are
also reflected in how aid is distributed among students. Though a simi-
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lar percentage of dependent and independent students received some
kind of grant aid in 2003–2004 (50.4 and 51.0 percent, respectively),
the average amount differed substantially. Dependent students averaged
$5,200 in grants, while independent students received $2,900 on average. Once one controls for enrollment intensity by limiting the sample
to full-time, full-year undergraduates, the differences are not as large
but still evident—$6,100 for dependent as opposed to $4,600 for independent students (Berkner and Wei 2006).
It is important to note that these numbers reflect the best-case scenario in terms of unmet need. They are calculated based on those who
actually make it into higher education and thus do not capture the unmet
needs of adults who elected not to enroll in postsecondary study. Moreover, the unmet needs of older students are likely understated because
of their less intense enrollment patterns, which reduce the costs they
face. The implications of this unmet need are significant in terms of
participation. According to research by Eduventures, a consulting firm
for higher education, nearly a quarter of prospective adult learners who
choose not to enroll cite costs as an obstacle (Stokes 2006).
The Impact of Financial Aid on Older Students
While significant unmet need remains a major issue for independents, research suggests that nontraditional students do respond to financial aid policy. In fact, they appear to be more responsive than younger,
dependent students. One study demonstrates this by focusing on the
Pell Grant: Seftor and Turner (2002) examine how the introduction of
the Pell Grant affected enrollment among students ages 22 to 35. They
compare the trends for these students before and after the 1972 introduction of the program, using data from the October Current Population
Survey. They conclude that the introduction of the Pell Grant increased
the probability of attending college by 1.5 percentage points for men
and 1.3 percentage points for women. Given mean enrollment rates at
the time, this translates into 16 percent relative growth for men and 40
percent growth for women. In contrast, other work has found that Pell
had little impact on attendance of traditional-age students, except for
perhaps at community colleges (Hansen 1983; Kane 1995).
Given the family situations of nontraditional students, it may be the
case that more than just grants applied to tuition could help them. Sim-
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mons and Turner (2004) instead focus on aid to help cover child care
costs. They hypothesize that the need to pay for child care could impede
participation in postsecondary training. To test this theory, they examine what happened when, in 1988–1989, up to $1,000 in child care costs
were allowed in the calculations used to determine Pell Grant amounts.
Using the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79), they
find that the policy change resulted in increasing the college enrollment
rate of women with children. However, they did not find gains in educational attainment corresponding to the higher enrollment rates.
There are several reasons that might explain the greater responsiveness of older, nontraditional students to financial aid policy. First,
as noted above, this group likely faces greater credit constraints than
younger students because their families are less likely to contribute to
their education. Moreover, they may have dependents of their own and
so cannot forgo earnings while in school. Therefore, any amount of aid
might make a large difference in their decisions. Also, because older
workers have more experience with processes such as tax and government support forms, they may be more adept at and less daunted by
complex aid application processes (Seftor and Turner 2002). Older students are also more likely to choose a convenient, local college, such as
a community college, and so they do not have to cover major transition
costs such as moving expenditures; tuition support is the main thing
they need to attend college. Finally, the types of colleges many nontraditional students attend are unlikely to give aid or to respond to government policy by raising their prices. Therefore, government support
may be more likely to have a substantial impact on the participation of
independent rather than dependent students.

SUPPORTING OLDER WORKERS: REFORMING COLLEGE
FINANCIAL AID FOR THE FUTURE
There are many things that the government and other institutions
could do to improve the financial support of older workers seeking postsecondary training. As noted above, many programs have been designed
with the traditional-age, dependent student in mind, but in order to help
older workers, aid programs need to take into account the enrollment
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patterns more common among older, nontraditional students. In terms
of federal financial aid, Bosworth and Choitz (2002) suggest changing
the eligibility criteria for aid programs to include students who attend
less than half-time and those in short-term programs that do not necessarily result in a formal degree or certificate.3 New financing instruments could also be especially beneficial for older workers. In his issue
paper for the Secretary of Education’s Commission on the Future of
Higher Education, Stokes (2006) supports programs such as Lifelong
Learning Accounts and Career Advancement Accounts.
The interaction with other social programs is another thing to consider in aid reform. Bosworth and Choitz (2002) encourage policymakers to consider how social programs, such as food stamps and Medicare,
interact with government financial aid programs, so that one benefit does
not adversely affect another. Voorhees and Lingenfelter (2003) note that
states could also expand their use of TANF dollars, which often support only short-term training. Instead, they could “direct their flexible
maintenance of effort funds to finance training that is longer than the 12
months designated by the federal standard. This would require collaboration between state agencies involved in higher education and those
involved in implementing federal regulations” (p. 10).
Colleges and universities could also play a greater role in facilitating the enrollment of older workers in postsecondary institutions. By
providing more local, accessible options with flexible schedules and
programs, they would enable more participation among nontraditional
students. Online options may also be a way to expand access. There
is as well a need for more career-oriented programs tied to particular industries. Voorhees and Lingenfelter (2003) highlight the idea that
community colleges could create employment-related programs that
could be supported by the WIA’s One-Stop Career Centers. These might
not extend for as long a time as traditional offerings but could be more
comprehensive than the brief programs typically supported through the
WIA.
Beyond academic programs, colleges and universities could do
more to address the particular needs of older workers. This includes
providing support for child care, in terms of both finances and capacity.
As suggested by Simmons and Turner (2004), subsidies for child care
could significantly affect the participation of nontraditional students.
The government could help with these types of initiatives by providing
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grants to colleges that create such programs to support older workers.
In the past, Congress has supported the federal program Child Care
Access Means Parents in School (Yachnin 2001).
Colleges and employers could also increase their level of partnership to support the postsecondary education of older workers. Beyond
merely increasing the general amount of support, changing the timing of
tuition collection and employer support could also have important benefits for nontraditional students. Currently, institutions collect tuition
payments prior to enrollment, but employers often will not reimburse
employees until after the course is satisfactorily completed. Introducing
more flexible reimbursement policies, along with more accommodating
institutional collection policies regarding tuition, could increase participation in such programs (Voorhees and Lingenfelter 2003).

Conclusion
The increased demand for skilled workers has made it necessary for
many nontraditional students to seek additional training, and their numbers are expected to rise in coming years. It is therefore imperative for
the government, colleges and universities, and employers to consider
how best to enable these investments by reevaluating the design of the
aid system as well as the supports provided. The resulting benefits to
individuals, their families, and society are potentially large as the labor
market becomes increasingly less forgiving of the unskilled.

Notes
1. Total cost of attendance, which is prorated based on the student’s enrollment
intensity (whether the student attends full- or part-time), includes tuition, fees,
room and board, and other costs at the institution the student attends.
2. The calculations assume the person is a resident of Illinois and is 30 years old. A
single adult with one child who made an income at the poverty threshold ($13,896)
also would not be expected to contribute anything to his or her postsecondary
training. However, at 150 percent of the poverty level ($20,844), the EFC would
be $931, and at 200 percent of the poverty level ($27,792), the amount would be
$1,974.
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3. On the other hand, the likelihood of successfully completing an educational program increases with enrollment intensity, and so it is important for the government
to provide enough aid to enable students to take larger course loads and complete
programs faster.
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Can Residential Mobility
Programs Improve Human Capital?
Comparing Social Mechanisms
in Two Different Programs
James E. Rosenbaum
Northwestern University

Underlying some arguments for residential mobility is an implicit
assumption that low-income individuals’ capabilities can be improved
by residential moves. We can conceive of four kinds of social influences
by which residential moves might improve individuals’ human capital:
1) schools, 2) labor markets, 3) informal social interaction, and 4) safety. Each of these mechanisms might have a different kind of influence
on the value of individuals’ human capital.
First, and most simply, school quality varies across different locations in the United States. Affluent neighborhoods have schools with
better-paid teachers, more resources, and higher achievement test
scores. If residential mobility moves low-income families from areas
with poor schools to areas with much better schools, children’s human
capital can increase because of better instruction and higher standards.
Second, residential mobility can move low-income families from
labor markets with weak demand for their labor to labor markets with
stronger demand for their labor—in other words, places offering semiskilled jobs. Even adults with modest skills will see the value of their
human capital increase. For instance, if suburban employers have more
difficulty than urban employers in finding individuals to take semiskilled jobs (e.g., as sales clerks, service workers, etc.), then individuals seeking such jobs will have much better employment prospects (and
perhaps better wages) if they move from urban to suburban locations.
Third, residential mobility can move participants to areas where
informal social interaction (social capital) supports employment and
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school effort. For children, moving away from schools and friends that
discourage school effort and into areas that encourage school effort may
improve their academic performance. For adults, moving to neighborhoods where they make new friends who strongly encourage employment may make them more motivated to work, which may increase
their human capital.
Fourth, residential mobility can move families to safer areas, and
adults’ and children’s human capital will be less impaired by anxiety
and depression. Research has shown the debilitating effects of violent
neighborhoods (Garbarino 1995), so moves away from such neighborhoods may reduce these influences.
Obviously, each mechanism is complex, and marshaling evidence
on any one of these would be a large endeavor, beyond the scope and
purpose of this chapter. Here, I merely propose these four mechanisms
as a means of understanding the possible ways in which residential
mobility programs might affect human capital. I use this concept to
examine whether these social influences are altered by two different
residential mobility programs.
This chapter seeks to identify dimensions on which these two residential mobility programs differ, to describe the neighborhood placements and social influences created by these programs, and to consider how these social influences might explain individual outcomes. In
contrast with literature that focuses on mobility’s effects on individual
outcomes, this review focuses on program procedures, program placements, and the social influences that participants encounter. Although I
also present empirical findings on individual outcomes, I am less concerned about inferring the average causal relationship between mobility
and outcome behavior than in considering variations in the kinds of
mobility procedures and their implications for creating a wide spectrum of different placements and social influences, which are the crucial
forces that affect outcomes. In effect, I am proposing a model in which
outcomes are a direct byproduct of social influences, which mediates
“mobility effects.” The key unanswered question is not the relationship between mobility and outcomes, but rather, what kinds of social
influences do residential mobility program procedures create? Once we
know what social influences are created, we will better understand what
behavioral outcomes result.
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The chapter begins by describing two residential mobility programs,
Moving to Opportunity for Fair Housing (MTO) and the Gautreaux
Assisted Housing Program (Gautreaux). I then describe procedures
in the two programs that influence placements. The next two sections
describe the kinds of neighborhood placements and the social influences created by each program. I find that the programs differ in the kinds
of placements and in three aspects of social influences (whether participants attend good schools, change labor markets, or change social
interactions), but are similar in improving perceived safety. I examine
the specific procedures used by these two programs and consider how
these procedures might influence the kinds of placements and social
influences created by the two programs. I suggest that residential ability programs can alter human capital through these mechanisms, but
that they must include program procedures that have a strong impact on
improving social influences.

Places Matter—Sometimes
Spatial mismatch has long been noted (Holzer 1991). Big differences have been shown in the resources and opportunities available in
different locations (Briggs 2005). Some analyses contend that negative
influences in neighborhoods with concentrated poverty may undermine
the benefits of job and education programs (Wilson 1996).
Such observations have led to suggestions that residential mobility
programs might provide more effective solutions. This is a profound
contention—it suggests that mobility might increase human capital.
However, all moves don’t have the same impact. Having observed
enormous differences in the quality of public schools between affluent
suburbs and inner-city neighborhoods, affluent families choose to buy
homes based on the quality of the public schools. Can residential mobility programs serving low-income families have the same impact?
This chapter shows that two residential mobility programs with
similar goals lead to placements in very different neighborhoods, which
produce different social influences—which in turn may have implications for participants. The questions of which moves have an impact
and how they do so are of great policy importance.
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Program Design of Two Residential
Mobility Programs
Gautreaux was a court-ordered demonstration program in Chicago,
removed from the political process and conducted with low visibility.
As a result of a consent decree, between 1976 and 1998, Gautreaux
placed low-income black families who lived in housing projects (or
were on the waiting list) into certain units in mostly white middleincome suburbs or in low-income mostly black urban neighborhoods. A
few hundred families moved each year, and only a few families moved
into any single neighborhood. Because of this, the program had low visibility, although 7,000 families ultimately moved through the program,
about half of whom moved to white middle-income suburbs (Polikoff
2006).
Gautreaux was not designed as a research study; few premove measures were collected, and families were not randomly assigned to suburbs or city. However, assignments to the two conditions created a quasi-experimental design. According to reports in the 1980s by housing
counselors implementing the program, families were assigned to one of
the two conditions on a first-come, first-served basis. Although clients
could refuse an offer, only 5 percent did so since they were unlikely to
get another in the six months of their program eligibility (Rubinowitz
and Rosenbaum 2000). As a result, placements approximated random
assignment, but they were not perfectly random.
Suburb and city participants, on average, were highly similar before
the move in personal attributes (age, number of children, education,
marital status, public aid, years in program, etc.), but a few differences
were noted in premove neighborhoods. While suburban movers came
from slightly lower poverty tracts than city movers (a poverty rate of
40.6 percent versus 43.8 percent), they moved to census tracts with dramatically lower poverty rates (5.0 percent versus 27.3 percent [DeLuca
and Rosenbaum 2003]). Although it is possible that preexisting differences may affect outcomes, there are reasons to think this impact is
relatively small. First, it seems reasonable to infer that the large outcome differences are probably explained less by the 3-percentage-point
difference in initial neighborhoods than by the 22-percentage-point
difference in placements. Second, multivariate analyses that control
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for baseline attributes and locations found large, significant impacts of
placement neighborhood attributes on outcomes an average of 14 years
after program placement (DeLuca and Rosenbaum 2003; Keels et al.
2005).
The MTO program was modeled on the Gautreaux program, but
MTO was a random assignment experiment. Eligible families were
placed in treatments by random assignment, and analysis considered
all families who received offers (regardless of whether they moved or
not). This allowed researchers to assess the impact of being given the
chance to move compared to what similar people did in the absence of
this opportunity.
MTO departed from the Gautreaux program design in several
respects besides random assignment. First, whereas Gautreaux placed
families in specific units, MTO specified census tracts and let families
choose any housing unit in any neighborhood, as long as it was located
in a qualifying tract. MTO designers may have felt that further constraints beyond census tract were unnecessary or not politically desirable. Although some counselors found units for families (much like the
Gautreaux housing staff), that was not common, so most families were
on their own to find units. Counseling practices were not specified in
the program design. It is not clear what MTO counselors told families
about neighborhoods, but some reports suggest that some counselors
encouraged addresses where participants would find neighbors similar
to themselves.
Second, while Gautreaux moved experimental group families to
distant suburbs, MTO focused on specifying census tract poverty concentration, and it permitted any kind of move, including moves within
the city. The emphasis in MTO was on meeting the tract poverty-rate
goal quickly and efficiently.
Third, while Gautreaux was a racial integration program that moved
experimental-group families into mostly white suburbs, all of which
were low-poverty, MTO gave no consideration to tract racial composition, and many MTO program movers chose residences that met the
poverty requirements but were located in mostly black neighborhoods
(Orr et al. 2003).
The two programs also had somewhat different entrance rules. All
MTO participants and most Gautreaux participants were housing project residents, but some Gautreaux participants were on the housing
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project wait list. While wait list families were not in housing project
circumstances, their housing circumstances were no better than those of
housing project residents, and perhaps they were worse—the families
were either in crowded conditions, constantly moving, on the verge of
eviction, or in homeless shelters (Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 2000).
The fact that they desired to enter Chicago public housing, despite its
well-known dangers, suggests that they considered their living conditions worse than the housing projects.
In terms of education and welfare receipt, two important population
characteristics, there are small differences between the programs. While
similar portions of household heads had completed high school or gotten a GED in MTO and Gautreaux (60.3 to 63.9 percent), more MTO
families were on public aid than in Gautreaux (61 versus 50 percent
[Orr et al. 2003, Table C-2; Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 2000, p. 79]).
Participants in the two programs were probably not greatly different.

Placements in the Two Programs
In both programs, families in the experimental group were intended to be placed into a different type of neighborhood than the control
group. I describe the kinds of neighborhoods into which the experimental groups of each program were actually placed. I look at three
aspects of neighborhoods: census tract, microneighborhood, and distance from baseline neighborhood. I find that the programs differ on all
three. Results are summarized in Table 8.1.
Census Tracts
Although both programs aimed to move families to less-poor neighborhoods, the programs led participants to neighborhoods with different compositions of poverty and race. Gautreaux’s suburban placements
were all in low-poverty census tracts. Indeed, based on an analysis of
a 50 percent random sample of Gautreaux movers between 1976 and
1990 using administrative data, the 743 suburban movers were placed in
census tracts where the average percentage of poverty was 5.3 (DeLuca
and Rosenbaum 2003, p. 323). Moreover, most neighbors were afflu-
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Table 8.1 Program Design Elements for MTO and Gautreaux Movers
(all numbers in %)
MTO
Gautreauxa
Moving distance
Moves less than 10 miles
84
10
Neighborhood placements
(census tract attributes)
Placements’ average percent poverty
12.4
5.3
Placement in over 40% black areas
38
5
Microneighborhoods
Procedures to prevent enclaves?
no
yes
Created enclaves?
yes?
no
Social contexts
Schools
School district change?
30
~100
Schools w/above-average test scores
10
88
Labor markets
Change labor market?
no?
yes?
Labor market comparison
strong→strong weak→strong
Social interactions
Contact with former peers?
often?
rare?
Safety improved
yes
yes
Duration
Retention rate in placement
44 after
66 after
neighborhoodsb
4–7 years
15+ years
NOTE: ? indicates best estimate from qualitative or administrative data; the rest is
based on systematic evidence.
a
These figures include the families who relocated to suburban communities outside of
the city of Chicago. See DeLuca and Rosenbaum (2003) for a more detailed analysis
of all Gautreaux program moves.
b
For MTO, this means that the neighborhood at the follow-up survey was less than 10
percent poor; for Gautreaux, it means that the neighborhoods at last follow-up were
less than 30 percent African American. Note, however, that Gautreaux has a much
longer follow-up period (see Orr et al., p. 33).
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ent; the mean family income in the suburban census tracts was $71,545
(ibid., p. 323). The suburban locations were required to be less than 30
percent black, and almost all (90 percent) placement tracts were less
than 16 percent black (ibid., p. 325). Overall, the average placement
tract had no more than 10 percent black households (ibid.).
In contrast, MTO placements did not consider racial composition.
Although it was hoped that the program would increase racial integration, it was not required, and the results indicate that it often did not
happen. In 1997, not long after the move, about 38 percent of experimental group movers were living in highly black areas (over 40 percent
black [Goering and Feins 2003]), while less than 5 percent of Gautreaux’s suburban movers’ placements were in such areas (DeLuca and
Rosenbaum 2003).
MTO appeared to accomplish its goals in terms of 1990 census figures, but some of these figures failed to capture the reality of changing census tract composition, and MTO ultimately fell short because
of this. Nearly all movers (94 percent) went to areas with less than 11
percent poverty, based on the 1990 census data available at the time
of placement (Orr et al. 2003, p. 29). However, because of changes in
tract composition after 1990, the actual composition of census tracts at
the time of the move averaged 12.4 percent. Based on the 2000 census
data, the program estimated that “just half of the moves were to areas
estimated to have poverty rates below 10 percent at the time of the
move, and another third were to areas of 10 to 15 percent poverty at
the time. All told, 97 percent moved to areas with less than 20 percent
poverty” (ibid., p.30). While moving participants from tracts with over
40 percent poverty to tracts with less than 20 percent poverty is a big
improvement, these neighborhoods may have had different characteristics than the intended 10 percent goal. Both programs moved one group
to low-poverty census tracts, but the programs led to different kinds of
neighborhoods.
Microneighborhoods
Beyond that, the programs led to different microneighborhoods
as well. Gautreaux placed families in specific apartments. Real-estate
staff located units that avoided enclaves, and counselors made sure to
avoid creating enclaves. No more than three families were placed in
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any neighborhood, and neighborhoods were avoided if many African
American families already lived there (Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum
2000). The program also avoided areas located near concentrations of
black or low-income families (ibid.).
In contrast, MTO defined neighborhoods only in terms of census
tracts, and did not consider microneighborhoods within census tracts.
MTO had no rules or procedures to avoid enclaves within census tracts,
and some counselors thought that enclaves were desirable because they
provided social support. MTO families chose their own housing units,
choices that were presumably based on their preferences, housing availability, and landlord willingness. Unlike Gautreaux, where real-estate
staff convinced reluctant landlords to take participants, the MTO program did not provide such opportunities. Consequently, in MTO, participant choices influenced microneighborhoods.
Did MTO move families into enclaves? Casual observation of maps
of MTO placements raises concerns. While experimental group placements in Gautreaux are widely scattered (as depicted on a map on a wall
at the Leadership Council), some placements in MTO indicate more
than three families placed close together. Some placements are located on census-tract boundaries adjoining higher-poverty census tracts
(Goering et al. 1999), a finding similar to observations of another housing voucher program (Cronin and Rasmussen 1981). Although we do
not have geo-coded data on MTO placements, it is possible to generate
such geo-codes, and research could be done to compare the programs
on whether microneighborhoods allowed concentration. If enclaves are
created, one must wonder whether and how they may insulate families
from the potential benefits of low-poverty census tracts.
Distance from Prior Neighborhoods
Part of the social impact of these programs may be in removing
participants from the influence of old neighborhoods. If “prior neighborhoods seem to be magnets” (Briggs 1997), and if the power of magnets declines with distance, moving distance may influence whether old
neighbors continue to influence families. The experimental group in the
two programs experienced quite different moves in this respect.
For Gautreaux movers, the average suburban placement was 25
miles (Keels et al. 2005), and fewer than 10 percent of moves were less
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than ten miles.1 In contrast, 84 percent of MTO experimental group
moves were less than ten miles from the baseline address, and some
participants moved less than one mile (Kling et al. 2004, Table A14).
These differences raise concerns about whether families actually left
their old neighborhood. While the difficulty of traveling ten miles may
differ according to public transit routes, we suspect that more participants will continue interactions with old friends from one to ten
miles away than will do so with ones 25 miles away, and they may
continue to be influenced by peer pressures from their former highpoverty neighborhoods.
In summary, program design elements of Gautreaux and MTO
appear to have created moves to very different types of neighborhoods
(based on poverty and racial characteristics), different microneighborhood influences, and different distances from initial residences.

Social Influences in the Two Programs
Having seen the actual placements, we might expect that the two
programs would create different social influences. New neighborhoods
present different institutions and conditions that offer the possibility
of new influences. These “social influences” refer to broad conditions
offered within neighborhoods, not individual outcomes. This section
considers four kinds of influences relevant to neighborhoods: 1) schools,
2) local labor markets, 3) social interaction, and 4) safety.
1) Schools: Did Residential Mobility Change Schools and
School Quality?
One of the most striking aspects of American public education is
the way schools vary by geography. Within a large metropolitan area,
schools often vary enormously in quality between affluent suburban
areas and less affluent urban areas. In part, this is due to local funding
differences and to differential ways that funding is spent (i.e., whether school funds are spent on curricula and instruction or on security
and building maintenance [Jencks and Phillips 1998]). If low-income
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minority families moved to better neighborhoods, we might expect that
they would attend better schools.
In Gautreaux, nearly all families moving to suburbs changed school
districts and began attending different schools (Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 2000). They generally attended much better schools than they had
in the city. Indeed, 88 percent of Gautreaux suburban movers attended
schools where the average test scores were in the top half of national
standards (Orr et al. 2003; Rosenbaum et al. 1993).
In contrast, while the MTO experimental group changed neighborhoods, they rarely changed school districts. Seventy percent of the
MTO treatment group movers stayed in the same school district (Orr
et al. 2003). Overall, the average experimental-group child was in a
school in the twenty-first percentile, and less than 10 percent attended
schools that ranked above the fiftieth percentile (ibid., pp. 110–111).
In summary, the two residential mobility programs led children to
very different sets of schools. Research is clearly needed to understand
why there was so little school improvement for MTO movers. Perhaps
the short moves explain part of this school difference. Research has
begun to examine how parents make these choices (see Briggs et al.
2006).
2) Labor Market: Did Moving to a Different Labor Market Mean
Moving to a Stronger Labor Market?
One of the most intriguing possibilities suggested by mobility programs is that residential mobility might directly increase the value of
the movers’ human capital. Individuals with low-level skills and limited
education may have little market value in high poverty neighborhoods,
where many people have the same qualifications and available jobs are
quickly filled. If these individuals move to distant affluent suburbs,
where the demand for low-skilled workers exceeds the supply, these
individuals will be in greater demand and perhaps have greater value.
Gautreaux occurred during the 1980s, when employment opportunities in the suburbs were strong, while they were weak in inner-city
areas. The spatial mismatch theory posits that the distance between
available unskilled jobs (in the suburbs) and available semiskilled
workers (in the city) contributes to unemployment of semiskilled work-
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ers (Holzer 1991). These distances often require long commutes, which
are particularly onerous given poor public transportation, and the low
pay of these jobs is not sufficient to justify the high costs of commutes
in time and money.
Given the well-documented spatial mismatch between suburban
labor markets and city residents, the Gautreaux program made exactly
the kinds of moves that were likely to put semiskilled adults into labor
markets with strong demand and few competitors. In contrast, as noted,
the MTO treatment group made short-distance moves, so it isn’t clear
whether those workers actually moved to a “different labor market.”
In addition, there are indications that the MTO program treatment group was already in strong labor markets prior to moving. MTO
occurred in the late 1990s, during a strong economy, when labor market
demand for semiskilled workers was very high. In addition, at the same
time, the TANF program of welfare reform had pushed large numbers
of families off public assistance and into jobs. As a result, the labor markets in low-income neighborhoods improved for everyone. The treatment group moved out of strong labor markets that would likely have
improved their prospects if they had stayed.
3) Social Interaction: How Much Did Families Really Leave Prior
Neighborhoods Behind?
Third, residential mobility can move participants to areas where
informal social interaction (social capital) supports employment and
school effort. For children, moving away from schools and friends that
don’t encourage school effort and into areas where social norms support
school effort may improve those students’ own school efforts. If adults
move to neighborhoods where they make new friends who strongly
encourage employment, they may be more motivated to work, which
may increase the value of their human capital. Obviously, these social
influences on mothers and children are complex and require detailed
analyses (see Rosenbaum, DeLuca, and Tuck 2005).2 However, all of
them are premised on the assumption that mothers and children stop
interacting with their former friends, which may not be true.
Residential mobility studies implicitly assume that residential
changes influence social interaction. Mothers and children whose
homes are in new neighborhoods will have new neighbors and institu-
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tions with which to interact. Thus it is important to consider whether
families maintain their ties with individuals and institutions in the old
neighborhood.
In interviews, Gautreaux suburban movers reported that weekday
visits to their former neighborhoods were very rare (Rubinowitz and
Rosenbaum 2000). With average suburban moves of 25 miles, mothers and children could not easily travel back to the old neighborhood
on a daily basis. Some suburban movers returned to the old neighborhood for occasional weekend visits with relatives or to go to church;
these Sunday visits were often to family dinners and churches, and they
occurred in the daytime, not at night (ibid.). While it was theoretically
possible for some children to continue attending their old schools (if
they pretended to live with a relative), this almost never happened, and
the few times it did was for summer school (ibid.). Thus, children’s
contacts with old neighbors were limited to occasional visits and mostly
in the presence of adults.
While these rare visits had the downside of causing initial feelings
of isolation, this may have increased the impact of the move. At the
time of the second interview, over seven years after moving, very few
mothers or children were socially isolated. Most of the children interacted with white classmates after school, often in each other’s homes
(Rosenbaum et al. 1993, p. 1538).
In contrast, the MTO short moves probably made it easier to maintain old support networks. Research suggests that many children continued to interact with friends from the old neighborhood. The interim
report finds that the experimental-group movers were less likely to visit
with friends from old neighborhoods (or to still be living there) compared to the control group. However, 43 percent of experimental-group
children still visited their friends from the old neighborhood, and the
rate was somewhat higher for boys.
These children moved to residences out of their old neighborhoods,
but they may not have left the old neighborhood socially. It is important
to note here that we do not know what children are doing when they
visit friends in the old neighborhood, how often these visits happen, or
how much these visits reduce exposure to the new neighborhood.
Despite changing residence, many MTO experimental-group families spent part of their social lives in their old neighborhoods and presumably were influenced by their former neighbors. It is important to
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further explore both the reasons for and the implications of social interaction with the old neighborhood. While this may have been comforting, it altered the social influences of “moving.”
4) Safety: Did Moving to a New Neighborhood Make Families
Feel Safer?
Given the higher incidence of crime and assaults in low-income
neighborhoods, it is generally expected that moves to low-poverty
neighborhoods would lead to less exposure to crime and greater feelings of safety. In the Gautreaux program, suburban movers reported
feeling much safer than city movers, and also much safer than they had
themselves felt when they lived in the city. For instance, only 31 percent of suburban movers said the suburban area was dangerous at night,
while 71 percent of city movers said their neighborhood was dangerous
at night (Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 2000, p. 94).
Similarly, MTO families reported large increases in feelings of
safety. In 2001, compared to the control group, the MTO experimental
group was much more likely to feel safe at night (85 percent versus 55
percent), much less likely to have been victimized in the last six months
(12 percent versus 21 percent), and much less likely to be dissatisfied
with the police (77 percent versus 48 percent) [Orr et al. 2003, Table
3.5]. These moves did have an effect on perceptions of safety. These
changes are likely linked to the big improvements in mental health noted below.
In summary, these findings indicate that moves in both programs
led to improved neighborhood influences. However, some evidence
suggests that moves in Gautreaux were accompanied by greater exposure to low-poverty neighborhoods and more social separation from the
old neighborhood than the MTO moves. Future research would benefit
from understanding the issues of social exposure to new and old neighborhoods and the positive and negative aspects of each.
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Influences on Individual outcomes:
Education, Employment, Subsequent Moves,
and Mental Health
Do residential moves affect individuals’ outcomes? The following sections examine the effects of the two programs on four different outcomes theorized to be related to neighborhoods: 1) education,
2) employment, 3) subsequent moves, and 4) mental health.
1) Education—Can Moves Improve School Outcomes without
Improved Schools?
The Gautreaux studies found dramatic differences between the suburban and city groups in educational outcomes. Compared to children
who moved within the city, suburban movers were more likely to complete a high school diploma, to be on a college track in high school, to
attend college, and to attend a four-year college. These were statistically
significant and large differences (Rosenbaum 1995). In contrast, MTO
has not had enough time to see such long-term effects; however, four to
seven years after random assignment, children in the MTO experimental group did not perform better than control-group children on reading
and math achievement tests, or in terms of suspensions, expulsions, and
school engagement (Kling et al. 2004).
Although MTO’s superior research design may explain the different
findings, alternative explanations are possible. As noted, MTO moves
rarely resulted in students changing school districts or attending aboveaverage schools, and sometimes resulted in no change of schools.
In contrast, nearly all suburban movers in Gautreaux moved to new
school districts, many of which were dramatically better than those for
the control group (whose members moved within the city). Given the
radical disparities in school quality in different locations, many hoped
residential mobility would provide access to good schools. As noted,
less than 10 percent of the MTO experimental group attended schools
with above-average achievement test scores, while 88 percent of Gautreaux experimental-group students did so. MTO’s findings may indicate that residential mobility without better schools has little impact on
educational outcomes (particularly if children keep interacting with old
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friends). Merely improving the composition of neighbors (in a census
tract) does not by itself improve children’s educational achievement.
This raises an important policy implication: policymakers need to
think carefully about how school choices are incorporated into neighborhood choices. Middle-class families often choose neighborhoods
based on school quality, but many MTO families ignored school quality, and the program provided no information or advice about school
quality. It is likely that without moving children to areas with aboveaverage schools, there will be no discernible education effects.
2) Employment—Moves to Different or Stronger Labor Markets
Do moves put people in different labor markets?
A second focus of research was on adult employment. The early
Gautreaux survey research showed that mothers’ employment was significantly higher in the suburbs, but that mothers’ earnings and hours
worked were no different. Later analyses, using administrative data
from a much larger random sample, suggest that the primary influence was neighborhood composition, not the city/suburb distinction
(DeLuca and Rosenbaum 2003; Mendenhall, DeLuca, and Duncan
2006; Rosenbaum, DeLuca, and Miller 1999). Research found that
while the city/suburb distinction did not have a significant effect on
public-aid receipt, “public-aid rates went from 26 percent to 39 percent
for families placed in the highest and lowest quintile neighborhoods,
with respect to education level of the tract. . . . The difference remains
very strong and significant even after controlling for years in the program, age, and premove public aid” (DeLuca and Rosenbaum 2003,
p. 312). Similar findings with more extensive controls (and a different
distinction, one based on race and poverty, not education) were found
for employment outcomes and public aid (Mendenhall, DeLuca, and
Duncan 2006).
Employment was also a major focus of the MTO research. The
main finding was summarized in a subheading of the executive summary of the interim impacts evaluation: compared to the control group
there were “no effects on employment or earnings” (Orr 2003, p. xiii).
However, there are two questions that arise.
The first is whether MTO actually moves families to different labor
markets. Unlike Gautreaux, where 25-mile moves from declining inner-

Can Residential Mobility Programs Improve Human Capital? 141

city neighborhoods to high-growth suburbs clearly put families in different labor markets, MTO’s less-than-10-mile moves (often within city
limits) may not have put them in a different labor market, and it may not
have even reduced commuting time.
Did MTO move people from strong labor markets?
The second question is whether MTO moved families from strong
labor markets to (other) strong labor markets. While the Gautreaux program moved families from weak to strong labor markets (Rosenbaum
et al. 1993), MTO moved families who were already in strong labor
markets. MTO occurred during a strong economy, when labor market demand for semiskilled workers was very high. MTO results were
measured between 1994 and 2000, when an unusually strong economy,
strong welfare reform policy (TANF), and expanded earned income tax
credit encouraged many poor people to work (Blank 2002). As a result,
the labor markets in low-income neighborhoods improved, leading to
less difference in labor market influences between MTO experimental
and control group families.
The strength of premove labor markets is seen in the control group.
The control group’s employment gains were extraordinary—100 percent gains. The MTO control group employment increased from 23.6
to 50.9 percent (ibid, p. 127). One hundred percent gains are rare in
experimental groups of powerful programs (Barnow 1987; Bassi and
Ashenfelter 1986; Bloom et al. 1993; Cave and Doolittle 1991). Obviously, the premove labor market that the control group represented was
a very strong labor market. Although the treatment group’s gains were
no larger than the control group’s gains, both groups resided in very
strong labor markets.
Indeed, in the context of such a strong labor market, one must wonder whether those still unemployed might have serious physical or psychological barriers to working—in other words, are there ceiling effects
against further gains? Or are residential mobility effects effective for
the same people who already benefited? One must also doubt that these
findings would generalize to more ordinary historical periods.
In summary, while Gautreaux families moved from weak to strong
labor markets, it is not clear whether MTO families moved to different
labor markets and, even if they did, it appears the experimental group
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moved out of labor markets that were getting very strong—markets that
led to 100 percent gains in employment for the control group.
3) Duration—Did Families Stay?
One indication of whether families see benefits to their move is
whether they choose to stay. In turn, duration may influence the impact
of moves. To the extent that they return to low-income neighborhoods,
we might infer that they got few benefits in their new locations. Conversely, short-duration moves are likely to have little impact.
Using administrative data, research located Gautreaux participants an average of 15 years after they had made their initial move
in the program. Selecting a 50 percent random sample of all families
who had moved between 1976 and 1990 (1,507 families), researchers
located recent addresses of 1,504 of these 1,507 families (DeLuca and
Rosenbaum 2003). The research found that about two-thirds of families
placed in the suburbs still remained in mostly white suburbs an average
of 15 years later. Further analyses of these data indicate that families
“continued to reside in neighborhoods with income levels that matched
those of their placement neighborhoods. . . . Families who were placed
in low-crime and suburban locations were more likely to reside in lowcrime neighborhoods years later” (Keels et al. 2005, p. 51).
In contrast, over a much shorter time interval (five years), MTO
studies found that only 44.4 percent of the experimental-group movers still lived in low-poverty census tracts (15 percent poverty or less
[Orr et al. 2003, pp. 30, 34]). In addition, a majority (59 percent) of
the experimental-group movers were living in 80-percent-plus minority tracts (ibid., pp. 34, 37). As the interim report notes, many of these
subsequent moves were “to areas more like the ones where the Section
8 families and control group movers lived … [and] to high-minority
neighborhoods” (ibid., p. 33, 37).
Ironically, although the Gautreaux moves imposed more disruption
on participants’ lives than did the MTO moves, the 15-year retention
rate in Gautreaux was substantially higher than the shorter, five-year
retention rate in MTO (66 percent versus 44 percent). Despite Gautreaux participants’ initial fears about these moves, their preferences
changed. Families reported that, over time, they formed friendships
with neighbors and their children also made friends and became part
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of their schools and communities (Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 2000).
While children had initial difficulties in school, they gradually did better. Ironically, after the program induced families to move to areas they
might not have chosen otherwise, families came to appreciate the new
neighborhoods.
In contrast, since MTO families didn’t move far, families may have
continued interacting with their old friends, so they may not have made
friends in their new neighborhoods. Although retaining old friends preserved social support and made the transition smoother, it also meant
that the old neighborhood remained a social magnet (Briggs 1997)
which often created a strong pull.
4) Mental Health—Do Moves Improve Families’ Outlooks?
Gautreaux did not study health outcomes, but I include this topic
because it is one of the most important discoveries of the MTO research,
which found significant improvements in mental health.
Despite the many countervailing influences I have identified that
might have reduced the impact of MTO moves, the MTO experimental
group showed strong significant differences from the control group in
terms of mothers’ and daughters’ perceptions of neighborhood safety, as
well as psychological distress, depression, and obesity (Orr et al. 2003,
p. 77). These findings are extremely impressive. The magnitude of difference is as great as one might see from programs devoted specifically
to improving mental health (Kling et al. 2004). These are consistent
differences, repeatedly found over time and in separate measures—not
just statistical flukes.

Conclusion
MTO is a truly impressive study. It offers a carefully designed program and a well-administered research design that provides the strongest study in this area. Although MTO offers a stronger research design
than Gautreaux, it offers a weaker program, leading to much weaker
changes in social influences. MTO is useful for examining the impact
of modest moves and modest changes in social influences.
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However, MTO is not a good test of whether residential mobility
can have a strong impact. If we are interested in discovering the potential impact of residential mobility on individual outcomes, we must
examine a program that creates bigger changes in social influences. I
have identified specific procedures that may contribute to those kinds
of placements and social influences.
While the MTO studies provide stronger research evidence, the
Gautreaux program creates larger changes in the environment. The two
programs create different placements and different social influences,
which are likely to explain some of the discrepancies in program outcomes (see Table 8.1).
Some observers have argued that the low-income families selected
for the Gautreaux program would have moved to these kinds of neighborhoods even without the program. MTO shows that this is a wrong
assumption—most MTO families were comparable, but virtually no
MTO families moved 25 miles to mostly white affluent neighborhoods
on their own. Obviously, Gautreaux-type moves would not have happened without the strong program requirement and assistance provided
by Gautreaux. Program design has a crucial impact on what kinds of
moves happen.
This chapter has shown that similar programs can lead to dramatically different placements and social influences, which are the key intervening mechanisms influencing human capital. These might have been
altered if programs had been run slightly differently. In other words,
the devil is in the details. It would have been easy to move many families into low-income enclaves, if the Gautreaux program had not been
more committed to avoiding enclaves (at the block level). If Gautreaux
had been less committed to expanding housing options into new areas,
it would have easily focused on a few nearby suburbs. Reducing the
distance of moves would have been more convenient for housing counselors who took families to see available units. These minor changes
in procedures would have met the conditions demanded by the consent
decree, and they would have looked pretty good in terms of census tract
poverty rates. Recognizing the possibility that slight modifications of
Gautreaux might have led to much weaker social influences can help
us think about ways to design residential programs that have stronger
benefits.
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Policy Implications
In examining whether a residential mobility program is designed in
a way that could improve human capital, we have asked what kinds of
moves and social influences it creates. If a program moves families but
leaves 90 percent of students in below-average schools, do we really
expect improved educational achievement? If the program moves families only a few miles, do we expect that they have entered a different
labor market, which will improve the value of their human capital? If
children don’t move far enough to change friendships and interactions,
will they retain old friends, former gang memberships, and prior activities and interests?
I have identified specific procedures that may contribute to big
changes in placements and social influences. One can easily conceive
of MTO including one or more of these procedures, and, as a result,
offering participants quite different placements and social influences.
As we try to imagine what kinds of programs might create such social
influences, we might consider minor modifications of MTO as realistic possibilities that might have such impact. Below, I suggest some
minor modifications and some hypotheses (HYP) about potential
consequences.
HYP 1: MTO + identify and require units not in low-income enclaves
→ higher human capital.
HYP 2: MTO + moves 20 miles from old address → less interaction
with old friends. Higher human capital.
In Gautreaux, real estate staff located appropriate housing units that
were not in enclaves, were in better neighborhoods, and many were
quite distant. On their own, participants were unlikely to even know
about these neighborhoods, and so it isn’t surprising that MTO participants did not find such units. Real-estate staff could potentially have
had a strong beneficial impact on MTO.
Counseling advice can also make a difference. Although both programs had housing counselors, MTO counselors did not provide information about school quality or labor market demand, nor did they pro-
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vide advice about why participants should base their choices on such
information. Gautreaux counselors mentioned both factors to help
participants see the advantages of the distant moves they were offering. Residential mobility programs should give some thought to using
housing counseling about these issues. Housing counseling may have
a strong influence on participants’ choices and could lead to better outcomes, as posited below.
HYP 3: MTO + identify locations with above-average schools + advice
on how to choose them → better schools. Higher human capital.
HYP 4: MTO + identify locations with better job opportunities (for participants’ level of skills) + advice on how to choose them → better
employment outcomes. Higher human capital.
On the latter point, it is noteworthy that in some two-year colleges that provide occupational training, job placement counselors often
advise their graduates to consider residential moves to improve their
employment prospects (Rosenbaum, Deil-Amen, and Person 2006).
These college advisers realize the practical barriers imposed by spatial mismatch—their graduates who live in low-income neighborhoods
often live very far from the areas of employment growth, and many job
vacancies require one-to-two-hour commutes. Besides providing skills
and training to their graduates, these colleges advise their graduates
to consider residential moves. Since they advise residential moves of
20–40 miles, we might expect that residential mobility programs may
need to advise participants to go similar distances to get employment
benefits.
As noted, children who make short moves may keep interacting
with old friends and experience little change in social norms, social
skills, or motivation. MTO studies have found that girls benefit from the
move but boys often do not. Although such gender differences might
arise from biology or early socialization—factors that programs can’t
change—gender differences might also arise from present influences,
i.e., parents’ different rules for boys and girls, which may mean that
boys actually don’t experience changes of “social influences.”
We suspect that boys and girls may differ in their “traveling radius”—the distance they are allowed to travel to see friends after school.
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If boys can travel greater distances than girls, then boys who moved
only a few miles in MTO can frequently return to old neighborhoods.
New residential neighborhoods may not change their social networks or
social norms—boys may retain old friends, former gang memberships,
and prior activities and interests. If so, we can hypothesize the following modifications that would reduce gender differences and increase the
benefits to boys.
HYP 5: MTO + moms prevent boys from returning to old neighborhood
→ change social interactions and outcomes. Higher human capital.
HYP 6: MTO + move 25 miles → boys can’t return easily, change social
interactions and outcomes. Higher human capital.
We now have evidence about the kinds of placements and social
influences created by two different programs. This comparison suggests
that small procedural details can make a big difference. Besides the two
programs described here, many other programs have arisen over the
past decade. Many have entailed minor changes (despite its name, Gautreaux II strongly resembles MTO), but some have required dramatic
changes in placements and social influences. For instance, another program created by a court decision, the Thompson decision in Baltimore,
is being studied by Professor DeLuca at Johns Hopkins University, and
it may provide new evidence about the issues raised here.
As we have seen, residential mobility is not a single entity. The two
cases described here show how similar programs lead to very different placements and social influences. I have suggested that it is these
intervening mechanisms that are likely to explain whether a residential
mobility program improves the value of individuals’ human capital,
and I have suggested some detailed procedures that might contribute to
such improvement. I hope that future policy discussions consider these
issues.

Notes
1. This latter number was a special calculation that Micere Keels computed and
reported to me in a conversation on February 23, 2006.
2. We studied only mothers, not fathers, because there were very few fathers in the
program.
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What Might Improve the
Employment and Advancement
Prospects of the Poor?
Harry J. Holzer
Georgetown University and
The Urban Institute

During the past few decades, millions of less-educated workers
have poured into the labor market in the United States, many as a result
of welfare reform and immigration. But, while many of these workers
have become successfully attached to the labor market, their wages often languish. Indeed, the wages of low earners (i.e., those at the tenth or
twentieth percentile of all workers) have stagnated over time, relative
to those at the middle or top of the labor market (Blank, Danziger, and
Schoeni 2006). Advancement prospects for these workers also appear
quite limited (Andersson, Holzer, and Lane 2005; French, Mazumder,
and Taber 2006).
In addition, millions of other potential workers—especially black
men from low-income families and neighborhoods—fail to attach regularly to the labor market at all. If anything, while the employment rates
of single poor mothers improved quite dramatically in the 1990s, the
labor force activity of less-educated black men continued to decline, as
it has for each of the past several decades.
In this chapter, I review some research evidence on the causes of
low earnings among the working poor and on the causes of weak labormarket activity among low-income men. I then consider some potential
policy responses to these problems.
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The Working Poor and the Nonattached:
What Are their Problems?
In an economy that continues to reward skills at ever-higher levels,
the skill deficits of the poor (relative to the nonpoor) are their greatest
handicaps. These deficits include the following:
• Poor levels of education, including high rates of dropping out of
high school;
• Weak cognitive skills and problem-solving abilities;
• Weak “soft” skills, including written and verbal communication;
and
• Lack of occupational training and specific experience that would
grant access to particular high-demand sectors of the economy,
such as health care and construction.
For the nonattached, a lack of general work experience often signals to employers that applicants may have difficulties with even basic
levels of job-readiness.
However, earnings in the labor market depend not only on worker
skills but also on employer policies and practices. Of course, some sectors—such as construction, durable goods manufacturing, and transportation—clearly pay higher wages than others for workers of a given skill
level. But even within very detailed industries and localities, employers
often choose to pay more or less than their competitors to workers of
comparable skills. Employers paying higher wages choose to compete
on the basis of higher productivity and lower turnover, while those paying lower wages compete on the basis of lower compensation costs (Appelbaum, Bernhardt, and Murnane 2003). Furthermore, these employer
wage premiums can account for large fractions of the observable differences in earnings across workers (Abowd and Kramarz 1999). In sum,
“good jobs” contribute to higher earnings as well as “good skills.”
But poor workers have very limited access to good jobs. This lack
of access can be attributed to lack of information, lack of informal contacts, weak transportation, and employer discrimination—especially
for minority workers (Holzer 2004). Poor access might inhibit workers from receiving the kind of on-the-job training and work experience
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that help build skills as well as pay. And if high-wage employers are
becoming scarcer in the labor market as employment in some sectors
shrinks (e.g., durable goods manufacturing) and newer competitive
forces (e.g., from employers like Wal-Mart in retail trade) drive out
higher-wage employers, then it will become even more difficult for the
poor to gain the higher-paying jobs that still exist. On the other hand,
as baby boomers retire from key sectors of the economy, replacement
demand might generate new job availability in these sectors for many
less-skilled workers.
The working poor suffer from other problems besides poor skills
and limited access to good jobs. Many suffer from repeated job turnover and have difficulty retaining employment. Of course, not all job
turnover is bad—indeed, voluntary turnover is often associated with
strong job growth, especially for young workers (Andersson, Holzer,
and Lane 2005; Topel and Ward 1992). But involuntary job instability
might be caused by poor work performance, or by frequent absenteeism
and tardiness, which are associated with difficulties in child care, transportation, or health (Holzer and LaLonde 2000; Holzer and Stoll 2001).
Low wages can also limit workers’ incentives to retain jobs.
Finally, millions of low-income (especially African American) men
fail to develop consistent labor-market attachments for a variety of
additional reasons. Growing up in poor and fatherless families and in
highly segregated schools and neighborhoods, many boys and young
men fall behind quickly and then disconnect from school at very early
ages (Edelman, Holzer, and Offner 2006; Fryer and Levitt 2004). Once
this disconnection occurs, these young men often fail to further develop
their skills or complete school, and many obtain very little formal work
experience of any kind. Furthermore, they also become more likely to
engage in other nonmainstream behaviors, such as illegal activity and
fathering children out of wedlock (Hill, Holzer, and Chen 2009).
The combination of criminal activity and unwed fatherhood almost
guarantees that these young men will become incarcerated and also
that they will receive child support orders (Holzer and Offner 2006).
Upon release from prison, their ex-offender status will further inhibit
their labor market prospects, as employers become even more reluctant
to hire them and as their own skills and labor market contacts further
depreciate (Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll 2004, 2006). Indeed, employer
reluctance to hire those with criminal records might even cause these
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employers to engage broadly in “statistical discrimination” against lesseducated black males (Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll 2004; Pager 2003).
Added to this, those who are noncustodial fathers almost certainly
will be in arrears, or debt, on their child support orders, since the orders
remain in effect while they are incarcerated. Those in arrears face very
high tax rates on their limited earnings—up to 65 percent. And, since
the child support collections are not always passed through by states to
low-income families if they have been on public assistance, the incentives for the fathers to work in the formal economy and make these
payments are very low, if they can escape detection by the child-support
enforcement system.
Finally, it is important to note other problems and barriers that
limit the labor force activity of various groups, including current or
former welfare recipients. These individuals, often referred to as the
“hard to employ,” frequently have physical or mental health disabilities,
substance abuse problems, and very poor skills and work experience
(Bloom and Butler 2007; Danziger et al. 2000).

Policies to Improve Advancement and Labor
Market Participation
Given the somewhat different situations and problems experienced
by the working poor as opposed to those who are largely not attached
to the labor market, somewhat different policy prescriptions apply to
each group.
For the working poor, their advancement prospects would be best
served by a combination of further job training, job placement assistance, and other supports and services, which would enable them to
get access to better jobs in the labor market. Community or vocational
colleges provide credentials that private sector employers will respect.
However, work experience in the relevant sector might also be necessary. And, since there are clearly well-paying jobs available in certain
high-demand sectors of the economy, strategies in which labor market
intermediaries help link workers to existing jobs with engaged employers might offer the best chance of success (Giloth 2004).
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These strategies now come in many forms (Holzer and Martinson
2005). They include the following:
• Sectoral training, in which training is targeted towards key highdemand sectors in the economy and intermediaries work with
local employers in these sectors to place trained workers into
jobs;
• Incumbent-worker training, in which training is provided by employers to workers whom they have already hired, to improve
their chances of upward mobility in the firm;
• Career-pathway development, in which intermediaries work
with employers on devising new combinations of career education and work experience, to create more pathways for workers
(incumbent or prospective) to attain good jobs and promotions in
their industries; and
• Apprenticeships and internships.
The intermediaries—which can include community-based organizations or various not-for-profit or for-profit companies—might direct
workers to the relevant sources of training and then to employers who
will hire them. They thus help less-skilled workers to overcome the informational problems (and perhaps discrimination) that can limit access
to better jobs. Assistance with child care or transportation is sometimes
provided as well. Financial assistance to pay for training—in the form
of Pell Grants or other supports—can also be arranged. And other forms
of enhanced financial incentives to encourage work can be used as well,
such as enhanced Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) benefits at the state
level or rental subsidies for those maintaining employment who live in
public housing.
Are these approaches cost-effective? Rigorous evaluation results
have often been lacking to date. Some rigorous evidence does show
positive impacts that are large enough to make programs cost-effective (this evidence comes from the Job Training Partnership Act [JTPA]
evaluation, the Portland site in the National Evaluation of Welfare-toWork Strategies [NEWWS], the evaluation of the Center for Employment Training [CET] in San Jose, and a few other studies), though the
overall evidence is somewhat mixed.1 A great many promising but nonrigorous evaluations of other strategies are available. Somewhat stron-
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ger evidence of positive impacts exists for incumbent worker training
(though not necessarily for the poor) and for work supports such as
the EITC and the public housing rental subsidies in Jobs Plus (Holzer
2007a).2 Evidence from the more recent Employment Retention and
Advancement project (ERA), which has sites around the country, has
generated mixed results, though the interventions at most sites have
been very modest.3 Clearly, much more evaluation work needs to be
done in this area.
What about efforts to improve labor market participation among
youth? A sensible strategy here would center on three broad goals
(Edelman, Holzer, and Offner 2006): 1) improving education and employment outcomes while preventing early disconnection, 2) extending
the EITC to childless young adults to improve their incentives to accept
low-wage jobs, and 3) reducing the various barriers and disincentives
that ex-offenders and noncustodial fathers face in the labor market.
Strategies to improve early outcomes and prevent disconnection
would involve the following four approaches: 1) utilizing youth development efforts aimed at adolescents (like Big Brothers/Big Sisters or
the Harlem Children’s Zone); 2) creating multiple pathways to success
in high schools, including high-quality Career and Technical Education
(CTE) options (such as apprenticeships and the Career Academies—see
Kemple and Scott-Clayton [2004] and Lerman [2007]) as well as options stressing direct access to higher education; 3) “second chance”
programs (such as Youth Build and the Youth Service and Conservation
Corps) and dropout prevention or recovery efforts; and 4) the resurrection of community-based models like the Youth Opportunity Program,
which has created employment centers in low-income neighborhoods
that track at-risk youth and refer the youth to available services. The
available evidence suggests that at least some of these approaches are
cost-effective, but in other cases more evidence is needed.4
Options for extending the EITC to childless adults appear in Berlin (2007); Edelman, Holzer, and Offner (2006); and Raphael (2008).
The notion that this category of young men might potentially be quite
responsive to these incentive programs receives support in evaluations
of New Hope (Duncan, Huston, and Weisner 2007) and in statistical
estimates of “labor supply elasticity” (or the responsiveness of work
effort to net wages) by Grogger (1998) and others.
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Efforts for ex-offenders include prisoner reentry programs, like
the Center for Employment Opportunity, which provides a paid but
temporary “transitional job” for each participant (Bloom et al. 2007);
early evaluation evidence shows little impact by this program on earnings over time but a sharp reduction in recidivism for those who move
quickly from prison into the program. Legislative or executive efforts
among states to reduce the many legal barriers at the state level that limit
employment options and other rights for ex-offenders (Holzer, Raphael,
and Stoll 2004) are also important.5 For noncustodial fathers, arrears
management efforts and full “pass through” of collections to families
would offer the best chance of success. Suspending the accumulation of
arrears during incarceration should also be considered.
Finally, efforts to improve the skills and work experience of the poor
and their access to good jobs would likely be more successful if more
such jobs existed. Higher minimum wages (in real terms) and greater
ability of workers to organize would be helpful—so long as wages are
not raised to levels that generate substantial disemployment.6 Perhaps
some local economic development efforts (such as Community Benefit
Agreements) that reward firms that are providing good jobs and training
might also be helpful in this regard, though more careful study of their
impacts is needed at this time.
While the cost-effectiveness of all of these approaches has not yet
been established, the enormous costs of doing nothing for these young
men (as measured in terms of the costs of crime and incarceration, poor
health, and intergenerational effects) must be considered as well. Greater financial support at the federal level should be available for these efforts through higher funding of Pell Grants, the Workforce Investment
Act, and other legislative vehicles such as the Second Chance Act for
prisoner reentry programs. At the same time, the federal government
should incentivize and assist states and localities as they devise their
own programs and policies along these lines, while also requiring rigorous evaluation.7
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Notes
1. For instance, the positive impacts of JTPA tend to fade over time, though they
remain large enough to make the program cost-effective. All other sites besides
Portland in NEWWS showed a lack of cost-effectiveness over time. The CET replication across the country did not generate positive impacts over time, though the
“high fidelity” sites in California (in other words, those that adhered most closely
to the original CET model) showed strong earnings growth among both treatment groups and controls where the latter attended community college in large
numbers.
2. For example, a quasi-experimental study showed that incumbent-worker training
grants in Michigan in the late 1980s led to productivity improvements among
workers that presumably improved their earnings over time, while somewhat
more descriptive evidence in California also suggests positive impacts on worker
earnings. The EITC has clearly raised the employment rates of low-income single
mothers, while Jobs Plus has also improved employment rates among public housing residents.
3. Hamilton (2008) shows that sites in Texas that supplemented the EITC with additional earnings subsidies generated higher earnings among workers over time,
while a site in Illinois that helped workers find and apply for better jobs generated
positive impacts as well. Community-based groups in Riverside, California, that
provided a range of employment services also had positive impacts on the earnings of low-wage workers there.
4. The Big Brothers/Big Sisters program and Career Academies have proven to be
clearly cost-effective in experimental evaluations. Econometric evidence suggests
similar positive impacts of Tech Prep and other CTE models. Early evidence for
the Youth Service and Conservation Corps (in a short-term, random-assignment
evaluation) was also very positive, while more descriptive evidence on the Youth
Opportunity program was quite positive relative to other high-poverty neighborhoods during the same time period.
5. The Legal Action Center in New York and the Sentencing Project in Washington,
D.C., have led efforts to induce states to reconsider the restrictions on employment
and voting rights that exist for ex-offenders. Florida, among others, has recently
undertaken a review of these barriers and has made some efforts to reduce both
kinds.
6. A legislative proposal known as the Employee Free Choice Act would make it
easier for workers to organize into unions without representation elections, though
more competitive labor markets might still restrict their ability to raise wages
without generating employment losses. See Hirsch (2008) for a good discussion
of these issues.
7. In Holzer (2007b), I propose a new competitive grant by the federal government to
states that build “advancement systems,” in which the federal government would
match new state and local expenditures while providing substantial technical assistance and requiring formal evaluation.
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What We Know About the Impacts
of Workforce Investment Programs
Burt S. Barnow
Johns Hopkins University
Jeffrey A. Smith
University of Michigan

This chapter briefly reviews the recent literature that seeks to evaluate employment and training programs, as well as important older papers. We focus on the question of whether the programs have measurable and economically relevant impacts on labor market outcomes.
We do not focus on the economics of such programs but do lean on
the “dismal science” when interpreting the findings in the literature. We
also do not focus on the econometrics of program evaluation, though
our views about the credibility of various combinations of econometric
strategies and data affect our choice of which evaluations to highlight
and how we interpret the overall literature.
Readers interested in more in-depth surveys of the substantive literature should consult Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999). Smith
(2000, 2004) provides a relatively nontechnical guide to the evaluation
literature, while Abbring and Heckman (2007); Angrist and Krueger
(1999); Friedlander, Greenberg, and Robins (1997); Heckman, LaLonde,
and Smith (1999); Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a,b); and Imbens and
Wooldridge (forthcoming) provide technical overviews.

Evaluations of the Major U.S. Federal Programs
Employment and training programs in the United States have a relatively brief history. In addition to the public employment programs of
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the Great Depression, the Manpower Development and Training Act
(MDTA, 1962–1972), the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA, 1973–1982), the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA,
1982–1998), and the Workforce Investment Act (WIA, 1998–present)
have provided vocational training, along with remedial education, subsidized on-the-job training, and job search assistance to disadvantaged
youth and adults as well as displaced workers. CETA also provided
public service employment.
Perry et al. (1975) review the literature on the MDTA. Except for
Ashenfelter (1978), this literature largely reflects the nascent stage of
evaluation methodology at the time. The U.S. Department of Labor
(USDOL) funded a number of evaluations of the CETA program, all
of which relied on the same data source, the Continuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey (CLMS), which combined random samples of
participants with nonexperimental comparison group data from the
Current Population Survey (CPS) and included matched calendar year
Social Security earnings data for both groups. Barnow (1987) summarizes these nonexperimental evaluations, which relied largely on
crude matching estimators or difference-in-differences strategies, and
obtained widely varying estimates. The sensitivity of the difference-indifferences estimates in the CETA studies to the choice of the “before”
period foreshadows a similar finding in Heckman and Smith (1999).
Despite the high-quality (but only annual) administrative outcome data,
the CLMS lacked the detailed information on local labor markets found
to be important in Heckman et al. (1998) as well as the information on
recent labor market and program participation choices (at a fine level
of temporal detail) found to be important in Card and Sullivan (1988);
Dolton, Azevedo, and Smith (2006); and Heckman et al. (1998).
The wide variety of CETA estimates led to a decision by the USDOL
to evaluate the JTPA using a social experiment, called the National
JTPA Study (NJS), which operated at a nonrandom sample of 16 (of
about 600) local JTPA sites from approximately November 1987 to
September 1989. Doolittle and Traeger (1990) describe the details of
the experiment, and Bloom et al. (1997) and Orr et al. (1996) present
the results. The NJS included disadvantaged adults and out-of-school
youth but not in-school youth and dislocated workers.
The U.S. General Accounting Office (USGAO 1996) provides impact estimates for five years after random assignment based on Social
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Security earnings data. The USGAO finds stable impacts of around
$800 a year for adult (22 and older) men and women, but these impacts
lose statistical significance over time. In contrast, the estimates for male
and female youth remain near zero throughout the follow-up period.
The NJS found substantial treatment-group nonparticipation (around 40
percent) and control group substitution (also around 40 percent) into
alternative providers of similar services. As a result, these estimates approximate (because of differences in service intensity between the treatment and control groups) what Imbens and Angrist (1994) call local average treatment effects: average impacts on those who receive services
if assigned to the treatment group but who would not have received
JTPA services if assigned to the control group. Heckman, LaLonde, and
Smith (1999, Table 20) show that JTPA produced a net social benefit for
adults but not for youth, generally irrespective of (reasonable) assumptions about benefit duration beyond five years, the discount rate, or the
welfare cost of taxation.
Mueser, Troske, and Gorislavsky (2007) employ modern matching
methods, as described in, for example, Smith and Todd (2005), combined with relatively rich administrative data, to estimate the earnings
impact of JTPA in Missouri for program years 1994 and 1995, using a
comparison group of individuals registering with the Employment Service. In real terms, their preferred estimates resemble those from the
NJS.
Finally, although the WIA program has been operating nationwide
since July 2000, there exist no published econometric evaluations. In
2008, the USDOL funded a random assignment evaluation of WIA.

Evaluations of Selected Other U.S. Programs
Job Corps
Job Corps, established in 1964, provides intensive and comprehensive services, including vocational and academic activities as well as
support services, to about 60,000 disadvantaged youth, ages 16–24, in
119 residential centers. The program has had two major evaluations:
a thoughtful, nonexperimental evaluation in the 1970s, summarized
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in Long, Mallar, and Thornton (1981), and an experimental evaluation in the 1990s, summarized in Schochet, Burghardt, and McConnell
(2006). The two have remarkably parallel findings; we focus on the
experiment.
The first key finding is that removing disadvantaged young men
from their local neighborhood dramatically reduces their criminal behavior in the short run. Second, there is a notable effect on educational
attainment in the short run, measured in terms of hours, literacy and
numeracy, and GED and vocational certificate receipt. Third, the Job
Corps program generates substantial sustained earnings impacts for 20to 24-year-old participants, but not for younger participants. As a result,
because of its high cost, the program does not come close to passing
a cost-benefit test (which includes the impacts on crime) for younger
participants but does come close for the 20- to 24-year-olds. Despite
the lack of an efficiency justification for the program, at least for the
20- to 24-year-olds it actually has a substantial impact on labor market
outcomes, which puts it well ahead of many other youth programs, such
as JTPA, where the impacts equaled approximately zero.
Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services
The Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) system
assigns mandatory reemployment services to new Unemployment Insurance (UI) claimants predicted to have long spells of UI receipt or
high probabilities of UI benefit exhaustion. A desire to proactively serve
UI claimants likely to exhaust their benefits early in their benefit spells,
rather than waiting to serve them until after they have experienced a
long spell, motivates the program. The WPRS poses two separate evaluation problems. First, what effect do the mandatory services have on
those who receive them and, second, how well does the existing system,
which is based on predicted labor market outcomes in the absence of
the mandatory services, do at allocating such services?
We know of two evaluations that address the first question. Dickinson, Decker, and Kreutzer (2002) summarize the results of a larger
project that includes linear selection-on-observables estimates of the
impact of WPRS referral on weeks and amount of UI received as well
as earnings and employment for six states. They find substantively
important and statistically significant impacts on the UI variables but
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no systematic effects on labor market outcomes; this suggests that the
WPRS system reduces UI usage without imposing a large cost on referred claimants via lower-quality job matches, although neither does
the program provide any benefits to the recipients.
More recently, using data from Kentucky and exploiting the particular institutional features of the profiling system in that state, Black
et al. (2003) provide experimental evidence of the impact of the reemployment services requirement on claimants who are on the margin
for the service requirement, given their employment histories and local
area characteristics. They find that the program has a substantial effect
relative to its (very small) cost, with that effect consisting largely of a
deterrent effect, whereby some claimants immediately find employment
upon receiving notice of the requirement that they receive services.
Black et al. (2003) also address the second question, and they find
little difference in the impacts by profiling score. Keeping in mind the
relative imprecision of their estimates, this suggests that the existing
allocation mechanism does not advance economic efficiency. Pope and
Sydnor (2007) argue that the existing mechanism fails on normative
grounds as well, though their argument hinges critically on the view
that the WPRS treatment represents a burden rather than a benefit.

Employer-Focused Programs
Although it might sound obvious that workforce programs should
focus on the labor demand side as well as the labor supply side, until
recently there has been a disproportionate emphasis on the latter. In this
section we briefly review the literature on three approaches to employer-focused programs: on-the job training (OJT), customized training,
and sectoral training.
On-the-Job Training
Subsidized on-the-job training (OJT) at private firms dates back at
least to MDTA. This service provides a (typically 50 percent) wage
subsidy for a limited period (typically six months) to firms hiring and
informally training certain specified types of workers. Program staff
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members recruit firms to provide OJT positions (a time-consuming
task), and firms always retain the right to reject candidates prior to hiring and to dismiss workers during or after the subsidy period. Though
the training provided is supposed to exceed that provided to other new
workers, anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that OJT recipients often
receive the same training as unsubsidized workers (and, in some cases,
little or no training at all).
Subsidized OJT has several rationales. The wage subsidy component seeks the purely redistributional goal of getting employers to try
out workers who may appear more risky because of weak labor market
histories or other problems. As the OJT participants are not considered
regular employees, employers are more willing to risk hiring them because if the OJT participants are let go at the end of the OJT period, it is
not the same as terminating a regular worker. Tying training by the firm
to the wage subsidy aims to increase the skills of workers lacking the
resources or credit to obtain training either directly from providers or
indirectly from firms via lower wages (where the minimum wage may
also limit the ability of workers to trade lower wages for training).
Most evaluations suggest positive impacts of OJT on participant
employment and earnings. For example, Barnow’s (1987) review of
the CETA evaluations finds OJT to have greater impacts than all other
service types. The NJS provides suggestive evidence on this point as
well. However, OJT impacts likely embody more displacement than
impacts for classroom training and other services that focus exclusively
on increasing human capital and not also on redistributing jobs. As a
result, partial equilibrium estimates like those noted here do less well at
capturing the impacts relevant for a social cost-benefit calculation.
Customized and Sectoral Training
Customized training is defined as training characterized by 1) employer input and approval authority for the curriculum, 2) employer
authority to establish eligibility criteria for participants and to select
participants if the employer desires, and 3) a commitment by the employer to hire successful program completers. Sectoral training projects
consist of customized employment and training services provided to a
group of employers in the same industry or sector of the economy; see,
e.g., Dresser and Rogers (1998) and Elliott and King (1999) for discus-
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sions. Though program advocates enthuse about these programs, they
do so without good evidence regarding their impacts.
Sectoral programs, like OJT, have the potential to provide opportunities for human capital enhancement to disadvantaged workers who
might be overlooked by employers. To warrant government support,
more evidence is needed on their effectiveness in increasing earnings,
and care should be taken to ensure that the training is provided to workers who ordinarily would not be trained at employer expense. Thus,
we recommend that rigorous evaluations be conducted to determine
whether these programs produce earnings gains that exceed their (full
social) costs. We further recommend that programs be structured so that
workers who receive the training have labor market disadvantages, and
so that the training is general in nature and useful at other firms in addition to the one hiring the workers.

Analytic Issues
This section highlights the four most important analytic issues in
the literature.
The first concerns heterogeneity in the effects of active labor market
policies. This heterogeneity arises in part from the fact that programs
themselves often provide quite heterogeneous services under headings
such as “classroom training.” The substantial differences across groups
defined by sex and age in average treatment effects, noted earlier in
the chapter, strongly suggest that even relatively homogeneous services
will have varying effects across individuals as well. In such an environment, evaluation researchers must pay close attention to exactly what
treatment effect their analysis estimates, and policy analysts must take
care to link the estimates they consider to the policy questions of interest. For example, an experiment with no control-group substitution
estimates the mean impact of “treatment on the treated.” This mean
impact represents the correct impact estimate for a cost-benefit analysis
that seeks to address the question of either keeping or scrapping the
existing program. It does not provide the correct impact estimate for
an analysis of whether the program should receive a larger budget so
as to allow it to expand the set of persons served; a simple economic
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model of program participation in which those with the largest impacts
choose to participate suggests that average impacts for individuals on
the margin of service receipt will lie below the mean impact of treatment on the treated.
Second, many studies do not even attempt a cost-benefit analysis,
and those that do often provide relatively low-quality analyses, either
because of lack of required inputs or failure to follow the best practices outlined in the literature. Without a serious cost-benefit analysis,
even a relatively strong positive impact estimate has little to say about
policy. Without data on all relevant outcomes (as when relying solely
on administrative earnings data for outcomes when programs may also
affect, say, criminal behavior and health), policymakers end up making
decisions based on incomplete information about impacts. Many government programs lack even rudimentary information on either average
or marginal program costs, let alone detailed information on the marginal and average costs for particular services and client types. Finally,
as noted in Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999), many cost-benefit
analyses fail to take full account of the costs of tax funding by omitting
consideration of the marginal excess burden of taxation, and proceeding
instead as if a dollar of tax funding costs society only a dollar.
Third, most evaluations estimate impacts over relatively short periods from the time of service initiation or random assignment. Recent
evidence indicates the dangers this poses to correct inferences about
program value. In the negative direction, the early positive impacts
found in the National Job Corps Study turned out to largely fade away
when longer-term follow-up data became available. In the positive direction, classroom training sometimes takes several years to yield its full
impact, as in the long-term follow-up of the California GAIN program
by Hotz, Imbens, and Klerman (2006) and the long-term evaluation of
German classroom training by Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2004). At
the same time, the long-term follow-ups of the Supported Work experiment by Couch (1992) and of the JTPA experiment in USGAO (1996)
show that sometimes program impact estimates remain rock solid at the
level observed shortly after program participation. With only a handful
of studies that provide credible impact estimates more than two or three
years out (this paragraph lists nearly all of them), we cannot draw any
conclusions about program types or client characteristics associated
with particular patterns of long-term impacts.
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Fourth, and finally, only a handful of papers look seriously at general equilibrium effects. Put differently, most evaluations ignore the
effects that programs may have on the behavior of those who do not
participate in them. In addition to indirect effects working through the
tax system, these include displacement effects, whereby individuals
induced to search harder (or smarter) by a program, or whose skills
increase as the result of a program, take jobs that would otherwise have
gone to individuals not participating in the program. Programs can also
have price effects; for example, a program that produces large numbers
of trained auto mechanics or nurses’ aides should drive down wages in
those labor markets. In many cases, failing to take account of general
equilibrium effects leads to overly positive conclusions about program
performance.
Calmfors (1994) and Johnson (1980) provide early conceptual discussions of these issues. The small but growing empirical literature includes Davidson and Woodbury (1987), who find modest but not trivial displacement effects of UI bonuses in a search context. Heckman,
Lochner, and Taber (1999) find large price effects of a subsidy to university tuition, effects that imply that a partial equilibrium analysis wildly
overstates the enrollment effects of the subsidy. Lise, Seitz, and Smith
(2006) consider the Canadian Self-Sufficiency Project, which provided
a generous earnings subsidy to some welfare recipients, and find that
taking account of displacement and changes in the amount of effort applied to searching by those without the subsidy changes the sign of the
cost-benefit calculation for the program. Finally, Kabbani (2001) finds
evidence using data from the NJS that training programs may increase
the earnings of nonparticipants by moving the participants into a different labor market.

Conclusion
First, most employment and training programs have either no
impact or modest positive impacts. Many do not pass careful social
cost-benefit tests, though some that fail may be worth doing on equity
grounds. Existing evaluations have important analytic limitations that
bias them in favor of programs with short-term impacts and large spill-
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over effects on nonparticipants from displacement or price changes. In
general, employment and training programs work best for adult women
and least well for youth. The literature provides no good explanation for
this demographic pattern.
For reasons of space we have omitted a variety of topics, such as
recent studies that examine program design by looking at performance
management systems (Barnow and Smith 2004; Heckman, Heinrich,
and Smith 2002), at the efficacy of caseworkers (Bell and Orr 2002;
McConnell, Decker, and Perez-Johnson 2006), and at statistical treatment rules as an alternative to caseworkers (Eberts, O’Leary, and
Wandner 2002; Lechner and Smith 2007). We have also omitted some
program categories, such as welfare-to-work programs (Ashworth,
Cebulla, Greenberg, and Walker 2004; Bloom, Hill, and Riccio 2003)
and the Trade Adjustment Act as well as all evidence from outside the
United States (Betcherman, Olivas, and Dar 2004; Kluve 2006). The
general lessons from the omitted literature parallel those from what we
have covered.

References
Abbring, Jaap H., and James J. Heckman. 2007. “Econometric Evaluation of
Social Programs, Part III: Distributional Treatment Effects, Dynamic Treatment Effects, Dynamic Discrete Choice, and General Equilibrium Policy
Evaluation.” In Handbook of Econometrics, James J. Heckman and Edward
E. Leamer, eds. Vol. 6B. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 5145–5306.
Angrist, Joshua D., and Alan B. Krueger. 1999. “Empirical Strategies in Labor Economics.” In Handbook of Labor Economics, Orley Ashenfelter and
David Card, eds. Vol. 3A. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 1277–1366.
Ashenfelter, Orley. 1978. “Estimating the Effect of Training Programs on
Earnings.” Review of Economics and Statistics 60(1): 47–57.
Ashworth, Karl, Andreas Cebulla, David Greenberg, and Robert Walker. 2004.
“Meta-Evaluation: Discovering What Works Best in Welfare Provision.”
Evaluation 10(2): 193–216.
Barnow, Burt S. 1987. “The Impact of CETA Programs on Earnings: A Review
of the Literature.” Journal of Human Resources 22(2): 157–193.
Barnow, Burt S., and Jeffrey A. Smith. 2004. “Performance Management of
U.S. Job Training Programs: Lessons from the Job Training Partnership
Act.” Public Finance and Management 4(3): 247–287.
Bell, Stephen H., and Larry L. Orr. 2002. “Screening (and Creaming?) Ap-

The Impacts of Workforce Investment Programs 173
plicants to Job Training Programs: The AFDC Homemaker–Home Health
Aide Demonstrations.” Labour Economics 9(2): 279–301.
Betcherman, Gordon, Karina Olivas, and Amit Dar. 2004. “Impacts of Active
Labor Market Programs: New Evidence from Evaluations with Particular
Attention to Developing and Transition Countries.” World Bank Social Protection Discussion Paper No. 0402. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Black, Dan A., Jeffrey A. Smith, Mark C. Berger, and Brett J. Noel. 2003.
“Is the Threat of Reemployment Services More Effective than the Services
Themselves? Evidence from Random Assignment in the UI System.” American Economic Review 93(4): 1313–1327.
Bloom, Howard S., Carolyn J. Hill, and James A. Riccio. 2003. “Linking Program Implementation and Effectiveness: Lessons from a Pooled Sample of
Welfare-to-Work Experiments.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 22(4): 551–575.
Bloom, Howard S., Larry L. Orr, Stephen H. Bell, George Cave, Fred Doolittle,
Winston Lin, and Johannes M. Bos. 1997. “The Benefits and Costs of JTPA
Title II-A Programs: Key Findings from the National Job Training Partnership Act Study.” Journal of Human Resources 32(3): 549–576.
Calmfors, Lars. 1994. “Active Labour Market Policy and Unemployment: A
Framework for the Analysis of Crucial Design Features.” OECD Economic
Studies 22(Spring): 7–47.
Card, David, and Daniel Sullivan. 1988. “Measuring the Effect of Subsidized
Training Programs on Movements In and Out of Employment.” Econometrica 56(3): 497–530.
Couch, Kenneth A. 1992. “New Evidence on the Long-Term Effects of Employment Training Programs.” Journal of Labor Economics 10(4): 380–388.
Davidson, Carl, and Stephen A. Woodbury. 1987. “The Displacement Effect
of Reemployment Bonus Programs.” Journal of Labor Economics 11(4):
575–605.
Dickinson, Katherine P., Paul T. Decker, and Suzanne D. Kreutzer. 2002. “Evaluation of WPRS Systems.” In Targeting Employment Services, Randall W.
Eberts, Christopher J. O’Leary, and Stephen A. Wandner, eds. Kalamazoo,
MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, pp. 61–90.
Dolton, Peter, João Pedro Azevedo, and Jeffrey A. Smith. 2006. “The Econometric Evaluation of the New Deal for Lone Parents.” Department for Work
and Pensions Research Report No. 356. London: Department for Work and
Pensions.
Doolittle, Fred C., and Linda Traeger. 1990. Implementing the National JTPA
Study. New York: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation.
Dresser, Laura, and Joel Rogers. 1998. “Networks, Sectors, and Workforce

174 Barnow and Smith
Learning.” In Jobs and Economic Development: Strategies and Practice,
Robert P. Giloth, ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, pp. 64–82.
Eberts, Randall W., Christopher J. O’Leary, and Stephen A. Wandner. 2002.
Targeting Employment Services. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research.
Elliott, Mark, and Elisabeth King.1999. Labor Market Leverage: Sectoral Employment Field Report. Philadelphia, PA: Public/Private Ventures.
Friedlander, Daniel, David H. Greenberg, and Philip K. Robins. 1997. “Evaluating Government Training Programs for the Economically Disadvantaged.”
Journal of Economic Literature 35(4): 1809–1855.
Heckman, James J., Carolyn Heinrich, and Jeffrey A. Smith. 2002. “The Performance of Performance Standards.” Journal of Human Resources 37(4):
778–811.
Heckman, James J., Hidehiko Ichimura, Jeffrey A. Smith, and Petra E. Todd.
1998. “Characterizing Selection Bias Using Experimental Data.” Econometrica 66(5): 1017–1098.
Heckman, James J., Robert J. LaLonde, and Jeffrey A. Smith. 1999. “The Economics and Econometrics of Active Labor Market Programs.” In Handbook of Labor Economics, Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, eds. Vol. 3A.
Handbooks in Economics 5. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 1865–2097.
Heckman, James J., Lance Lochner, and Christopher Taber. 1999. “General-Equilibrium Cost-Benefit Analysis of Education and Tax Policies.”
In Trade, Growth, and Development: Essays in Honor of Professor T.N.
Srinivasan. Gustav Ranis and Lakshmi K. Raut, eds. Amsterdam: Elsevier
Science, pp. 291–349.
Heckman, James J., and Jeffrey A. Smith. 1999. “The Pre-Programme Earnings Dip and the Determinants of Participation in a Social Programme: Implications for Simple Programme Evaluation Strategies.” Economic Journal 109(457): 313–348.
Heckman, James J., and Edward J. Vytlacil. 2007a. “Econometric Evaluation of
Social Programs, Part I: Causal Models, Structural Models, and Econometric Policy Evaluation.” In Handbook of Econometrics, James J. Heckman
and Edward E. Leamer, eds. Vol. 6B. Handbooks in Economics 2. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 4779–4874.
———. 2007b. “Econometric Evaluation of Social Programs, Part II: Using the Marginal Treatment Effect to Organize Alternative Econometric Estimators to Evaluate Social Programs, and to Forecast Their Effects in New Environments.” In Handbook of Econometrics, James J.
Heckman and Edward E. Leamer, eds. Vol. 6B. Handbooks in Economics 2.
Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 4875–5144.
Hotz, V. Joseph, Guido W. Imbens, and Jacob A. Klerman. 2006. “Evaluating

The Impacts of Workforce Investment Programs 175
the Differential Effects of Alternative Welfare-to-Work Training Components: A Reanalysis of the California GAIN Program.” Journal of Labor
Economics 24(3): 521–566.
Imbens, Guido W., and Joshua D. Angrist. 1994. “Identification and Estimation
of Local Average Treatment Effects.” Econometrica 62(2): 467–475.
Imbens, Guido W., and Jeffrey M. Wooldridge. Forthcoming. “Recent Developments in the Econometrics of Program Evaluation.” Journal of Economic
Literature.
Johnson, George E. 1980. “The Theory of Labor Market Intervention.” Economica 47(187): 309–329.
Kabbani, Nader S. 2001. “The Effect of Public Sector Training Programs on
the Employment and Earnings of Non-Participant Workers.” Unpublished
doctoral dissertation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University.
Kluve, Jochen. 2006. “The Effectiveness of European Active Labor Market
Policy.” IZA Discussion Paper No. 2018. Bonn, Germany: Institute for the
Study of Labor.
Lechner, Michael, Ruth Miquel, and Conny Wunsch. 2004. “Long-Run Effects
of Public Sector Sponsored Training in West Germany.” IZA Discussion
Paper No. 1443. Bonn, Germany: Institute for the Study of Labor.
Lechner, Michael, and Jeffrey A. Smith. 2007. “What Is the Value Added by
Caseworkers?” Labour Economics 14(2): 135–151.
Lise, Jeremy, Shannon Seitz, and Jeffrey Smith. 2006. “Equilibrium Policy Experiments and the Evaluation of Social Programs.” NBER Working Paper
10283. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Long, David A., Charles D. Mallar, and Craig V. D. Thornton. 1981. “Evaluating the Benefits and Costs of the Job Corps.” Journal of Policy Analysis and
Management 1(1): 55–76.
McConnell, Sheena, Paul Decker, and Irma Perez-Johnson. 2006. “The Role
of Counseling in Voucher Programs: Finding from the Individual Training
Account Experiment.” Canadian Labour Market and Skills Researcher Network Working Paper No. 21. Princeton, NJ: Mathematica Policy Research.
Mueser, Peter R., Kenneth R. Troske, and Alexey Gorislavsky. 2007. “Using
State Administrative Data to Measure Program Performance.” Review of
Economics and Statistics 89(4): 761–783.
Orr, Larry L., Howard S. Bloom, Stephen H. Bell, Fred Doolittle, and Winston
Lin. 1996. Does Training for the Disadvantaged Work? Evidence from the
National JTPA Study. Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press.
Perry, Charles R., Bernard E. Anderson, Richard L. Rowan, and Herbert R.
Northrup. 1975. The Impact of Government Manpower Programs: In General, and on Minorities and Women. Philadelphia: Industrial Research Unit,
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.

176 Barnow and Smith
Pope, Devon G., and Justin R. Sydnor. 2007. “Implicit Statistical Discrimination in Predictive Models.” Working Paper No. 2007-09-11. Philadelphia:
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
Schochet, Peter Z., John Burghardt, and Sheena McConnell. 2006. National
Job Corps Study and Longer-Term Follow-Up Study: Impact and BenefitCost Findings Using Survey and Summary Earnings Records Data. Final
Report. Princeton, NJ: Mathematica Policy Research.
Smith, Jeffrey A. 2000. “A Critical Survey of Empirical Methods for Evaluating Employment and Training Programs.” Swiss Journal for Economics and
Statistics 136(3): 247–268.
———. 2004. “Evaluating Local Economic Development Policies: Theory
and Practice.” In Evaluating Local Economic and Employment Development: How to Assess What Works among Programmes and Policies, Alistair
Nolan and Ging Wong. eds. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development, 287–332.
Smith, Jeffrey A., and Petra E. Todd. 2005. “Does Matching Overcome
LaLonde’s Critique of Nonexperimental Estimators?” Journal of Econometrics 125(1–2): 305–353.
U.S. General Accounting Office (USGAO). 1996. Job Training Partnership
Act: Long-Term Earnings and Employment Outcomes. Report to Congressional Requesters. GAO/HEHS-96-40. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office (USGAO).

11
Correctional Programs in the
Age of Mass Incarceration
What Do We Know about “What Works”?
John H. Tyler
Jillian Berk
Brown University

THE AGE OF MASS INCARCERATION
Beginning in the mid-1970s the convergence of several social and
economic forces changed the size, face, and nature of the U.S. penal
system. In terms of the size of the penal system, changes in criminal
justice policies associated with the government’s fight against drugs and
crime mean that more convictions now lead to a prison sentence than in
the past, and the prison sentences they lead to tend to be of longer duration than in the past. The overall result of these policy shifts is a rising
penal population. As of June 2006 there were 1.5 million prisoners held
in our federal and state prisons, compared to 329,000 in 1980—more
than a fourfold increase (BJS 2008a).1 In terms of imprisonment rates,
the United States is the world’s leader. In 2005, out of every 100,000
U.S. citizens, 705 were in jail or prison, a 500 percent increase over the
last 30 years. That rate is higher than in all other developed countries,
including Russia, and almost twice as high as in South Africa (Mauer
2003). Currently the corrections “industry” in our nation is a $65 billion
enterprise, a sum that represents an increase of almost 600 percent since
1982 (BJS 2008b).
At the same time that we have been imprisoning and releasing
increasing numbers of individuals, changes in our economy have led
to declining economic opportunities for low-skilled individuals. These
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changes, coupled with the exodus of inner-city job opportunities for
the low- and medium-skilled, have resulted in declining labor market
opportunities for young, poorly educated minority men. As a result, these
individuals have become especially vulnerable to the new, more punitive criminal justice regime. The statistics are stark: by 1999, almost 60
percent of black male dropouts between the ages of 30 and 34 had been
imprisoned at some point, compared to about 10 percent of white male
dropouts (Pettit and Western 2004).2 As our economy has become more
highly skilled, our prison populations have become disproportionately
low-educated (two-thirds of prisoners now lack a regular high school
diploma [Harlow 2003]) and African American (40 percent as of 2005
[Harrison and Beck 2006]).
The importance of these criminal justice and economic trends lies
in this undeniable reality: almost all of these individuals will leave
prison one day and return to free society.3 Over 600,000 people will
leave prison this year, three and a half times more than the 170,000 who
were released in 1980. Furthermore, a disproportionate number will be
returning to a relatively small number of distressed communities and
neighborhoods. Not only will a large proportion of these individuals
have low levels of education, but many will also have low levels of
skills, work experience, and preprison earnings, while at the same time
criminal justice reforms during this “age of mass incarceration” will
ensure that they will have substantially less postrelease supervision and
assistance than in the past. In addition, the experience with the criminal
justice system itself can present barriers to postrelease employment. A
felony conviction can leave ex-offenders with a social stigma that Nagin
(1998) likens to a “scarlet letter.” Pager (2003) has shown through audit
studies that this stigma is mediated and compounded through the lens
of race. In addition to the potential stigma attached to a felony record,
state laws often prohibit the employment of convicted felons in a variety of jobs from child care providers to barbers, and many jobs now
require mandatory criminal background checks. Given these realities,
many argue that the roles for prison-based education and vocational and
work-experience programs are potentially more important than ever.
Of course, the extent to which these programs can help ex-offenders
reintegrate into mainstream society and stay out of prison depends on
how effective they are.
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THE EVIDENCE ON CORRECTIONAL EDUCATION,
VOCATIONAL, AND EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS
Prisoners, Prisons, and Prison-Based Programs
As a first step, it is worth stepping back to characterize the “typical” prisoner in our nation’s state and federal prisons, along with the
common prison experience faced by the typical offender. In addition to
the low education levels cited earlier, 90 percent of prison inmates are
male, a third are less than 30 years of age, and half are serving sentences
for nonviolent crimes (Harrison and Beck 2006). The dominant track in
prison for an offender sentenced to a nonviolent crime is characterized
by a relatively short stay in prison (less than 15 months on average, with
many in state prisons serving less than a year), spent mostly in medium
or minimum-security prisons before his release (Austin 2001). Even
though the skill and education levels of the average prisoner are low,
and even though time in prison could be seen as an opportunity to positively affect human capital levels, relatively small numbers of inmates
are participating in prison-based education or vocational programs at
any given time. A report issued by the Bureau of Justice Statistics indicates that about one-half of the inmates in state and federal prisons were
participating in some kind of education or vocational program in 1997,
with the great bulk of these participating in General Educational Development (GED) testing programs or vocational education programs.
This means that at the time of the 1997 survey, fully one-half of the
nation’s inmates were not engaged in any kind of education or training
program while in prison. Also, it is likely that these participation rates
are even worse now—prisons have had to deal with increased crowding
and strained resources as inmate populations have swelled since 1997.
The low rates of prison-program participation reflect several realities associated with prison life, beginning with a shortage of staff and
instructional space, as these resources have often failed to keep up with
the explosive growth in the prison population. Adding to these institutional constraints are three considerations: 1) security issues trump the
programmatic needs of offenders; 2) prison time is often given to work
assignments within the prison associated with facility maintenance, services, and upkeep; and 3) prisoners often move from one facility to
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another as their custody level changes and in response to the balance
between available bed space and differences in security levels across
facilities. As one experienced correctional education officer stated,
“Inmates face lots of idle time, but it is punctuated with lots of interruptions, from security checks and lockdowns to medical issues that require
attention, to mundane jobs they are often required to do” (LoBuglio
2007). The overall picture is one where individuals with substantial
educational and skill deficits arrive at prison’s door for a relatively short
stay, and because of institutional arrangements and resource allocation
decisions, they receive relatively little sustained education and vocational programming while they are in prison.
Previous Evidence on Program Impact
Situated in the prison setting just described are three basic kinds
of programs that focus chiefly on increasing the postrelease employability of ex-offenders: 1) classroom education programs (chiefly Adult
Basic Education and preparation to pass the GED exam), 2) vocational
training programs, and 3) employment programs designed to provide
general work experience and training on specific jobs.4 What do we currently know about the effectiveness of these kinds of corrections-based
programs in reducing recidivism and assisting ex-offenders in reintegrating into the labor market? Most observers would say that until very
recently the answer is that we know very little about the causal impact
of corrections-based skill and employment programs. It is not for lack
of study that we know so little about the effectiveness of correctional
programs. Indeed there have been hundreds of studies over the years of
the many different prison and community-based programs designed to
rehabilitate offenders and ex-offenders.5 The problem lies in the quality
and rigor of program evaluation in the correctional field. For example,
in a 1999 meta-analysis of 33 corrections-based education, vocational,
and work programs, Wilson et al. (1999) note, “Few studies [that were
included in the meta-analysis] made any serious attempt . . . to control
for biases produced by . . . self-selection into programs.” Wilson et al.
go on to state the following:
Future research that merely compares participants with nonparticipants of these programs is not needed to resolve the questions
of the effectiveness of these programs, for it is well established
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that participants do reoffend at a lower rate than nonparticipants.
Rather, the field needs high-quality evaluation studies that can provide a strong basis for establishing a causal connection between
the activities of the programs and future positive changes in inmate
behavior (p. 17).

In a paper published the next year, Wilson, Gallagher, and
MacKenzie (2000) had this to say about the models that were used to
evaluate the impact of correctional education programs on outcomes:
“Although close to half of the [33] studies included in this synthesis
performed some form of post hoc matching or statistical control, these
controls were generally restricted to adjustments for the age and race
distributions between groups” (p. 361).
A survey of the correctional program evaluation literature suggests
that the conclusions drawn by Wilson and his coauthors extend beyond
the studies they examine to include much of the research in this field.
While there are some notable examples where serious attempts were
made to balance program participants and nonparticipants on observable variables (e.g., Saylor and Gaes [1996]), and while there have been
some random assignment experiments of corrections-based programs,
the results from these stronger studies give, at best, a mixed picture, and
the great bulk of the field is made up of the far less rigorous studies characterized by Wilson et al. In another study, Farrington and Welsh (2005)
conclude their meta-analysis of the 84 random assignment evaluations
conducted in criminology between 1982 and 2004 with the observation
that “rigorous evaluations of contemporary employment interventions
for former prisoners are sorely needed” (p. 311).
This same conclusion is reached by Bloom in the most up-to-date
review of employment-focused programs for ex-prisoners (Bloom
2006). The following points effectively summarize Bloom’s findings:
• While there are no clear-cut patterns of successful programs,
“there are hints of success for older offenders, for programs that
provide integrated services both before and after release, and
perhaps for models using financial incentives.”
• The evidence to date does not support a conclusion that we already know what works and simply need to fund it, and this is
primarily because some of the most promising findings that one
sees in the literature come from some of the more weakly designed evaluations.

182 Tyler and Berk

• The shifting economic and criminal justice contexts of the last
decade and a half mean that a clear need for more definitive evidence as to “what works” still remains.
This survey of the literature leaves one both dissatisfied and discouraged. After many evaluation efforts over dozens of years, it appears
that we still do not have a good sense of the programs or even the kinds
of programs that can help offenders reintegrate into society. This pessimistic outlook should, however, be tempered by the convergence of
three trends that may well influence corrections-based evaluations in
the coming years. We argue that a similar convergence had an impact on
education-related research in the 1990s, with the two related results that
1) program evaluation in that field has gotten much stronger and more
rigorous over the last decade and a half and 2) we therefore know more
about key features of this field, such as the importance of class size
or teacher quality on student achievement, than we otherwise would
have.
The first trend has to do with awareness. Much like what has happened in the world of education research and education policy, a consensus is emerging among researchers and practitioners in the correctional field that in order to solicit support from policymakers, funders,
and legislative bodies, programs will be required to provide strong
evidence that they are effective. And, in order for evidence to be considered “strong,” it will have to come from evaluations that are much
more rigorous than in the past. The message seems clear: public money
and foundation funds are tight, and the people controlling these sources
of support have become a more careful, knowledgeable, and skeptical
bunch. This happened in the world of education, and, just as in education, this recognition is an important first step toward better evaluation
research.
Second, just as more rigorous research is required, research designs
and methods have become increasingly more powerful, appropriate,
and sophisticated. It is likely that random assignment evaluations will
play an increasingly important role in the corrections world—again,
this is comparable to what has happened in the last decade in education.
However, as is the case in education and other public policy spheres,
there will be many times when experimental evaluation is not possible.
Advances in econometrics and statistics, combined with a new generation of researchers who bring training and experience to issues associ-
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ated with causal inference, give one substantial hope that future nonexperimental evaluations of corrections-based programs will be much
more rigorous than the nonexperimental evaluations of the past.
Third, as more rigorous evaluations are demanded and as our techniques for using data in more appropriate ways grow, corrections-based
data collection and management are beginning to catch up with the
twenty-first century. Again, this is similar to what has happened in education. Just as in that enterprise, federal and state agencies, and even
some individual facilities and programs, have begun to collect, store,
use, and share their data with researchers. These rich administrative
data sources can be extremely useful and often essential when it comes
to evaluating programs and interventions. Also, with the increasing
knowledge that definitive answers to the “what works” question require
and rely on good data, governmental agencies and private foundations
are more aware that the funding of large-scale surveys can have net
social benefits.
If our analogy to what has happened in education research is correct, we should see stronger evaluations of correctional programs in the
future. In the next section we present results from three recent studies
that are suggestive of the potential direction of correctional program
evaluation.

WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED RECENTLY? THREE
DIFFERENT APPROACHES
A Random Assignment Study: The Center for Employment
Opportunities (CEO) Evaluation
The Center for Employment Opportunities (CEO) is one of the
nation’s largest and most well-regarded employment programs for exoffenders. The goal of CEO is to improve the postrelease outcomes of
ex-offenders by providing immediate employment upon release via a
highly structured and tightly supervised transitional employment program, as well as by continuing to monitor and offer services to program participants after they move out of transitional employment into
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“independent” employment. The CEO experience begins with placement on a work crew within one week of enrollment in CEO. This work
experience is highly structured and monitored and pays the New York
state minimum wage. CEO staff work with program participants to help
them develop good work habits while they are in the transitional jobs,
and then they help participants move off of the work crews into regular
jobs. After the initial, transitional job phase, CEO remains as involved
as possible with program participants as they enter and compete in the
labor market. One way CEO does this is by providing cash rewards of
up to $600 a year for individuals in jobs who bring in their pay stubs
to CEO on a regular basis. The purpose of this reward system is to
keep CEO staff connected to former program participants so that they
can monitor how participants are doing in their regular jobs and intervene with assistance when necessary. As part of the Hard-to-Employ
Demonstration and Evaluation Project funded by the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services, MDRC, in partnership with the Urban
Institute, is evaluating the CEO program with a random assignment
design.
Random assignment of CEO applicants between January of 2004
and October of 2005 resulted in 568 program participants who received
the full CEO “treatment” and 409 control subjects who received some
job search assistance. The first-year results (i.e., one year after random
assignment) from the CEO evaluation are interesting and tantalizing.
These patterns emerge:6
• The employment effects of CEO participation are not impressive. Employment differences between the treatment and control
groups heavily favor the treatment group in the first quarter after
random assignment when the treatment group members work in
CEO transitional jobs. This CEO advantage falls steadily over
the next three months, so that by the fourth quarter after random
assignment there are no statistical differences between the two
groups in the probability of being employed.
• On the other hand, the effects of CEO on recidivism appear
to be rather substantial, at least for the subgroup who came to
CEO within three months of their release from prison and were
randomly assigned at that point.7 Within this reentry subgroup,
those randomized into the CEO program had statistically signifi-
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cantly lower arrest rates (1.7 percent versus 6.2), lower parole
revocations (18.8 percent versus 27.0), lower reincarceration
rates in the state prison system for any reason (9.6 versus 19.7),
and lower reincarceration rates in the state prison system for a
new conviction (0.5 versus 5.1) than did those in the reentry subgroup who were randomized out of the CEO treatment. These
differences in recidivism largely disappeared when the whole
experimental sample—those who applied within three months
of release and those who applied at some later time—was used.
Taken together, these initial results from the CEO evaluation suggest some interesting conclusions to consider. First, since the recidivism
results largely disappear when the whole sample is used, it appears that
the CEO program model is most effective for offenders who come to
the program and get employment assistance relatively soon after release
(as do three-quarters of all CEO participants). Second, the fact that by
the fourth quarter the CEO employment effects had largely disappeared
among the reentry subgroup, even as this group had lower rates of
recidivism than did the control group, suggests that the mechanisms
through which employment reduces recidivism may need more careful thought. That is, typical economic models of crime suggest that if
higher wages and a greater probability of employment can replace the
economic component of crime, the result should be a lower probability of engaging in criminal behavior. The CEO results suggest there
may be other mechanisms through which gainful employment reduces
criminal activity. For example, it may be that even though early gainful employment may not lead to greater employment by the end of the
fourth quarter, employment in the months close to prison release helps
ex-offenders get through what criminologist Shawn Bushway calls “the
toxic first year” after release.8 Subsequent follow-ups in the CEO evaluation may help us better understand some of these interesting first-year
findings and shed light on the linkages between employment, wages,
and recidivism.
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Lessons from a Large-Scale Longitudinal Survey Study:
Evaluation of the Serious and Violent Offenders Reentry
Initiative (SVORI)
In 2003, the U.S. Departments of Justice, Labor, Housing and
Urban Development, and Health and Human Services established the
Serious and Violent Offender Reentry Initiative (SVORI), a large-scale
program providing over $100 million to 69 grantees to develop programming, training, and state-of-the-art reentry strategies at the community level. The SVORI programs are intended to reduce recidivism
as well as to improve employment, housing, and health outcomes of
participating released prisoners. RTI International, a nonprofit research
firm, and the Urban Institute are involved in a five-year evaluation of
SVORI-funded programs. The 15-month postrelease results from that
evaluation are now available, and the results, while less than encouraging, are nonetheless instructive.
In the SVORI evaluation, all ex-offenders who participated in
SVORI-supported programs across 16 programs over 14 states and
in more than 300 jails and prisons form the treatment group. A comparison group was constructed from ex-offenders in the same facilities who were released at approximately the same time, and the groups
are balanced as effectively as possible using propensity score-matching
techniques. In a baseline survey prior to release, 74 percent of the treatment group and 73 percent of the comparison group indicated that they
felt that they needed employment, education, or skill-building services.
Follow-up surveys indicated that only 39 percent of the treatment group
and 24 percent of the comparison group had received any employment,
education, or skill-building services. Postrelease, only 15 percent of the
treatment group and 8 percent of the comparison group had received
any services, and nine months after release the figures were 12 percent
and 8 percent, respectively.
The central lesson from these results is that the overall level of
service provision, including services from the SVORI programs that
were receiving federal funding, was substantially below what offenders
indicated they needed prior to their release. So, even though SVORI
program participants received a somewhat greater level of services both
before and after release, there was still much unmet need, according
to the reports of the sample members. Given the relatively low level
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of service provision, even among the treatment group members, it is
hardly surprising that 15-month postrelease results showed very few
statistically significant differences in outcomes between treatment and
comparison group members. The evaluation considers roughly 100 different outcomes across the broad categories of “self-sufficiency and
quality of life,” “health,” and “reduced criminality.” In only 19 of 107
instances did SVORI participants have statistically significantly better
outcomes than the comparison group in the propensity score results.9
Thus, it is not clear what the ultimate message is at the early stage of
this evaluation: that SVORI programs are mostly ineffective, or that
there is a substantial amount of unmet need when it comes to programming designed to help offenders reintegrate.
The lessons about unmet need as documented by the SVORI evaluation should be placed beside what we already know about how the realities of prison life can disrupt or prevent program provision, program
enrollment (as offenders move between facilities that do and do not
offer programs they desire), and program attendance. Taken together,
these facts of prison life and what the SVORI evaluation tells us about
program provision suggest that it may be the case that few programs are
delivered with integrity relative to their design. If it is indeed the case
that few enrollees are getting the full treatment in any given program, it
could be hard for even effective programs to show an impact.
Learning about Education, Vocational, and Work Programs Using
Administrative Data: The Florida Case
Between 2000 and 2002, John H. Tyler and Jeffrey Kling worked
with three state agencies in Florida to assemble a series of data sets that
could be used to study criminal justice questions and issues. For this
project the Florida Department of Corrections, the Florida Department
of Law Enforcement, and the Florida Education and Training Placement Information Program worked in concert to provide the necessary
criminal justice and labor market administrative records. The linkable
data sets delivered to Tyler and Kling were stripped of all personally
identifiable information and contain information on more than one million records on all individuals arrested in Florida since 1990, with a
complete panel on arrests, convictions, incarceration spells, rehabilitative program participation, and Florida unemployment insurance (UI)
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earnings since 1994. The quality and richness of these data provide an
opportunity to conduct rigorous evaluations of the effectiveness of corrections-based programs in Florida, a state with one of the largest prison
populations in the nation.
Using the Florida data, Tyler and Kling (2007) found that white
male offenders who entered prison as dropouts and obtained a GED
had no better earnings after three years than did white dropouts who did
not obtain a GED while in prison. On the other hand, this study found
that minority-group male offenders (everyone coded as nonwhite in the
data) who entered as dropouts but obtained a GED in prison had earnings that were about 15 percent higher in the first year after release than
minority group offenders who entered prison as dropouts but did not
obtain a GED.10 Both findings are based on a specification that includes
a rich set of personal demographic and criminal justice history variables
as well as preprison earnings. The model also controls for all unobservable differences between program participants and nonparticipants that
are time invariant, a so-called fixed effects model.11
While the results for minority group offenders are encouraging, the
first-year earnings gains for the GED holders fall in both the second and
third years after release, so that by the end of the third year there are
no statistical differences between those minority offenders who did and
those who did not obtain a GED while in prison. It is worth noting that
Tyler and Kling (2007) were able to show that for all groups, any simple
comparisons (without controls) between those with and those without a
GED obtained while in prison would show a large, positive, and statistically significant effect of the GED on earnings.
For this paper, we returned to the Tyler and Kling data from Florida
to estimate the effects of six different prison-based education, vocational, or employment programs. An interesting feature of conducting this
analysis is that we can compare program effects on the same population
of inmates using the same techniques and the same data. Specifically,
we examine three classroom programs (Adult Basic Education or ABE,
GED preparation, and vocational training) and three work experience
programs (prison industries, work camps, and work release).12 We look
at the effects of these programs on earnings for three years following
prison release, limiting our sample to male inmates who enter prison
without a high school diploma to ensure that everyone is in need of
educational programming.
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As did Tyler and Kling, we first showed that, for all of the programs except ABE, simple comparisons between program participants
and nonparticipants would show that program participation was associated with higher earnings and lower recidivism rates three years after
release. However, when we applied the same fixed-effects model used
in Tyler and Kling, controlling for the available set of covariates, only
two of the programs showed any positive effects. Based on the fully
specified model, offenders who participated in a prison industry had
earnings that were about 15 percent higher than nonparticipants’, and
those who participated in work release had quarterly earnings that were
about 24 percent higher than the earnings of nonparticipants. We found
no recidivism effects for prison industry participation, but work release
participants had recidivism rates that were 4, 5, and 6 percentage points
lower than the comparison group in the first, second, and third years
after release, respectively. These recidivism gains occur against baseline recidivism rates that show 30 percent return to prison within one
year, 45 percent within two years, and 53 percent within three years of
release. Again, most of the programs show recidivism effects across the
three postrelease years in models with no control variables.
Although our detailed data allow us to move beyond much of the
nonexperimental research on prison programming, it is still important
to wrestle further with questions of program selection based on unobservables. In other research, Berk investigates the work release program
more carefully (Berk 2008). Using propensity score matching, this
work tests whether the effect of work release participation on earnings
varies with the propensity to be treated. We do find evidence that the
earnings effect is largest in the tails of the propensity score distribution.
We interpret this as evidence of a heterogeneous treatment effect or the
increased importance of selection on unobservables in this portion of
the distribution.
An insight from this research is that it is important to consider that
interventions targeting employment might not be right for all inmates.
If we take an economic model of crime seriously, one might not expect
corrections-based employment programs, even effective ones, to have
the same impact for all offenders. The reason is that one of the primary goals of corrections-based employment programs is to increase
the employability and earnings of released offenders and, hence, reduce
their proclivity to engage in criminal activity. Financial gain, how-
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ever, does not motivate all crime, and so it is not clear how effective
employment programs might be expected to be when it comes to “nonincome-generating” offenses. To explore this possibility, Berk separates
offenders into two groups—those who committed income-generating
offenses (robbery, burglary, property theft, and drug sales) and those
who committed nonincome-generating offenses (violent crime, drug
use, weapons possession, and other offenses). While both groups of
offenders have improved employment outcomes after participating in
work release, only the income-generating crime group has a drop in
recidivism. In many respects, this result is intuitive, but it is crucial to
consider its implications. There is not one type of prison inmate, and
there will never be one type of prison program that meets the needs of
all inmates. We do need to think carefully about what types of employment programs improve labor market outcomes, but we also need to
realize that better labor market opportunities will not eliminate the
recidivism problem.

CONCLUSION
The explosion in the prison population in this nation has translated
into an explosion in the number of released ex-offenders who return
to our nation’s communities every day of every year. Given this reality, understanding the extent to which various correctional programs
help or do not help ex-offenders reintegrate into mainstream society has
never been more important. We argue that the relatively low quality of
correctional program evaluation that has been the norm until recently
has left us uncertain as to which, and even which types of, programs
work. We further argue that research into what works in corrections
may be at a critical juncture, similar to that faced by education research
in the 1990s when three trends converged: 1) a growing recognition of
the importance of more rigorous program evaluation centered on the
idea that random assignment evaluations constitute the gold standard
in program evaluation, 2) the development and increased use of more
powerful and appropriate statistical and econometric research methods
that could be brought to bear when random assignment was not possible, coupled with the emergence of a new generation of researchers
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who were much more accustomed to thinking hard and deeply about
causal inference in the social sciences and were better equipped to do
so, and 3) the emergence and availability of rich administrative data
sets that could be used in program evaluation when random-assignment
field experiments were not in place.
Against this backdrop, this paper asks, “What do we learn from the
latest research regarding what works in rehabilitative programming?”
We believe that the most important lessons from recent research are the
following:
• First, it is very hard to have a substantial impact on the lives of
adult criminal justice offenders. That is, research that seriously
tries to account for positive selection into rehabilitative programs
is often unable to reject the null hypothesis of no program effect
on outcomes, be they labor market outcomes or recidivism.
• Second, this result should not be completely surprising given
what we know about how hard it is to change life trajectories,13
what we have learned thus far from the SVORI evaluation about
the apparent underprovision of programs, and what we know
about how the institutional realities of prisons and prison life
make it difficult to deliver rehabilitative programs in ways that
comport with how the programs were designed to be delivered.
• Third, the early results of the CEO evaluation that show no effects of the program on employment, even as program participation reduces recidivism, suggest that we need to think hard about
the mechanisms through which an employment program might
affect recidivism and employment.
• Fourth, the results from Berk’s recent work-release research suggest that the targeting of scarce program resources at particular
types of offenders and ex-offenders could potentially have big
payoffs. In particular, her findings tell us that perhaps we should
target employment programs at offenders who commit incomegenerating crimes, with the potential corollary being that we
might target cognitive-behavior or substance-abuse programs at
offenders who are in prison for nonincome-generating crimes,
such as violent crime, drug use, and weapons possession.
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Notes
1. An additional 750,000 individuals were in local jails in 2006, for a total penal
population of 2.25 million.
2. According to the same source, the comparable figures in 1979 were 17.1 percent
for black male dropouts and 4.0 percent for white male dropouts.
3. Approximately 95 percent of the individuals who are incarcerated are eventually
released. The 5 percent who are not are composed of those who die while in prison, who are executed, or who are serving life-without-parole sentences.
4. Prison programs also focus on drug treatment and recovery, life skills, and cognitive behavioral skills designed to change the decision-making processes of criminal justice offenders. While any of these programs could, if effective, improve the
labor market outcomes of individuals, since their primary goal is not to improve
employment outcomes, they are not considered in this study.
5. It is worth noting at this point that almost all of the program evaluation research
has been focused on the effects of program participation on recidivism, with very
few studies looking at labor market outcomes such as wages, earnings, or employment as the outcome of interest. This is partly because most criminologists are
primarily interested in program effects on recidivism and partly because, until
recently, labor market information on ex-offenders has been difficult to obtain.
The increased use of state unemployment-insurance wage records by researchers
is changing the latter constraint.
6. The following results and figures come from the presentation of MDRC’s Dan
Bloom at the June 2007 Welfare Research and Evaluation Conference, hosted by
the Administration for Children and Families and held in Washington, D.C. These
publicly available slides can be found at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/opre/
wrconference/agenda.html.
7. This “reentry subgroup,” as it is called in the evaluation, is a valid subgroup from
the experimental evaluation standpoint, since those who came to CEO within three
months of their release and were randomized into treatment were compared with
those who came to CEO within three months of release and were randomized into
the control group. That is, the reentry subgroup is not an endogenously defined
subgroup, and so any treatment-control differences in outcomes can be attributed
to CEO participation. See Orr (1999) for a discussion of endogenously defined
subgroups.
8. After three years, approximately 60 percent of released prisoners will have returned to prison. Half of these individuals return within the first year after release
(BJS 2008c).
9. Also, the comparison group had better outcomes that were statistically significant
in two instances.
10. Whites (treatment and comparison groups) had higher preprison earnings than did
nonwhite offenders (treatment and comparison groups).
11. The earnings fixed-effects model is
		 Yit = AFTit β40 + GEDitδ4 + AGEit β41 + YRQTRit β42 + AFTit * Xi β43 + αi + ε4it ,

Correctional Programs in the Age of Mass Incarceration 193
		 where i indexes person, t indexes time in quarters before or after prison, α is the
individual fixed effect, AFT is an “after prison” indicator, GED is a dummy variable indicating the possession of a GED in quarter t, AGE is age at time t, YRQTR
is a vector of year-quarter dummy variables, and X is a vector of variables that includes education level upon prison entry, predicted sentence length, marital status
and number of children upon prison entry, years in Florida prior to prison entry,
whether a Florida resident, state or region of birth, whether employed prior to
arrest, industry and occupation prior to arrest, whether or not an English speaker
and whether a confirmed U.S. citizen or an alien, cumulative years in prison prior
to the current prison spell, number of disciplinary reports ever accumulated in
prison, type of offense for this imprisonment spell, and a measure of cognitive
skills at prison entry. This fixed-effects specification allows for the variables in X
to affect postrelease earnings. For another example of this type of flexible specification in a fixed-effects model, see Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993).
12. Florida’s prison industries engage in a variety of tasks—inmates grow sugar cane,
digitize government documents, and make cardboard boxes. Inmates working in
prison industries receive a nominal wage (20–55 cents an hour). Inmates in work
camps clean roadways, perform grounds and building maintenance, and work on
public construction projects. These inmates receive no remuneration. Inmates
nearing the end of their sentences are eligibile for work-release assignments. Inmates at a work-release facility hold jobs in the community during the day and
return to the secure facility at night. Inmates are paid the prevailing wage but these
wages are garnished for room and board, victim restitution, and family support.
13. For a discussion and evidence on this topic, see Heckman (2000).
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12
Comparing Apples to Oranges
when Evaluating Community-Based
Programs and Services
Robert J. LaLonde
University of Chicago

Community organizations have proliferated over time. These nonprofit entities may provide a range of services, or they may provide a
very specific set of services targeted to residents of a geographically
defined area, such as a neighborhood, a school community, a parish, or
even a city or town. Their services include, but are not limited to,
Prisoner reentry
Community policing
Job placement
School tutoring
Job training for new immigrants
Home visitation for new mothers
Drug treatment and drug treatment referrals
Domestic violence counseling and centers
Early childhood education initiatives
Programs to encourage minority arts participation
Small business assistance for low-income persons
Food banks and services for the homeless.
These services have been provided by both nonsectarian and faithbased organizations. They are designed to improve outcomes for recipients of the services, for their families, and for the communities in which
they live.
Financing for these services usually comes from charitable contributions, from members of the community organization providing the
service, and from outsiders, but it can also come from grants from foun-
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dations. Each year these foundations provide community organizations
with billions of dollars of support through grants.1
In recent years foundations have increasingly asked community
organizations to evaluate the programs and services that have been at
least partially financed by their giving. Although it is not always clear
what these foundations have in mind when they ask their grantees for
these evaluations, and sometimes what they ask for is inappropriate
or infeasible, they are correct to ask their grantees to be quantitatively
more accountable than they have been in the past for the dollars that
they have spent.
In this chapter, I explain why evaluations often do not constitute a
cost-effective use of foundation resources, nor do they constitute a productive use of the time and resources for the community organizations
that receive the grants. This point holds especially true for “impact”
or “cost-effectiveness” evaluations. In addition to the list of services
given above, empowerment or enterprise zones, tax increment financing methods (TIFs), recycling programs, and “NIMBY” (“not in my
backyard”) disputes over such issues as the siting of a transfer station or
a power generating plant also can fall under this rubric of communitylevel services. One of my conclusions here is that despite this varied list
of services and policies, the challenges associated with evaluating them
are virtually identical.
These challenges include not enough baseline information to complete a timely and rigorous evaluation, too little quantitative information on the services provided, who receives them, and how the services
delivered differ from those intended. At other times the size of the intervention is relatively small and its impacts could only be detected with
an extremely large sample of participants.
However, even when impact evaluations or cost-effectiveness evaluations are inappropriate, there is usually other valuable information
about the community organizations’ practices and performances that
the organizations can collect and quantify. This information is valuable,
not only to the foundations and other nonprofit and public-sector organizations that fund these community organizations’ services, but also to
their stakeholders and the organizations themselves as a tool to improve
their program operations.
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What to Evaluate?
Should evaluators evaluate for community organizations 1) the
impact of grants that they receive on the services that they provide to
their clients or 2) the impact of their services on participants’ outcomes?
In the former case, suppose a foundation asks its grantee to assess the
impact of the foundation’s funding on the quantity or quality of services
it provides to members of its community. In the second case, suppose
a foundation asks its grantee to evaluate the impact of the community
organization’s primary services on the residents it serves and on who
receives services.
The Impact of Grants on a Single Organization’s Performance
Cannot Be Evaluated
The first of these objectives—to evaluate the effects of the foundation’s funding on the services that a single community organization provides—is not feasible. Although foundations would like to know what
difference their giving has made to the organizations that have received
the grants, and the organizations that received them would like to tell all
the foundations that support their programs how important their funding was to them, yet without including often implausible assumptions
into the analysis it is not possible to evaluate this question for a single
community organization. In practice, there are many factors affecting
the quality and quantity of services provided by a community organization. Besides the foundation’s grant, the community organization’s
services also are affected by grants from other foundations and from the
public sector, hiring and departures of personnel, and changing social
and economic factors in the community.
To see the difficulty associated with the task of evaluating how a
foundation’s funding affects a community organization’s services and
performance, I manipulate the terms in a simple framework. First I
define some notation:
A = a measure of services provided by the community organization
after it received funding from the foundation.

200 LaLonde

A’ = a hypothetical measure of services that would have been provided by the community organization if its proposal for funding from
the foundation had been rejected.
A−1 = a measure of services provided by the community organization before it received funding from the foundation.
B = a measure of services provided by another community organization whose proposal for funding from the foundation had been
rejected.
D = a measure of services provided by another community organization that never even applied for funding from the foundation.
In order to assess whether its grants have made a difference, a foundation may ask community organizations to provide it with a measure
of the following impact:
IMPACT = A − A’ .
This impact measures the difference between the quantity (or quality) of services provided after the community organization received
the foundation’s grant (A) and the quantity (or quality) of services
that would have been provided if the community organization had not
received the foundation’s grant (A’). Notice that measure A’ is not the
same as the measure of services provided by the community organization before it received funding from the foundation (i.e., A−1).
Put this way, the problem is readily apparent. Although the term A
can be measured, the term A’ cannot. To measure A’ requires literally
turning back the clock to the point at which the foundation was making
its funding decisions (Holland 1986). Once events have been theoretically returned to that time, the foundation then rejects the community
organization’s proposal and term A’ measures the services provided
under this alternative scenario.
Program evaluators refer to this problem of not being able to turn
back the clock as “the evaluation problem” (Heckman, LaLonde and
Smith 1999). Since turning back time is impossible, evaluators must fill
in these missing data with an estimate of measure A’. In one approach,
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to estimate A’, evaluators use a measure from a similar community
organization that did not receive funding from the foundation. One possibility in this approach is to use information from another community
organization whose proposal for funding was rejected by the foundation
(denoted by B), as follows:
(1)

IMPACT = A − B .

Another possibility is to use information from another community
organization that never applied for funding (denoted by D), as follows:
(2)

IMPACT = A − D .

Finally, a third possibility is to use information from the community
organization before it received funding from the foundation (denoted
by A−1), as follows:
(3)

IMPACT = A − A−1 .

Immediately, it is apparent that we have at least three different estimators of the impact of the foundation’s grant-making, and none of
them are necessarily equal to the true impact of the foundation’s grantmaking, which is A – A’.
All three of the foregoing impact measures have the same shortcoming: namely, that measures B, D, and A−1 are not the same as measure
A’. They are oranges, and measure A’ is the apple. Consider the following rearrangement of terms in the three impact measures:2
(1’)

IMPACT = A − B = (A – A’ ) + (A’ – B) ;

(2’)

IMPACT = A − D = (A – A’ ) + (A’ – D) ;

(3’)

IMPACT = A − A−1 = (A – A’ ) + (A’ – A−1) .

The implication of these three estimators of the impact of a foundation’s giving on a (single) community organization’s services or performance is that evaluators can reliably and precisely estimate the counterfactual value A’ using measures based on data from other community
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organizations or from the same community organization at some point
before it was funded by the foundation. Experience indicates that neither of these possibilities works well in practice.
To understand why not, consider the first of these measures: A − B.
Information drawn for measure B is from another community organization that applied for funding but whose proposal was rejected by the
foundation. As a result, this rejected community organization is one
that the foundation has looked at carefully and decided that its proposal and its likely performance were inferior to those of the community
organization it decided to fund. It would be remarkable if the counterfactual measure A’ for the funded community organization would be
well approximated by measure B from another community organization
whose application for funding was rejected.
Foundations’ funding decisions are carefully made. Foundations
fund proposals that best serve their objectives and mission. So it is
unlikely that the set of funded community organizations would be like
their unfunded counterparts. However, suppose for the sake of argument that foundations’ funding decisions were not carefully made. Even
in the extreme and unlikely case where the foundation did not deliberate
over the proposals it received and instead flipped a coin to determine
funding, it would be likely that the impact measure of A – B is in error.
To be sure, the coin flip ensures that on average the impact measured by
A – B approximates the true impact measured by A – A’. However, this
point only holds on average, not for any single comparison between a
funded community organization and one of its rejected counterparts.
The problem with using even a randomly rejected community
organization’s measure of services or performance, B, so as to use A
– B to estimate the true impact of the foundation’s funding, A – A’, is
matching error. Even in the absence of the foundation’s funding, these
community organizations are not the same, and as a consequence their
measures of performance also should not be the same. The difference
A’ – B contains both 1) the performance differences between the community organizations and 2) the errors associated with comparing or
matching organizations that are not the same. These expressions tell us
that in order to measure the impact of a foundation’s giving on a community organization’s services and performance, it is necessary that we
compare measures for organizations that are the same or essentially the
same.
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This point raises another question: since other community organizations are not the same, could evaluators use the information on the
same community organization before it was funded by the foundation?
The problem here, as I explained above, is that many factors affect an
organization’s performance—including different personnel, funding
from other nonprofit organizations, changing economic and social factors within the targeted communities, even the entry or emergence of
another community organization in the area. Even here there is “matching error.” An organization in the past is not the same organization as it
is constituted in the present.
Evaluate the Average Impact of Funding on a Group of
Organizations’ Performances
The discussion in the preceding section explains why evaluators
contend that we cannot evaluate the impact of an intervention—such
as a foundation’s giving—on the performance of a single organization.
This principle also extends to individuals, and for the same reasons.
There are many influences on an individual’s outcomes besides those
associated with the services that they receive from a community organization. A comparison between an individual who receives services
from a community organization and another individual who does not
receive such services usually tells us more about preexisting differences
between these two people than it does about the differences in effectiveness of the services themselves.
The standout solution to what I described above as the matchingerror problem is to evaluate the average impact of a foundation’s giving
on many different, but similar, community organizations by comparing
their measures of performance to those of many other community organizations that have not received funding from the foundation. In this
case, the expectation is that if the evaluators have done a good job of
matching these other, unfunded community organizations to the funded
community organizations, then the matching errors will average out.
The implication of this proposed solution to the evaluation problem
is that it is not feasible to evaluate the performance of a set of, say, four
or five community organizations that have been supported by a foundation. However, it may be feasible to evaluate the impact of a foundation’s grant-giving by evaluating the average impact on a set of, say,
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100 similar community organizations. In this latter case, it is possible
that the matching errors average out, leaving a credible and possibly
precise estimate of the average impact across the 100 organizations that
the foundation chooses to fund. The underlying assumption is that the
matching errors average out in large samples of community organizations or of service recipients.
In more colloquial terms, under some circumstances it may be an
effective evaluation strategy to compare large numbers of apples to
large numbers of oranges. To be sure, when evaluating the impact of
foundation giving on a few community organizations’ performances,
we are faced with the familiar intractable problem of comparing apples
to oranges. But when evaluating the impact of foundation giving on a
large number of organizations, it is possible that the matching errors
associated with comparing apples to oranges will average out. One setting in which they are likely to average out occurs under the hypothetical but unrealistic scenario that foundations’ funding decisions are
made randomly from their pools of applicants.
In practice, this proposed statistical solution does not help most
foundations and nonprofits evaluate their giving, because of their practice of targeting their resources to a few community organizations with
well-conceived proposals for providing innovative services. These
foundations’ giving policies are likely good ones. Yet despite this, in the
vast majority of cases, it makes little sense for the foundations to insist
that community organizations evaluate the impact of their funding.
Evaluate Services Regardless of the Source of Funding
The preceding discussion does not imply that foundations should
forgo evaluation of important services targeted toward communities
and individuals. Foundations can improve their own funding decisions
and provide valuable information that will help community organizations operate their programs and deliver their services if they evaluate
the services offered or the services received and not the organizations
themselves.
Therefore, instead of asking, “What difference did our funding make
to a particular organization and by extension to the organization’s ‘clients’?” foundations should ask instead, “What impact do these particular services have on individuals who receive them?” Such evaluations
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should focus on services and the individuals who received them and not
on the improved performance of organizations that resulted from the
funding provided by the foundation.
Even when taking this approach, it is not always an efficacious use
of resources to insist on an impact evaluation. Prior to the impact evaluation, there are at least three other steps that foundation program officers and community organizations should take:
1) Collect baseline and programmatic information on participants,
2) Implement a study to see if the services are delivered as intended, and
3) Assess the size of the intervention and its theoretical impacts.
In most cases community organizations’ data collection efforts have
lagged behind other important work that the organizations do. Since
evaluation is a quantitative endeavor, outcomes of interest as well as
services provided must be measured before any formal evaluation
occurs.3 The key point is that if the outcome cannot be measured, it cannot be evaluated.4
There is no point in evaluating a program or service before we learn
how it operates in practice. An implementation study must precede an
impact evaluation. Otherwise, even if the impact evaluation demonstrated that the service was effective, the potential for the service to be
replicated would remain uncertain, because it would not be clear how
the program actually operated in practice in the field. An implementation study should, among other things, document whether the services
offered and received differ sufficiently from what is intended. Such differences arise because of the organization’s or service provider’s performance, because of a mismatch between the services and the recipients,
or because resources are insufficient to implement the intended design.
Before initiating an impact evaluation, such implementation questions
need to be resolved.
Finally, the size of an intervention may be too small for its impact
to be detected with a modest sample of recipients. For example, a 20minute counseling session on how to find a job could be cost-effective,
because the intervention is so inexpensive on a per-person basis. In this
situation, the impacts would not need to be large for these services to
be cost-effective.5 However, an outcome such as employment rates or
unemployment durations could be sufficiently variable among mem-
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bers of the community that a large sample of service recipients would
be required in order to detect small impacts but cost-effective services.
These challenges associated with evaluating community organizations and their services are not unique and arise in other similar circumstances. For example, in evaluating enterprise zones, studies have
addressed the evaluation problem by comparing economic activity in
areas after they have been designated as enterprise zones to the economic activity prior to their receiving this designation.
A second approach compares these zones to areas with similar
characteristics (Greenbaum and Engberg 2000; Holland 1986). Using
both approaches, these areas have been defined as communities, census
tracts, neighborhoods, or cities. In this alternative approach, evaluations
attempt to construct a quasi-experimental setting in which areas that are
designated as enterprise zones are compared to observationally similar
areas that are not designated as enterprise zones.
No matter what approach is used, these evaluations cannot produce
reliable estimates of the impact of a single or even a few enterprise
zones on community and individual outcomes. In order for such evaluation studies to reliably measure impacts of enterprise zones, they must
carefully measure outcomes and area characteristics for a sufficiently
large number of these zones and their corresponding comparison areas.
In this way, they measure the average impact of the enterprise zone
strategy for a sample or particular “population” of communities.

Conclusion
High-quality evaluations are costly, and they are cost-effective only
if they lead to some significant outcome. Saving an effective program
or set of services that would otherwise be eliminated is a worthy purpose of evaluation. So is documenting socially significant net impacts
for a new, innovative program.
However, in many instances involving community organizations,
the goals of evaluation should be more modest. Often they should not
focus on impact evaluation or cost-effectiveness, but on simply measuring and collecting data on program services. Providing operators and
foundations with this information alone can provide valuable insight
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into how the program operates or how services are delivered and the
challenges that must be overcome in order to affect recipients’ outcomes. At the very least this information can improve program management. As I have explained above, this information also is essential for
considering whether it is a good use of resources to initiate an impact
evaluation of these programs and services.

Notes
1. See http://foundationcenter.org/findfunders/statistics/grantsampling.html for statistics on foundations believed to account for about half of all grant-making in the
United States. Total grant giving from foundations for all purposes is thought to
have amounted to about $40 billion in 2006.
2. In each case in Equations (1’) through (3’), I simply subtract A’ and add A’ to
Equations (1) through (3), above.
3. An example in Chicago is the study titled Mapping Cultural Participation in
Chicago (LaLonde et al. 2006), funded by the Joyce Foundation. Originally, the
foundation asked researchers at the National Opinion Research Center (NORC)
and the Irving B. Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies to evaluate the
effectiveness of various initiatives designed to promote minority participation in
the large Chicago-area arts organizations. The researchers countered that without
baseline information in hand such an evaluation would not succeed. So instead
the foundation and the researchers agreed to collect baseline information on participation in the arts by individuals living in the Chicago metropolitan area. See
LaLonde et al. (2006).
4. To address the costs of data collection and data management, smaller community
organizations should consider hiring as interns the very talented students from
the select high schools in their areas for data collection purposes. Many of these
students have quantitative and computer skills that can be very useful to a standard
community organization. They could be hired at very low cost.
5. An example of a small-sized intervention—a letter that unemployed job seekers
were instructed to show potential employers—is discussed in Burtless (1985).

208 LaLonde

References
Burtless, Gary. 1985. “Are Targeted Wage Subsidies Harmful? Evidence from
a Wage-Voucher Experiment.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review
39(1): 105–114.
Greenbaum, Robert, and John Engberg. 2000. “An Evaluation of State Enterprise Zone Policies.” Policy Studies Review 17(2/3): 29–46.
Heckman, James J., Robert J. LaLonde, and Jeffrey A. Smith. 1999. “The Economics and Econometrics of Active Labor Market Programs.” In Handbook
of Labor Economics, Orley C. Ashenfelter and David Card, eds. Vol. 3A.
Handbooks in Economics 5. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 1865–2084.
Holland, Paul W. 1986. “Statistics and Causal Inference.” Journal of the American Statistical Association 81(396): 945–960.
LaLonde, Robert J., Colm O’Muircheartaigh, Julia Perkins, Ned English,
Diane Grams, and Carroll Joynes. 2006. Mapping Cultural Participation in
Chicago. Monograph. Chicago: Cultural Policy Center, University of Chicago.

Toussaint-Comeau.indb 226

7/1/2009 11:16:55 AM

Index
The italic letters f, n, and t following a page number indicate that the subject information
of the heading is within a figure, note, or table, respectively, on that page. Double italics
indicate multiple but consecutive elements.
529 Plans, 112
ABE. See Adult Basic Education
Academic success
lack of, as barrier to higher education,
92, 104
support structures for, 94–96, 95t,
100, 104, 123n3
ACCESS project, New York, 93
Adult women workers
effectiveness of employment training
programs for, 28, 31–32, 91
employment rates, 71, 72f, 73ff, 76n6
married, 71, 72f, 73f, 76n4
occupations and wages of, 56t, 59t
See also Single women with children
AFDC. See Aid to Families with
Dependent Children
Affordability barriers, 26, 92, 119
overcoming (see Financial aid;
Housing assistance programs)
African American families. See Black
men; Black workers
Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), 16, 65
caseloads, 66, 67f
EITC and, 68, 70f, 76n4
American Community Survey,
occupational data from, 61n7
Apprenticeships, 28, 157
Autor, David, conference participant, 39
Baltimore, Maryland, court decision in,
149
Barnow, Burt S., conference participant,
40
Barrow, Lisa, conference participant, 40
Basic Educational Opportunity Grants, 19

Beal, Frank, conference participant, 25,
39
Bernanke, Ben S., quoted, 7
Berube, Alan, conference participant, 39
Big Brothers/Big Sisters (organization),
27, 158, 160n4
Black men
incarcerated, as school dropouts, 180,
194n2
labor force activity of, 9–10, 153, 155
Black workers, 11, 156
earnings of, vs. white, 194n10, 194–
195n11
residential mobility programs with,
130, 131, 134–135, 139, 144
Blinder, Alan S., conference participant,
40
Block grants, 16, 26, 160n7
Bloom, Dan, corroborating data from,
186–187, 194n6
BLS (Bureau of Labor Statistics). See
U.S. Dept. of Labor
Boskin Commission, government bias
and, 82
Boston, Massachusetts, TANF-eligible
students in, 93
Brown, Gov. Edmund, commission
appointed by, 23
Bush, Pres. George W., education policy
of, 19
Butcher, Kristin F., conference
participant, 40
California, 23, 160n3, 172
CET in, 157, 160nn1–2
community colleges with employment
services in, 91, 93, 95t
work-study funds for TANF students
in, 116–117

213

Toussaint-Comeau.indb 213

7/1/2009 11:16:54 AM

214 Toussaint-Comeau
Canadian Self-Sufficiency Project, 173
Career Academies, 27–28, 158, 160n4
Career Advancement Accounts, support
for, 121
Career and Technical Education (CTE),
27–28, 158, 160n4
Career pathway development, labor
market intermediaries and, 157
Census of Populations, 61n2, 61nn7–8, 82
Census tracts, Chicago residential
mobility and, 130–131, 132–134,
133t
Center for Employment Opportunity
(CEO) program, 27
evaluation of, 29–30, 159, 185–187,
193, 194n7
Center for Employment Training (CET),
91–92
cost-effectiveness of, 157, 160n1
CEO program. See Center for
Employment Opportunity
CES. See Current Employment Statistics
CET. See Center for Employment
Training
CETA. See Comprehensive Employment
and Training Act
Chaffey College, California, Opening
Doors project at, 95t
Chicago, Illinois, 9
Metropolitan Planning Council,
25–26, 43n15
residential mobility programs in,
23–25
		 census tracts used for, 130–131,
132–134, 133t
		 Gautreaux compared to MTO,
130–149
		 neighborhoods studied, 129t,
134–136
Child Care Access Means Parents in
School program, 122
Children, 80
adolescents, 27, 158
care of, 120, 121–122, 155, 156
		 (see also Day-care facilities)
early childhood, 19, 36

Toussaint-Comeau.indb 214

effects of low-income assistance on,
17–18
neighborhood social interaction of,
138–140, 144–145
social interactions of, differ by gender,
148–149
See also Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC); No
Child Left Behind (NCLB); Single
women with children
Civil disorders, violence in, 23
Civil rights, ex-offenders and, 159,
160n5
Classroom training, 172, 190–191
Clinton, Pres. William J., commission
appointed by, 23
CLMS. See Continuous Longitudinal
Manpower Survey
College education, 11, 114, 116
cost of, 20, 92, 119, 122n1
EFC towards, 112–114, 115, 118,
122n2
nontraditional students and, 109–112,
117–118, 120
wage differential of, 62n11, 90
College retention. See Education
retention programs
Commission on the Future of Higher
Education, 121
Community-based organizations,
199–209
impact of
		 group average, 205–206
		 single organization, not evaluable,
28, 201–205
services provided by, 157, 160n3,
199–200
		 evaluation of, 4, 6, 31–34, 37–38,
206–209
See also Nonprofit community
organizations
Community Benefit Agreements,
rewarding employers with, 159
Community colleges
employment services at, 27, 91, 121,
148, 156

7/1/2009 11:16:54 AM

Index 215
Community colleges, cont.
Opening Doors demonstration at,
93–104, 95t, 98t–99t, 102t–103t
redressing mismatch of skills with
jobs in, 21, 35
role in American higher education,
92–93, 117–118, 120
Community health, supportive factors, 9
Compensation, 154
benefits in, 14, 18–19, 41n9
inequality in, 79–80
parental subsidies in, 42n14
Competition among employers, 154
Comprehensive Employment and
Training Act (CETA), 26, 28,
165–166, 170
Computer technology, 20, 80
impacts of, 53–55, 61nn5–6
Connecticut Jobs First program, 18
Conservation Corps program, 28, 160n4
Construction sector, 154
Consumption poverty, 14, 81–82
Continuous Longitudinal Manpower
Survey (CLMS), CETA
evaluations and, 166
Corrections sector, 179, 184
Cost-benefit analysis, evaluation and, 172
Counseling services, 174
residential mobility programs and,
130–31, 147–148
support structures for student, 94–96,
95t, 148
Court-ordered decrees
child support, 155–156
equitable housing and, 130, 146, 149
Coverdell Savings Accounts, 116
CPS. See Current Population Survey
Criminal behaviors, 159, 168
costs of, 159
dropouts and, 155, 180
prison programs to change, 193,
194n4
See also Violent behaviors
CTE. See Career and Technical
Education

Toussaint-Comeau.indb 215

Current Employment Statistics (CES),
calculation discrepancies and,
61–62n9
Current Population Survey (CPS), 61n2,
166
women’s employment rates, 72f, 73ff,
76n6
Dahl, Molly, conference participant, 39
Data collection vs. evaluation, program
services and, 32–33, 37–38
Day-care facilities, 22, 42n14, 120
DeLeire, Thomas, conference participant,
39
Delgado Community College, Louisiana,
Opening Doors project at, 95t,
98t–99t, 102t–103t, 104n2
Detroit WorkFirst program, 17
Diaz, Evelyn, conference participant, 40,
41n3
Disadvantaged populations, 166
policies affecting, 3–7
poverty and, 9f, 26
workforce development of, 26–31, 36
See also Ex-offenders; Nontraditional
students; Single women with
children; Youth
Displaced workers, 15, 111
assistance to, 21, 26–27, 35, 42n12,
166
District of Columbia, civil rights review
in, 160n5
Dropouts
criminal behaviors and, 155, 180,
194n2
preventing, 28, 92–93, 158
Duncan, Greg, conference participant, 40
Durable goods sector, 154, 155
Early childhood education, 19
See also Day-care facilities
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
combating spatial mismatch with,
42n14
effectiveness of, 15, 17, 66

7/1/2009 11:16:54 AM

216 Toussaint-Comeau
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), cont.
employment rates and, 68, 71–75,
72f, 73ff, 160nn2–3
income assistance policy and, 16–17,
35–36, 70ff, 75n2
negative income effect of, 66–67,
76n5
proposed expansion of, 84–85, 158–
159
single women with children and, 4, 5,
65–75, 69ff, 76n4
state and federal programs for, 75–
76nn2–3, 157
welfare reform and, 66–68, 70f, 71,
74–75
Earnings, 154, 160n2
black compared to white workers and,
194n10, 194–195n11
data from Social Security program,
166–67
education and, 89–92, 101
growth of, 60, 61nn2–3
inequality of, 51–52, 52f, 53f
subsidies for, 160n3, 173
Eberts, Randall W., conference
participant, 39
Economic assumptions, quotes on, 7
Economic mobility, 36, 60, 62n12
conference on improving, 7–40, 41n3
improving, by combating spatial
mismatch, 42–43n14, 60
reflections on, and policy, 79–86
workers and, 5, 12–14, 109
Education
access to, 19–20, 28, 92, 116, 188
alternative pathways to, 27–28, 158
dropout prevention, 28, 92–93, 158
Education Amendments of 1972, 19
Education levels, 13, 20, 42n10, 168
college, 11, 21, 62n11, 109–110
early childhood, 19
GED, 26, 114, 132
high school, 11–12, 114, 132
low, 9–10, 11, 16, 55, 56t, 61n8, 72,
73f, 89–90, 154
remedial, 166

Toussaint-Comeau.indb 216

vocational, 28
Education policy, 19, 83, 119–120
financial aid in, 120–122
Education retention programs, lowincome adults and, 3, 4, 5, 21,
90–105, 120
EFC. See Expected Family Contribution
EITC. See Earned Income Tax Credit
Employee Free Choice Act, union
organization and, 160n6
Employers, 26, 157
discrimination by, 154, 156
investment in nontraditional students
by, 116–117, 117–118
rewards to, for training, 159, 170
Employment Retention and
Advancement (ERA) projects, 91,
158, 160n3
Employment sectors, 17, 61n8, 154, 157,
170–171, 184
natural resources occupations in, 56t,
59t
Employment training programs, 9
analytic issues of, 171–173, 182–185
cost-effectiveness of, 157–158, 159
demonstrated changes after, 28, 31,
160n2
evaluations of, 165–171, 173–174
		 employer-focused programs and,
169–171
		 major U.S. federal programs and,
165–167
		 selected other programs and,
167–169
policies to provide, 5–6, 21, 26, 157
redressing mismatch of skills and jobs
with, 21, 34–35
targeted
		 customized training, 170
		 former welfare recipients and, 3,
90–91
		 informal and indirect, 112, 116,
117
		 sectoral training, 157, 170–171
See also On-the-job training (OJT)

7/1/2009 11:16:54 AM

Index 217
ERA. See Employment Retention and
Advancement projects
Evans, Charles L., conference
participant, 39
Ex-offenders
civil rights and, 159, 160n5
employment and advancement of, 6,
179–195
		 (see also Center for Employment
Opportunities [CEO])
employment restrictions for, 160n5,
180
labor market reentry programs for, 3,
4, 27, 29–31, 158, 159, 188–189,
193
recidivism and, 159, 182–183, 187,
191–192, 194n5, 194n8
Expected Family Contribution (EFC)
college costs and, 112–114, 115, 118,
122n2
independent students forgo, 113–
114, 118–119, 120
FAFSA. See Free Application for Federal
Student Aid
Family income, 114, 117
EFC and, 112–113, 122n2
growth of, over time, 86, 93
median measurements of, 82, 83f
volatility in, 80–81
Federal Reserve Bank, Chicago,
conference sponsorship by, 3–6,
39–40
Financial aid
block grants to states, 16, 160n7
FAFSA as first step in, 112–113, 115
loan programs, 114
nontraditional students and, 20,
21–22, 110–122, 122n2
Pell Grants to students, 19, 20, 104–
105n3, 113, 114–115, 157, 159
scholarships as, 94–97, 95t, 100, 101,
104
subsidies as, 42n14, 120, 121–122,
157, 158, 160n3, 173
support structures for, 94–97, 95t,

Toussaint-Comeau.indb 217

100, 117–118, 120–122, 123n3
See also Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC); Grants-in-aid; Lowincome assistance policy
Financial aid reform, 120–121
Florida
ex-offenders and, 30, 160n5
prison program evaluation in, 189–192
For-profit companies, as labor market
intermediaries, 157
Foreign-born workers, 111
low wages and, 101, 153
occupations and wages of, 56t, 59t
Foundations, grants-in-aid funded by,
200, 209n1
Free Application for Federal Student Aid
(FAFSA), 112–113, 115
GAIN program, long-term follow-up of,
172
Gautreaux Assisted Housing Program,
Chicago, 23–24
design, 130–136, 133t
individual outcomes from, 141–145
policy implications of, 147–149
social influences on, 133t, 136–140,
146
study conclusion, 145–146
GED. See General Educational
Development
Gender differences
children and social interaction, 148–
149
effectiveness of employment training
programs, 28, 31–32
EITC benefits and, 35–36
See also Adult women workers;
specific cohorts, e.g., Black men;
Noncustodial fathers; Single
women with children; White men
General Educational Development
(GED), 28, 114
effect on earnings, 90–91
prison-based programs for, 181, 182,
190
Georgia, tuition program in, 116

7/1/2009 11:16:54 AM

218 Toussaint-Comeau
Giloth, Bob, conference participant, 33,
40, 41n3
Globalization, wage inequality and,
42n9, 101
Gosselin, Peter, conference participant,
39
Grants-in-aid, 19, 116
average impact on group of
organizations, 205–206
block grants, 16, 26, 160n7
evaluation of services funded by,
206–209
foundation funding of, 200, 209n1
impact not evaluable on single
organization of, 201–205
Pell Grants to students, 19, 20, 104–
105n3, 113, 114–115, 157, 159
Great Depression, public employment in,
165–166
Greenspan, Alan, quoted, 7
Harlem Children’s Zone (organization),
27, 158
Head Start program, 19
Health, 188
poor, 155, 159
Health care sector, access to, 154
Hibbs, Maria, conference participant, 40,
41n3
Hispanic workers, 11
Holzer, Harry J., conference participant,
40
Hope Tax Credit, 114–115
Houseman, Susan, conference
participant, 39
Housing affordability, 24–26, 157, 158
Housing assistance programs
employment rates and, 158, 160n2
human capital improvement through,
127–149
school quality and, 127, 129
spatial mismatch and, 3, 5, 23–24,
36–37, 43n14
See also Residential mobility
programs

Toussaint-Comeau.indb 218

Hoynes, Hilary Williamson, conference
participant, 39
Human capital
employer investment in nontraditional
students, 117–118
improvement of, and residential
mobility, 127–128, 129, 137–140,
144–145, 146–149
investments to enhance, 19, 20–21,
60, 80, 83, 86, 171
Illinois
job support services in, 30–31, 160n3
residential mobility in (see under
Chicago, Illinois)
state EITC supplement to federal
program, 76n3
state housing legislation in, 25, 26
student aid in, 113, 116, 122n2
Immigrant workers. See Foreign-born
workers
Incarceration
employability upon release from, 10,
155–156, 182, 190
		 (see also Ex-offenders)
penal population characteristics,
179–181, 192, 194nn1–3
prison programs during, 181–182,
189–192, 194n4
		 impact of, 182–185, 193
recidivism and, 159, 182–183, 187,
191–192, 194n5, 194n8
Income volatility, 15, 79, 80–81
Inner cities. See Urban areas
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series
(IPUMS), occupational data from,
61nn7–8
Internships, 157
IPUMS. See Integrated Public Use
Microdata Series
Job Corps, 6, 28, 167–168, 172
Job information centers, 42n14, 121
Job Opportunities and Basic Skills
(JOBS) training program, 16

7/1/2009 11:16:54 AM

Index 219
Job readiness, work experience as, 154
Job retention, 91, 155
Job Search Assistance program, 31, 166
Job skills, 16, 20
deficit, of working poor, 9, 154
employment training programs and,
34–35, 101, 112, 122, 170
polarization of, and wages, 52–55,
58–60, 61n4
semiskilled jobs and spatial
mismatches, 127, 137–138
Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA), 26,
172
effectiveness of, 28, 91, 157, 160n1,
168
NJS evaluation of, 166–167
public employment programs of,
165–166
JOBS. See Job Opportunities and Basic
Skills training program
Jobs Plus, employment rates and, 158,
160n2
JTPA. See Job Training Partnership Act
Kentucky, UI claimants and WPRS in,
169
Kerner Commission, inner-city riots and,
23
Kingsborough Community College, New
York, Opening Doors project at,
95t
Kotlowitz, Alex, conference participant,
40
Labor market intermediaries, 27, 33,
156–157
Labor market reentry programs
formerly incarcerated persons and, 3,
4, 6, 27, 29–31, 158, 159
welfare reform and, 12, 17
Labor markets, 61n6
lack of attachment to, 153–156
policies to improve participation in,
156–159, 171–172
residential mobility and, 127, 137–
138, 142–143

Toussaint-Comeau.indb 219

supply disincentives and, 66–67, 156,
158
LaLonde, Robert J., conference
participant, 40
Lazear, Edward, conference participant,
19, 40
Legal Action Center, New York, 160n5
Lifelong Learning Accounts, support for,
121
Lifetime Learning Tax Credit (LLTC),
114
LLTC. See Lifetime Learning Tax Credit
Loan programs, education and, 114
Long, Bridget Terry, conference
participant, 40
Lorain County Community College,
Ohio, Opening Doors project
at, 94–96, 95t, 98t–99t, 102t–103t,
104n1
Los Angeles, California, Watts riots in,
23
Louisiana, 116
community college projects in, 95t,
98t–99t, 102t–103t, 104–105n2
Louisiana Technical College–West
Jefferson, Opening Doors project
at, 95t, 96–101, 102t–103t, 104–
105n2
Low-income assistance, 3–6, 14, 16–19,
35–36, 65
effects on children, 17–18
residential mobility as, 127–149
See also Financial aid
Low-wage occupations, 12, 56t, 58, 59t
Low-wage workers, 41n4
earnings improvements for, 160nn2–3
education and, 89–92, 101, 104, 110,
115
material circumstances of, 4, 5, 14–
15, 79, 82–83, 84f, 109
opportunities for, 7, 12–14, 21
policies affecting, 3–6, 15
Low wages
consequences of, 7–8, 12, 15, 138
trends in, 4, 5, 13f, 51–52, 52f, 53f

7/1/2009 11:16:54 AM

220 Toussaint-Comeau
Maine, Parents as Scholars program in,
93
Managerial occupations, 56t, 59t, 62n10
Manpower Demonstration Research
Corporation. See MDRC
Manpower Development and Training
Act (MDTA), 26, 165–166
Manual occupations, characteristics of,
56t, 59t
Manufacturing sector, 154, 155
Maryland, court decision in, 149
Massachusetts, TANF-eligible students
in, 93
Mazumder, Bhashkar, conference
participant, 39
McCone Commission, inner-city riots
and, 23
McMillen, Daniel, conference
participant, 39
MDRC (Manpower Demonstration
Research Corporation), 194n6
Opening Doors demonstration, 21,
93–104, 104–105nn1–3
Welfare-to-Work income
supplements, 17–18
MDTA. See Manpower Development and
Training Act
Median income measurements, 82–83,
83f
Meléndez, Edwin, conference
participant, 33–34, 40
Mental health, residential mobility and,
140, 145
Meyer, Bruce D., conference participant,
40
MFIP. See Minnesota Family Investment
Program
Michigan, improved productivity in,
160n2
Microneighborhoods, residential mobility
placement and, 133t, 134–135,
146
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, New Hope
program in, 18–19
Minimum wage, 159, 170

Toussaint-Comeau.indb 220

Minnesota Family Investment Program
(MFIP), 18
Minnesota programs, 18, 76n3, 116
Minorities, 8, 91–92, 137
employer discrimination and, 154, 156
See also Black workers; Hispanic
workers; Nonwhite workers
Minority Female Single Parent
Demonstration program,
effectiveness of, 91–92
Missouri, earnings impact of JTPA in,
167
Mobility issues. See Economic mobility;
Residential mobility programs
Moving to Opportunity for Fair Housing
(MTO) program, Chicago, 23–24
design, 131–136, 133t
policy implications of, 147–149
social influences on clients, 133t,
136–140, 146
study conclusion, 145–146
MTO. See Moving to Opportunity for
Fair Housing
National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders, unemployment role in,
23
National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work
Strategies (NEWWS), 17–18,
90–91, 157, 160n1
National JTPA Study (NJS), JTPA
evaluation known as, 166, 173
Natural resources occupations,
characteristics of, 56t, 59t
NCLB. See No Child Left Behind Act
of 2001
Negative income tax (NIT), EITC and,
66–67, 76n5
Neighborhoods, 25, 33, 158
in Chicago, 9, 132–136, 133t, 140
low-income, 28, 140
poverty in, 80, 129, 130, 160n4
safety in, 42–43n14, 128, 140, 145,
168
schools in, 127, 137, 141–142
New Hope program, 18–19, 158

7/1/2009 11:16:54 AM

Index 221
New Visions program, 91, 93
New York, 93, 95t, 160n5
Harlem Children’s Zone in, 27, 158
NEWWS. See National Evaluation of
Welfare-to-Work Strategies
NIT. See Negative income tax (NIT)
NJS. See National JTPA Study (NJS)
No Child Left Behind Act of 2001
(NCLB), 19
Noncustodial fathers, 156, 158, 159
Nonfarm employment, service sector in,
61n8
Nonprofit community organizations, 26
as labor market intermediaries, 27, 157
Nontraditional students, 109–123
defined, 111–112
employer investment in, 117–118
federal aid programs for, 114–116,
121–122
financial aid for, 21–22, 110, 112–
123, 122n2
need analysis for, 112–114, 118–119
older workers as, 21–22, 109–111
state aid programs for, 116–117
Nonwhite workers, 56t, 59t, 194n10
See also Black workers; Hispanic
workers
OBRA90. See Omnibus Reconciliation
Act of 1990
OBRA93. See Omnibus Reconciliation
Act of 1993
Occupations, 154
census IPUMS data on, 56t, 61nn7–8
education levels and, 55, 56t
employment growth rates in, 58–60,
59t
trends in, 4, 5, 55–60, 57f
Ohio, 116
community college with employment
services in, 94–96, 95t, 98t–99t,
102t–103t, 104n1
OJT. See On-the-job training
Older workers
financial aid for education of, 110,
111–120, 122n2

Toussaint-Comeau.indb 221

as nontraditional students, 21–22,
109–111
support systems for, 120–122, 122n3
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990
(OBRA90), 16, 68, 69f
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993
(OBRA93), 16, 68, 69f
On-the-job training (OJT), 6, 28, 171
combating spatial mismatch with,
42n14
employers receive subsidies for,
169–170
evaluation of, 29, 91
federal programs with, 26, 166
One-Stop Career Centers, 121
Opening Doors demonstration, MDRC,
21, 93–104, 104–105nn1–3
Oregon, 116, 157, 160n1
Outsourcing, 35, 61n6
displaced worker assistance due to,
21, 26–27, 42n12
Owens Community College, Ohio,
Opening Doors project at, 94–96,
95t, 98t–99t, 102t–103t, 104n1
Palms-Barber, Brenda, conference
participant, 40, 41n3
Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID), income volatility and, 80
Parent Loans for Undergraduate Students
(PLUS), 115
Parents
single, and effective programs, 91–92
state aid to, for education, 93, 117
subsidies in compensation patterns of,
42n14, 120, 121–122
See also Noncustodial fathers; Single
mothers with children
Parents as Scholars program, 93
Pell Grants, 19, 20
advancement of working poor and,
157, 159
college retention and, 104–105n3,
119–120
eligibility for, 113, 114–115

7/1/2009 11:16:55 AM

222 Toussaint-Comeau
Pennsylvania, workforce development
in, 33
Perkins Loan Program, 115
Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996 (PRWORA), 16, 66
Philanthropy, 209n1
Plant closings, displaced workers and,
42n12
PLUS. See Parent Loans for
Undergraduate Students
Portland, Oregon, NEWWS and, 157,
160n1
Poverty, 14, 80
educational aid and, wages, 113, 114,
117, 122n2
low-wage workers and, 41n4, 89–90
measurements, 82–83, 84f
neighborhoods with, 8–9, 23, 80, 130,
140, 160n4
NIT to reduce, 66–67
trends in work and, 11–15, 11f, 13f
Princeton University. Center for
Economic Policy Studies, working
papers from, 42n11
Production occupations, characteristics
of, 56t, 59t
Productivity, 154, 160n2
Professional occupations, 56t, 59t, 62n10
Project Upward Bound, 19
PRWORA. See Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996
PSID. See Panel Study of Income
Dynamics
Public transit, 25
limitations of, 22, 23, 138
Racial differences. See specific cohorts,
e.g., Black men; White men
Racial integration/segregation, 23,
43n14, 131, 155
Residential mobility programs, 149n2
effectiveness of, 4, 23–24
Gautreaux compared to MTO, 130–
146

Toussaint-Comeau.indb 222

		 policy implications of, 147–149
individual outcomes of, 141–145
social mechanisms of, 24–26, 127–
140
Richburg-Hayes, Lashawn, conference
participant, 40
Riverside Community College,
California, New Visions program
at, 91, 93, 160n3
Rosenbaum, James E., conference
participant, 39
San Jose, California, CET cost
effectiveness in, 157, 160n1
Scholarships, 94–97, 95t, 100, 101, 104
School integration, combating spatial
mismatch with, 43n14, 144–145
School quality, 155
residential mobility and, 127, 129,
136–137, 141–142
Second chance programs, 28, 158, 159
Sentencing Project, Washington, D.C.,
160n5
Serious and Violent Offender Reentry
Initiative (SVORI), 30, 188–189,
193
Service occupations, 127
calculation discrepancies and data
sets on, 61–62n9
low education and, 58, 60, 61n8
low-wage workers in, 12, 17, 56t,
57–58, 59t
Service sector vs. service occupations,
61n8
Single women with children, 149n2
as AFDC/TANF recipients, 16, 65,
66, 76n4
annual income percentiles of, 85, 86t
education and, 91–92, 93, 104, 120
EITC and, 4, 5, 16–17, 65–76, 69ff,
160n2
employment rates and, 65–66, 66,
71–75, 72f, 73ff, 153
welfare reform and, 4, 5, 16–17,
65–68

7/1/2009 11:16:55 AM

Index 223
SIPP. See Survey of Income and Program
Participation
Snyderman, Robin, conference
participant, 25–26, 39, 43n15
Social interaction, residential mobility
and, 127–128, 138–140, 144–145,
148–149
Social Security Act of 1935, 16, 66,
166–167
Song, Unmi, conference participant, 40
Spatial mismatch, 42n13, 80
housing allowance programs and, 3,
5, 23–26, 36–37
mobility strategies to combat, 42–
43n14, 127, 129, 137–138
Spriggs, William, conference participant,
41
Stafford loan program, 114
Straits, Robert, conference participant,
40, 41n3
Student services
counseling, 94–96, 95t, 148
employment, 94–96, 95t, 98t–99t,
102t–103t, 104n1
Suburban areas
job growth in, vs. worker residences
(see Spatial mismatch)
racial mix of, and resident choices,
130, 144, 146
zoning regulations in, 24, 25
Suburban compared to urban residents,
130
educational outcome differences
between, 141–142
employment characteristics, 142–143
strategies to combat mismatches of,
22–26, 36–37, 43n14, 127
Sullivan, Daniel, conference participant,
40
Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP), income
volatility and, 80
SVORI. See Serious and Violent
Offender Reentry Initiative
Sykes, Donald, conference participant,
40, 41n3

Toussaint-Comeau.indb 223

TANF. See Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families
Tax credits, 26, 114–115
See also Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC)
Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86), 16,
68, 69f
Tech Prep model, positive impact of,
160n4
Technician occupations, characteristics
of, 56t, 59t
Technological changes, wage inequality
and, 20, 42nn9–10
Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF)
caseloads, 66, 67f
costs of, vs. EITC, 65, 68, 70f
eligibility for, and college training,
22, 35, 93, 116–117, 121
PRWORA and, 16, 66, 138, 143
Temporary help sector, 17
Testa, William, conference participant,
39
Texas, earnings subsidies in, 160n3
Thompson decision, Baltimore, 149
Title III, Workforce Investment Act
(WIA), displaced workers and,
42n12
Title IV, Pell Grants and, 114
Toussaint-Comeau, Maude, conference
participant, 39
TRA86. See Tax Reform Act of 1986
(TRA86)
Trade adjustment assistance, 42n12, 174
Trade unions, 41–42n9, 101, 160n6
Transportation restructure
combating spatial mismatch with,
22–23, 42n14
commuters with private cars in,
24–25
need for, 154–155, 156
See also Public transit
Transportation sector, wages and skills
for, 154
Tyler, John H., conference participant, 40

7/1/2009 11:16:55 AM

224 Toussaint-Comeau
UI. See Unemployment insurance (UI)
Unemployment, 23 116
Unemployment insurance (UI), 42n12,
173, 194n5
claimants of, and WPRS, 28–29,
168–169
U.S. Dept. of Health and Human
Services, 188
U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), 43n14, 188
U.S. Dept. of Justice, 188
U.S. Dept. of Labor (USDOL), 62n9, 188
program evaluation by, 28, 159, 166–
167
U.S. General Accounting Office
(USGAO), 33, 166–167
U.S. law and legislation, 16, 19, 160n6
workforce development, 26, 159
U.S. Secretary of Education, commission
appointed by, 121
U.S. Senate, commission appointed by,
82
Urban areas, 22, 23, 130
Violent behaviors, 23
debilitating effects from, 42–43n14,
128, 140, 145
rehabilitation of, 30, 188–189, 193
Vocational education, 35, 117, 156
effects of, vs. work experience, 190–
191
federal programs with, 28, 166
prison-based programs for, 180–181,
182
Wages, 160n6, 170
causes of inequality in, 20, 41–42n9,
52–53, 89–90, 154–156
college differential on, 62n11, 91, 110
higher minimum, with caveat, 159,
170
trends in inequality of, 12, 13f, 51–52,
52f, 53f, 79–80
See also Minimum wage
Washington, D.C., civil rights review in,
160n5

Toussaint-Comeau.indb 224

Washington (state), 116, 117
W.E. Upjohn Institute, conference
sponsorship by, 3–6, 39–40
Welfare reform
effectiveness of, 15, 143
EITC and, 66–68, 70f, 74–75
employment training programs and, 3,
90–91, 110
impact of work incentives on, 17–19
income assistance policy and, 16–17
labor market entry at, 12, 17, 138,
153
single women with children and, 4, 5,
16–17, 65–68
Welfare-to-Work programs
education first vs. job search first as,
90–91
evaluation of, 157, 160n1, 174
income supplements in, 17–18
West Virginia, tuition program in, 116
White men
earnings of, vs. nonwhite, 194n10,
194–195n11
incarcerated, as school dropouts, 180,
194n2
WIA. See Workforce Investment Act
Williams, Alicia, conference participant,
40
Wisconsin
New Hope program in, 18–19
state EITC supplement to federal
program, 76n3
Work-Based Learning Tuition Assistance
Program, 117
Work experience vs. classroom training,
190–191
Work-study programs, 116–117
Worker Profiling and Reemployment
Services (WPRS), 6, 28–29, 168–
169
Workforce development initiatives
access to education, 92–93, 116–117
best practices for, 3–6
impacts of, 165–174
policy and evaluation of, 26–31,
33–34, 37–38

7/1/2009 11:16:55 AM

Index 225
Workforce development initiatives, cont.
See also Employment training
programs
Workforce Investment Act (WIA), 6,
26–27, 43n16, 159
evaluation of, 28, 116, 167
services provided by, 42n12, 121,
165–166
training ties to, 22, 35
Working poor, 154
education and, 89–92, 101, 104, 110
EITC eligibility and, 67–68
employment and advancement of, 6,
27, 92, 153–159
policies for success of, 83–84, 156–
159
trends in, 11–15, 11f, 13f, 109
See also Low-wage workers
WPRS. See Worker Profiling and
Reemployment Services
Youth, 9, 155, 166
employment and advancement of, 6,
27–28, 158, 159, 166
Job Corps for disadvantaged, 6, 28,
167–168
Youth Opportunity Program, 28, 158,
160n4
Youth Service program, 28, 158, 160n4
YouthBuild program, 28, 158

Toussaint-Comeau.indb 225

7/1/2009 11:16:55 AM

The Authors
David Autor (PhD Harvard) is professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, faculty research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research, and editor in chief of the Journal of Economic
Perspectives, published by the American Economic Association. Autor is currently engaged in two research programs, one on the growth of labor market
intermediation, and one on job skill demands, technological change, and earnings inequality.
Burt S. Barnow (PhD Wisconsin) is associate director for research and
principal research scientist at the Institute for Policy Studies at Johns Hopkins University. He has over 30 years of experience conducting research in
the fields of workforce investment, program evaluation, performance analysis,
labor economics, welfare, poverty, child support, and fatherhood.
Jillian Berk (PhD Brown) is a researcher at Mathematica Policy Research
Inc. She studies the impact of education and employment programs on the
labor market outcomes of disadvantaged populations, including ex-offenders
and dislocated workers.
Harry J. Holzer (PhD Harvard) is a professor of public policy at Georgetown University, a senior fellow at the Urban Institute, and a former Chief
Economist of the U.S. Department of Labor. His research focuses on the lowwage labor market and on policies to improve the earnings of disadvantaged
workers.
Hilary Williamson Hoynes (PhD Stanford) is professor of economics at
the University of California, Davis, and the coeditor of the American Economic Journal: Economic Policy. Hoynes specializes in the study of tax and
transfer programs for poor families.
Robert J. LaLonde (PhD Princeton) is a professor at the Irving B. Harris
Graduate School of Public Policy Studies at the University of Chicago. His
research interests include program evaluation, education and training, immigration policy, worker displacement, unions and collective bargaining, and the
consequences of incarceration.
Bridget Terry Long (PhD Harvard) is professor of education at the Harvard
Graduate School of Education. Her research focuses on access and choice in
higher education, the outcomes of college students, and the behavior of post-

211

Toussaint-Comeau.indb 211

7/1/2009 11:16:53 AM

212 Toussaint-Comeau and Meyer
secondary institutions. Long is a faculty research associate of the National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).
Bruce D. Meyer (PhD MIT) is McCormick Foundation Professor at the
Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago. His research has
focused on social insurance, taxation, labor supply, and poverty.
As deputy director of MDRC’s Young Adults and Postsecondary Education Policy Area, Lashawn Richburg-Hayes (PhD Princeton) is the principal
researcher and project director of a national demonstration that will test the
effectiveness of performance-based scholarship programs to increase retention
and persistence in higher education. Her current research focuses on measuring
various effects of new forms of financial aid, enhanced student services, and
curricular and instructional innovations on community college retention and
credit accumulation and nonexperimental methods of data analysis.
James E. Rosenbaum (PhD Harvard) is professor of sociology, education,
and social policy at Northwestern University. His research has been published
in sociology and policy journals and has been reported in the New York Times,
the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, Fortune Magazine, the Chronicle
of Higher Education, and on 60 Minutes.
Jeffrey A. Smith (PhD Chicago) is professor of economics at the University of Michigan, and has also taught at the University of Western Ontario and
the University of Maryland. His research centers on experimental and nonexperimental methods for the evaluation of interventions, with particular application to social and educational programs.
Maude Toussaint-Comeau (PhD University of Illinois at Chicago) is an
economist in the microeconomics team of the economic research department
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Toussaint-Comeau’s research has
been on the use of formal and informal financial markets by minority groups
and the use of alternative financial services, such as check-cashing outlets and
payday loan companies. Her current research focuses on consumer sentiment
and consumption expenditure and on diversity and firms’ productivity.
John H. Tyler (EdD Harvard) is associate professor of education, economics, and public policy at Brown University. In addition to studying correctional
education and the linkages between schooling and labor market outcomes,
Tyler examines teacher quality issues, including how teachers use student performance data to inform their classroom instruction.

Toussaint-Comeau.indb 212

7/1/2009 11:16:53 AM

About the Institute
The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research is a nonprofit research organization devoted to finding and promoting solutions to employmentrelated problems at the national, state, and local levels. It is an activity of the
W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trustee Corporation, which was established in
1932 to administer a fund set aside by Dr. W.E. Upjohn, founder of The Upjohn
Company, to seek ways to counteract the loss of employment income during
economic downturns.
The Institute is funded largely by income from the W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trust, supplemented by outside grants, contracts, and sales of publications. Activities of the Institute comprise the following elements: 1) a research program conducted by a resident staff of professional social scientists;
2) a competitive grant program, which expands and complements the internal
research program by providing financial support to researchers outside the Institute; 3) a publications program, which provides the major vehicle for disseminating the research of staff and grantees, as well as other selected works in
the field; and 4) an Employment Management Services division, which manages most of the publicly funded employment and training programs in the
local area.
The broad objectives of the Institute’s research, grant, and publication programs are to 1) promote scholarship and experimentation on issues of public
and private employment and unemployment policy, and 2) make knowledge
and scholarship relevant and useful to policymakers in their pursuit of solutions to employment and unemployment problems.
Current areas of concentration for these programs include causes, consequences, and measures to alleviate unemployment; social insurance and income
maintenance programs; compensation; workforce quality; work arrangements;
family labor issues; labor-management relations; and regional economic development and local labor markets.

227

Toussaint-Comeau.indb 227

7/1/2009 11:16:55 AM

